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Preface
I have always been intrigued by medicine. When I was a 9-year old kid my father used to
come home exhausted after a night-long kidney transplant with blood on his scrubs whose
memory still haunts me today. The idea of working on the economics of organ donation and
transplantation came to me seven years ago while I was nearing to ﬁnish my graduate studies
in economics in Canada. I remember sharing my ideas with Harry Chartrand at the time, one
of the most eccentric and brilliant economists I've known, in long discussions over coﬀee.
At the beginning my intention was to work on technical areas which, I presume, would
be understood only by the few who are not interested in the most appalling and heartfelt
issues of the gift of life. As time passed by I was taken hold by the more practical issues and
decided to contribute to resolve the organ shortage conundrum by compiling my ideas and
knowledge of law and economics. This monograph is written over many sleepless nights. As I
kept reading and writing the contemplation of death settled in my life; not my own but those
of others. Writing and thinking about the dead made my journey a dark one through which I
occasionally abandoned myself to despair.
Organ donation and procurement is literally and metaphorically a matter of the heart.
Working on this subject has shaped the way I look into the transplant medicine. My journey
to write this thesis is ﬁlled with dualities. On one hand I am deeply troubled by the hypocrisy
of the status quo that eventually had to let thousands of patients die just because the current
system of gift giving cares more about the moral permissibility than about the life transplant
patients were striving for. On the other hand I think altruism is out there waiting to be tapped.
At the end, despite the statistical facts and allegedly happy transplant stories I was convinced
that transplant is only exchanging one medical condition for another which I thought I would
not exchange. Most would disagree with me on this matter.
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1. A Global Chronic Organ Shortage
Problem
Transplant technology may be compared to an evil genie let out of a bottle and now
won't return. Nancy Scheper-Hughes
1
1. A Global Chronic Organ Shortage Problem
1.1. The Demand for Transplantable Organs
Kidney transplantation is a well-known and routine treatment today for patients with ESRD.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, experiments in transplantation were conducted in
dogs by Emerich Ullmann and Alexis Carrel. Following these eﬀorts few attempts have been
made in France by Mathieu Jabolay to transplant kidneys from animals to humans, called
xenotransplantation. A number of transplants into humans were reported by Jaboulay in
1906 using pig and goat kidneys, followed by Ernst Unger in 1910 using kidney from a monkey
and by Harold Neuhof in 1923 using kidney from a lamb, all of which failed immediately
afterwards (Chavers, 2003; Papalois et al., 2003). The ﬁrst human-to-human kidney transplant
in the history was performed in Russia by Yu Yu Voronoy in 1936 from a cadaver. But the
patient died few days after the transplant. During the early years of human-to-human kidney
transplantation the organs were obtained from cadavers. Betwen 1951 and 1953 a dozen of
cadaveric kidney transplants were performed in France and the US. On December 1952, the
ﬁrst but unsuccessful living donor kidney transplant in the history was performed in Paris,
France. The recipient died after 21 days due to graft rejection. The series of transplants
in the early 1950s indicated that human-to-human transplantation was bound to fail due to
genetic mismatch and high indicence of organ rejection. It was not until 1954 that the ﬁrst
successful living donor kidney transplant in the history was performed by the 1990 Nobel
laureate Joseph Murray between genetically identical twins. The operation is considered to
be the ﬁrst of long-term success. Following Murray's success six similar transplants between
monozygotic twins were reported in 1958 (Chavers, 2003). However the long-term success of
transplants from dizygotic or unrelated donors was unattainable.
1.1.1. Immunosuppressive Therapy
The rejection of the transplanted organ by the immune system became a serious concern
because patients were dying after the transplant. In the late 1960s the inhibitor known as
Azathioprine was approved and used as the primary immunosuppressive agent to prevent
organ rejection. The development of Azathioprine was a breakthrough towards successful
kidney transplantation for patients with irreversible renal failure. However, for patients with
complicated kidney or other solid organ failures such as heart, liver or lung, transplantation
was not a viable option. Azathioprine either did not provide adequate immunosuppression at
2
1.1. The Demand for Transplantable Organs
reasonable doses or became toxic, resulting in serious kidney damage. Despite its limits the
ﬁrst pancreas, liver and heart transplants were performed by Richard Lillehei (1966), Thomas
Starzl (1967) and Christiaan Barnard (1967) respectively.
The research on transplant immunology aimed at ﬁnding a compund that could adequately
inhibit rejection while preserving other functions of the immune system. In the early 1970s,
Dr. Jean Borel developed an eﬀective drug called CSA that inhibits the rejection response
without damaging other functions of the immune system. CSA was used in pilot studies in
transplant patients who received cadaver kidneys. In these pilot studies CSA was found to
be toxic for the kidneys but contrary to Azathioprine provided adequate immunosuppression.
The routine use of CSA was initiated after its approval in the US in 1983 and enabled heart
and liver transplantation which were not possible a decade ago. During the early 1990s, the
research has focused on ﬁnding other compounds with similar immunosuppressive properties
such as Tacrolimus and Sirolimus which were approved in 1993 and 1999 respectively (Kamps,
2003). They have been used as the primary drugs in immunosuppression therapy today. The
discovery of suppressive agents made it possible to perform transplants without using blood-
related donors and greatly increased the number of transplants from biologically unrelated
donors and the survival rates. But the recipients were subject to post-transplant health risks
such as mild infection, common ﬂu-like diseases and intoxication due to the administration of
immunosuppressive drugs.
1.1.2. Determination of Brain Death
The extensive research and development on immunosupressive therapy and advances in trans-
plantation would not be possible unless the concept of brain death is deﬁned. The determi-
nation of death is thus important for medical reasons as well as for personal, social, religious,
moral and legal reasons (Ott, 1995). For centuries death was regarded as the cessation of
cardiorespiratory functions. According to this traditional deﬁnition death occurs by the ir-
reversible cessation of spontaneous respiration and circulation (Ott, 1995). Transplantation
of solid organs from cardiac-dead donors was not possible because heart, liver and lungs suf-
fered from irreversible damage caused by long periods of warm ischemia1. Advances in the
medical technology allowed the maintenance of cardiac and respiratory functions artiﬁcially
1Warm ischemia is the period an organ remains at the body temperature after its blood supply has been cut
oﬀ but before it is cooled or reconnected to a blood supply.
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through life-support machines even there is irreversible loss of brain function (Papalois and
Matas, 2003). The second deﬁnition of death is the death of the whole brain which is deﬁned
as the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain including the brain stem. In
1968, the ad hoc committee of Harvard Medical School declared this new criterion of brain
death (heart-beating donor) as the state of irreversible coma which stems from serious brain
hemorrhage. A similar criterion endorsed by the Conference of Royal Colleges and Faculties
was later adopted in the UK (Papalois and Matas, 2003). The deﬁnition of brain death was
oﬃcially ratiﬁed in France in 1968 followed by Finland in 1971, UK in 1976, US in 1981,
Sweden in 1988 and Japan in 1997. To this date, brain death has been a controversial issue
although it is unanimously accepted as certain death by the medical community. With the
emergence of the concept of brain death organ transplantation has become the hope of many
patients experiencing heart, lung, liver and pancreas failure.
1.1.3. Medical Technology
After 50 years of experience and knowledge transplantation of solid internal organs has become
a routine procedure performed in hundreds of transplant centers in western countries. While
the surgical techniques progressed as far as performing split liver transplants, recent attempts
have even succeeded in transplanting appendages such as hand and partial face in the US and
France in 1999 and 2005 respectively and penis in China in 2006. The determination of brain
death, the intensive research on immunosuppressive therapy and organ preservation together
with the advances in surgical techniques have largely led to the soaring of the demand for
transplantable human organs. At the root of this demand lies an increasing burden of disease
leading to organ failure, prevalent in developed western cultures and peculiarly pandemic in
the US.
1.1.4. Burden of Disease
Although there are many lifestyle-related, genetic or idiopathic factors that might lead to the
failure of a particular organ, certain known causes of organ failure are associated with today's
challenging public health issues such as obesity, diabetes and malnutrition. In the US where
data are readily available from the CDC, 2.5 percent of the US population was diagnosed
4
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with diabetes in 19802. In 2007, this share has doubled. Similarly, obesity continues to be a
public health concern in the US. More than 72 million people in the US were obese by 2006
and the prevalence of obesity has doubled since 1980. Higher incidence of obesity led to adult
diabetes and caused kidney failure in certain population groups. Rising incidence of obesity
further led to irreversible cardiovascular problems whose sole treatment is to receive a heart
transplant. Abuse of alcohol and narcotics leading to organ failure has largely contributed to
the increasing burden of disease and the rising demand for transplantable organs.
1.2. The Supply of Transplantable Organs
While the rise of the demand was unprecedented the supply of organs on the other hand
remained stagnant partly due to an inherent scarcity of donors and partly due to other fac-
tors. These factors could be marshalled as natural scarcity, altruism, organizational problems,
subjective judgments and governmental or policy problems.
1.2.1. Natural Scarcity
Elster (1992) distinguishes between three types of scarcity: strongly or weakly natural, quasi-
natural and artiﬁcial scarcity. Strong natural scarcity arises when there is nothing that can
be done to increase the supply. Weak natural scarcity arises when there is nothing that can
be done to increase the supply to the point of satiating everybody. Quasi-natural scarcity
arises when the supply could be increased possibly to the point of satiating the demand, but
only without imposing coercion. Finally artiﬁcial scarcity arises when the supply could be
increased to the level of satiating all the demand if the government allows so. In the case
of transplantable organs the type of scarcity depends on the source of human organs. Under
deceased donation the supply of organs represents a weak natural scarcity. The reason is
that the supply of cadavers cannot satiate the entire demand for transplantable organs simply
because the likelihood of dying under circumstances that would render an individual's organs
suitable for transplantation is very low3. On the other hand under living organ donation the
supply of organs (kidney) represents a quasi-natural scarcity because it could be increased
2http://www.cdc.org
3Howard and Byrne (2007) estimate that the probability that a person will become a potential donor at some
point during her lifetime is 0.0028.
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by a set of diﬀerent strategies without taking coercive actions. The supply of transplantable
human organs, living or deceased, thus represents a quasi-natural scarcity (Koch, 2002)4.
1.2.2. Altruism
Altruism can be broadly deﬁned in two ways. The ﬁrst deﬁnition has been adopted by evo-
lutionary biologists who deﬁne it entirely in terms of survival and reproduction. Accordingly,
an altruist is someone who increases the ﬁtness of others at the expense of decreasing his own.
The second deﬁnition has been adopted by sociologists and psychologists who deﬁne it in terms
of the motives which do not necessarily require a cost to the giver (Healy, 2006). Healy (2004)
posits that altruism seeks to increase another's welfare, not one's own; it is a voluntary and
intentional action meant to help someone else without expecting external rewards. According
to Piliavin and Charng (1990), diﬀerent deﬁnitions of altruism from a wide range of disciplines
have been presented so far, some of them sharing the emphasis only on the costs of the actions
to the altruist and some of them emphasizing both the costs and the motives of the altruist. It
is acknowledged that there are many kinds of altruism5. Although altruism is believed to have
some hereditary components, much of the literature suggests that it cannot be described solely
by individual behavior or by innate components but it also depends on the social context in
which it is highly institutionalized.
In the book on the eﬀects of organ transplantation, Simmons et al. (1987) found that the
decision to premortem donate a kidney is often made instantaneously as an impulsive response
to urgency. It is documented that situational factors of altruism play an important role in
donation such that the likelihood of donating a kidney, knowing the presence of others who
might donate, decreases almost linearly with the number of potential known donors. When a
donor believes that there are others (bystander eﬀect) who can donate, the urge or the pressure
to help the patient diminishes.
4If governments could provide monetary or otherwise incentives for organ donation the supply of organs could
be increased to the point of meeting the entire demand and the distinction between quasi-natural and
artiﬁcial scarcity becomes blurry (Elster, 1992).
5Hill (1984) states that altruistic behavior arises in response to perceived social expectations; Wilson (1976)
postulates hard core altruism as the irrational and unilateral act regarding others; Sober (1988) diﬀerentiates
between evolutionary altruism which emphasizes the consequences to the altruist and the recipient, arisen
as an impulse in cases of emergency and vernacular altruism in which the altruist is motivated to beneﬁt
others.
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1.2.3. Organizational Problems
Organ procurement is a very complex phenomenon that enhances altruism and treats it as
a resource-extraction problem (Healy, 2006). Organizational problems initially emerge in
the eﬀorts of hospital and physicians in identifying potential donors. This identiﬁcation is
contingent upon an individual mostly going through a violent accident and being brought to
a hospital by law. Converting an accident victim into a donor therefore requires the hospital
and the procurement teams to overcome tight schedules and other organizational challenges
(Healy, 2006). First, a group of doctors who are unrelated to the procurement process must
determine if brain death has occurred based on explicitly deﬁned medical criteria. This process
can take from seconds to few days depending on the medical criteria of brain death, related
protocols and on the type and severity of brain injury. During this period the body cannot
breathe on its own and it is kept alive on life-support machines in order to preserve the organs.
Once brain death is conﬁrmed the physician who is responsible from the brain-dead patient is
required to inform the OPO or the relevant authority about a potential donation. Sometimes
patient referral becomes uncomfortable for the physician because of the reluctance to give
away the organs of the patient they were trying to save and to engage in more work by doing
so (Thorne, 1998).
Hospitals, physicians and organ procurers are not only delegated to solve the logistic prob-
lems of preserving and transporting suitable organs but they must also obtain consent from
the next-of-kin (Healy, 2006). Numerous studies have shown that medical professionals fall
inadequate in obtaining consent from the next-of-kin either because they do not know how
to obtain permission in a competent manner or they ask for permission in such a way that
causes refusal or they do not have the suﬃcient knowledge of the procurement process. The
incompetence of physicians in obtaining consent lies in the manner they approach the family.
Therefore questions like do you have any reason to think the donor would have objected?
or can we have your permission to collect the decedent's organs? or you don't want to
give away any of his parts, do you? make a substantial diﬀerence in obtaining consent from
the donor's family (Healy, 2004). On the other hand, asking permission for organ removal is
extremely diﬃcult for physicians who are responsible for the treatment of the brain injured
patient (Matas et al., 1985; Breyer and Kliemt, 2007). This problem becomes compounding
upon the pressure exerted by transplant teams to hasten the declaration of brain-death and
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the consent phase (Barber, 2007). The bereavement and mourning of the family is exacerbated
when physician broaches the subject of donation. Most importantly there is an insurmountable
resistance, not only from the families but also from nurses, even doctors against the concept
of brain death although it has been medically accepted as certain death.
Once the family consents to donate the donor's medical history must be known. This
includes history of malignancy, alcohol and drug abuse, incidence of diabetes, HIV, hepatitis
B and C and other risk factors or diseases pertinent to the organ under consideration. For
each donor that passes the medical clearance potential recipients are ranked on the waiting list
according to the blood type, histocompatibility of the donated organ, the size of the organ,
the medical urgency of the patient, the time on the waiting list, the distance between the
donor and the recipient and other speciﬁc case-by-case criteria. Once a potential recipient is
located and matched to a recipient, the doctor who is in charge of the recipient should quickly
decide whether to accept or reject the oﬀered organ. If the organ is turned down the next
most suitable patient is contacted. If the organ is accepted the donor must be transported to
a hospital for the transplant where two transplant teams must be ready for the extraction and
the transplantation of organs. These steps must be completed in a very short period to keep
the donor's organs viable. A poorly managed procurement process is likely to compromise
the transplantation and will keep the procurement rates down. Organizational problems that
are associated with artiﬁcial scarcity could be reduced by eﬃcient, if not socially acceptable,
policy measures (Koch, 2002).
1.2.4. Subjective Judgments
An equally powerful factor contributing to the paucity of the supply of transplantable human
organs is the subjective judgments of individuals. While the medical community contends that
amending the organizational deﬁciencies of organ procurement could substantially increase
procurement rates, such a strategy would be conditional upon identifying why people are
reluctant to donate. When the concept of brain death has become the key for non-renal
transplantation, the public debate was surrounded by the controversial issues in the deﬁnition
and in the determination of brain death. Among others, potential donors feared that their
organs can be procured prematurely before brain death occured. This fear of premature
determination of death discouraged potential donors to sign up for organ donation and was
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largely associated with the failure to contemplate with one's own death and the wide spread
tendency to avoid the discussion of post-mortem donation with the relatives. Most of the
research on attitudes towards donation ﬁnds that refusals happen because of irrational beliefs
and unarticulated fears about organ donation which may be responsible for low donation rates
(Healy, 2006).
Although the extent of the negative impact of religious beliefs on organ donation was rela-
tively small, certain religious groups refused to donate in particular or opposed transplantation
altogether. For instance, Jehovah's witnesses' opposition to blood transfusion has become an
obstacle for a successful transplantation even though they do not oppose transplantation.
Christian Scientists on the other hand refuse medical treatment altogether. Similarly the
Shinto tradition in Japan and the views of the Orthodox Judaism towards deceased donation
rendered transplantation of cadaver organs impossible.
Surveys of Gallup showed that extremely low donation rates in the US have also been
associated with the lack of trust in the health care system especially among ethnic minorities.
African-Americans in the US are known for their mistrust in the health care system because it
treats minorities unfairly and discriminates in favor of white population. A general mistrust in
the health care system causes ethnic minorities and other vulnerable strata of the population
to oppose donation even transplantation.
1.2.5. Governmental/Policy Problems
In economies run by in-kind transactions severe restrictions and transaction costs are imposed
by the double coindicence of wants problem caused by the improbability of the wants, needs or
events that motivate an exchange. Therefore in the absence of money, a necessary condition
is that the service each party is willing to exchange must be exactly what the other party is
demanding or supplying at the same time and the same place. Because of these transaction
costs money tends to emerge naturally as a medium of exchange in in-kind economies. Current
organ procurement systems are no diﬀerent because they are based on altruism and gift-giving.
A sale prohibition imposed by the government on the mediation of wants and needs, ampliﬁed
by an increasing demand for transplants caused patients to seek organs through illegal means.
This government prohibition on the mediation of wants and needs further led to the emergence
of a growing body of policy proposals.
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The policy proposals in the exchange of human organs have polarized in a considerable
number of mutually exclusive policy prescriptions in lieu of a system based on pure altruism.
These proposals ranged from conscription on one hand to competitive markets on the other
and enabled the growth of a proliﬁc literature on the ﬁnancial incentives and their economic,
legal and human consequences. The majority of economists and legal scholars contends that
a zero-price policy imposed by the government has been responsible for low donation rates
and rent-seeking in secondary markets (i.e. dialysis); thus if liberalization was allowed by
introducing money organ shortages and the suﬀering of the many could have been reduced
greatly if not completely eliminated. On the other hand, a handful of economists argue that
the government prohibition is a mere reﬂection of the underlying causes of shortages which may
be rectiﬁed without resorting to markets. These causes are mostly related to organizational
problems and ineﬀective management of the procurement processes. Market reforms have also
been criticized by many non-economists in terms of justice, fairness, issues of morality and
legal and political reasons.
1.3. The Emergence of Organ Shortage
During the early years there was no apparent discrepancy between the number of organ donors
and the number of recipients. Advances in the transplant technology caused a boost in the
demand for transplants. Let alone brain death, the medical conditions necessary to be eligible
for a cadaveric organ donation were strict and the supply of organs has fallen short of the
demand as more and more people were experiencing organ failure. The supply of and the
demand for organs moving in opposite directions caused long waiting lists in many countries.
Increasing organ shortage has become a major policy issue within the last two decades
and drastic measures had to be taken to stabilize the demand and/or to increase the pool
of transplantable organs. On the demand side patients who were previously listed have been
removed after transplant coordinators have strengthened the medical conditions necessary to
remain on the waiting list. Patients suﬀering from renal failure have remained on dialysis unless
they had no choice but transplant. While medical requirements for patients were getting strict,
they were loosened for donors. Individuals who have not been considered as viable donors due
to old age and poor quality of organs have been considered as donors, known as ECD. The
age limit has been dropped and a more subjective case-by-case evaluation has been used to
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locate potential donor organs. Although some surgeons have declined organs of poor quality
for their relatively healthier patients, most of them have become willing to use organs that
they previously would have rejected (Howard, 2002). As the medical technology advanced,
non-heart beating donors (cardiac death) have been used in addition to heart-beating donors
(brain death). A series of donor awareness programs and national initiatives for organ donation
have been implemented to overcome misconceptions and subjective judgments of individuals.
Donor awareness programs in many ways emphasized that organ donation is a gift of life.
In countries particularly where religion was thought to be the major obstacle for donation,
leaders of major denominations stated that donation is an act of supremacy encouraged by
most religious doctrines.
Figure 1.1.: The number of transplants performed in the US and Europe 1995-2009
Despite these eﬀorts to match the demand with the supply the number of patients on the
waiting list has kept its steady rise and the supply of organs remained relatively ﬂat causing
an increasing gap. This led to an increase in the average waiting time for a transplantable
organ. Consequently some patients died while waiting on the list and others experienced a
signiﬁcant loss or a permanent reduction in health. In the year 2003-2004, the median waiting
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time for a liver transplant in the US ranged from 6 to 642 days and the median time for a
kidney transplant reached almost 2000 days.
Figure 1.1 shows the number and the growth rate of transplants performed in the US and the
EuroTransplant area6. In both regions the number of transplants shows similar upward trends
with a 15-year growth rate of 46 and 42 percent respectively in the US and the EuroTransplant
area. However, the waiting list in the US grew tremendously by 172 percent from 1995 to 2009
while this ﬁgure was only 33 percent in the EuroTransplant area.
Figure 1.2.: The size of the waiting lists in the US and Europe, 1995-2009
As of November 2010, there are over 117, 000 patients in the US and over 40, 000 patients in
Europe waiting for a transplant. In the US, 32, 000 patients have been added to the waiting
list in the year 2009 and almost 7, 000 patients have died due to organ failure while waiting
on the list the same year. 94, 000 patients died between 1995 and 2009 while waiting for a
life-saving organ in the US only, representing a 94 percent increase in the waiting list deaths
over the 15-year period7. In contrast deaths on the waiting list grew only 14 percent during
6The EuroTransplant area consists of Belgium, Croatia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and
Slovenia.
7This ﬁgure amounts to more than twice the number of terrorism fatalities in the entire world in the last
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this period in the EuroTransplant area.
Figure 1.3.: The number of deaths on the backlog in the US and Europe, 1995-2009
1.4. Central Contribution
This research aims to propose policy prescriptions through supply-driven regulatory, legislative
and institutional changes that would directly or indirectly help eliminate the organ shortage
and the traﬃcking of human organs. Organ shortage not only concerns medical profession-
als but also economists, legal scholars, sociologists, bioethicists, philosophers, policy makers,
bureaucrats, philanthropists and most importantly patients and their families. However the di-
mensions of the issue are countless, leaving some of the topics unaddressed. Although there are
numerous factors leading to an ever-increasing gap between the supply of and the demand for
human organs, this study almost exclusively focuses on governmental/policy problems related
to the supply of human organs and does not investigate demand-related problems, demand-
side remedies, managerial, organizational or consensual issues in the supply of organs. As far
as the disciplinary dimensions of this research are concerned, this study strictly deals with
forty years which was only 35, 000.
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the legal and the socio-economic issues in the supply of organs including but not limited to,
the allocation of organs, monetary and non-monetary incentives, default rules, legislations and
institutions. Under the aforementioned framework the central contribution of this monograph
is to present an economic analysis of the legal and the policy-related aspects of organ pro-
curement in order to alleviate the repercussions of persistent organ shortages that have been
experienced throughout the world.
The research examines the legal and economic aspects of organ procurement in three com-
plementary dimensions. The ﬁrst two of these dimensions are concerned with deceased and
living donor organ procurement systems that are either legislated and well-established or dis-
cussed at length without further action. The third dimension focuses on black markets and
the traﬃcking in humans for the purposes of organ removal.
Chapter 2 reviews eleven deceased organ procurement policies that have been proposed
in the literature. These are presumed and informed consent, mandated choice, conscription,
reciprocal systems (opt-in, opt-out), free market, government monopsony, future delivery mar-
kets (opt-in, opt-out) and reimbursement schemes. Each policy is evaluated by invoking to an
axiomatic approach which takes into account three important and detailed notions of policy
evalution: equity, eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness. An axiomatic approach not only oﬀers a system-
atic and complete treatment for policy evaluation but also allows exploring notions of fairness
and justice which may be highly relevant in the assessment of social welfare. Furthermore by
drawing upon a survey conducted in the city of Bursa, Turkey, chapter 2 attempts to broaden
the literature by testing the crowding-out hypothesis in free markets and its impact on the
market price and on the resulting number of transplants.
The chronic organ shortage has become a daunting health policy issue in Europe, the US
and other western countries. In most of the European countries, deceased organ procurement
is based on the principle of presumed consent on the anticipation that it could yield higher
deceased donation rates. Following the success of the few, a great debate has emerged about
whether the default rule itself could be responsible for higher deceased procurement rates. For
this purpose Chapter 3 purports to advance the literature on the impact of presumed consent
laws on deceased donation rates by examining the interactions between a presumed consent
legal regime, role of the family and donor registry systems using an international dataset for 24
countries over a 14-year period. The chapter contributes to the existing empirical literature in
two respects. First it is argued that the impact of presumed consent laws on deceased donations
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depends on various institutional settings which have not been explicitly modeled previously.
Second in a setting in which laws and institutions show no variance overtime, failure to control
for the unobserved country heterogeneity will lead to misleading inference regarding the impact
of presumed consent legislation. Thus instead of a FE model it is worthwhile to employ a three-
stage error component estimator which controls for the unobserved country heterogeneity and
still identiﬁes the impact of presumed consent legislation on deceased donation rates.
Living donation diﬀers signiﬁcantly from deceased donation both in terms of the organs in
question as well as in terms of the denouement of the donor. A decade ago market reforms
or revising the allocation rather than the procurement was out of the scope of the debate
because the former raised ethical issues and the latter raised equity concerns. As backlogs
continued to grow faster than the number of transplantable organs, some scholars proposed
minor compensation or a regulated market while others advocated that the current system
of living donor organ procurement could be developed to its full potential by rectifying an
eﬃcient allocation of organs from living donors. These allocation mechanisms developed in an
attempt to transplant formerly medically incompatible kidneys by exchanging donors. Chapter
4 reviews ﬁve living donor organ procurement policies in this respect, namely monopsony,
reimbursement, PKE, NEAD chain and list donation, all of which have been implemented in
several countries and proposes potentially eﬀective solutions in order to increase the number
of kidneys recovered from living donors.
It has been known that individuals willing to become living donors are exposed to serious
ﬁnancial and medical risks and that these risks may generate disincentives or barriers to do-
nation. An increasing number of proposals emphasizes the need to introduce reimbursement
for living donors for non-medical costs incurred throughout the process of donation. In the
US, a number of states passed legislation that allows individuals to take paid leave of absence
and/or to claim a $10, 000 tax deduction following organ or bone marrow donation. How-
ever, the impact of reimbursement legislation on living donation rates has not been studied
extensively so far. By using a dataset from the US for 50 states and the District of Columbia
over a 22-year period, chapter 5 aims to provide some preliminary empirical evidence on the
extent to which reimbursement legislation is eﬀective in increasing biological and unrelated
living donation rates. Chapter 5 also aims to investigate the overall impact of an eﬃcient
organ allocation mechanism known as PKE on living donation rates and test the existence of
two donor substitution eﬀects.
15
1. A Global Chronic Organ Shortage Problem
Chapter 6 is devoted to the legal and the economic aspects of organ traﬃcking. The ﬁrst
part examines the topology of illicit markets, the motivations behind the sale and the pur-
chase of human organs. The second part discusses the legal instruments and the international
standards set by the UN, the WHO and the COE. A comparative analysis of criminal provi-
sions for thirty-eight countries suggests that despite organ traﬃcking being an international
crime, legislations concerning such criminal activities are local with suboptimal sanctions and
inadequate provisions of enforcement. This problem not only requires the identiﬁcation of an
optimal magnitude and mix of penalty that should be imposed on oﬀenders but also necessi-
tates the distinction between criminal agents and severe and otherwise punishable violations.
The third part develops a simple model of law enforcement to address these issues.
The seventh and the ﬁnal chapter summarizes the ﬁndings of the research, recommends
supply-side policy prescriptions in order to help alleviate the persistent global organ shortage
problem and discusses the future of organ procurement and the potential consequences of
market reforms. Interested readers are advised to consult the appendices of this monograph
for a detailed account of the laws governing deceased organ donation and procurement, the
legislation related to reimbursement of living donors and the criminal provisions against the
commercialization of human organs in selected countries.
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A controversial organ donation ad by the French Association of Human Organ and Tissue Dona-
tion (ADOT)
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Dead bodies do not speak. But the relatives can be quite expressive. Michele
Goodwin
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2.1. An Axiomatic Approach
Various incentives have been proposed to increase the supply of transplantable human organs.
These policy proposals diverge from one another primarily in terms of the source the organs
are extracted from. The majority of patients waiting for a transplant in Europe as well as in
the US needs kidneys which can be procured from brain-dead and living donors. However for
other solid organs such as hearts, lungs, intestines and pancreas, a deceased donor is currently
the only source.
This chapter develops a comprehensive and axiomatic approach to evaluate the existing
and alternative deceased organ procurement policies in detail given widely debated concerns
and constraints on procurement. An axiomatic approach for policy evaluation classiﬁes and
studies the properties of deceased organ procurement policies that capture a certain number of
normative and positive notions of what policy evaluation entails. The approach sets out axioms
or properties an organ procurement policy may or may not satisfy and determines the extent
to which a policy is more preferable than others. Although an axiomatic approach may not be
a welfarist policy assessment for it introduces non-individualistic elements of social welfare, it
has few merits to mention in the case of organ procurement. First an axiomatic approach not
only oﬀers a systematic and complete treatment for policy evaluation but also allows exploring
the notions of fairness and justice which may be highly relevant in the assessment of social
welfare1. In the delicate and controversial area of organ procurement, individuals, governments
and policymakers may derive higher utility if a policy takes into account the notions of justice
and fairness which may also constrain individuals who cannot be trusted to use their discretion
to maximize social welfare (Kaplow and Shavell, 2001). Second in the face of widely-enforced
prohibition for explicit payment, it becomes inestimable to evalutate monetary policies with
supporting evidence from the pilot studies and experiments which are also prohibited by law.
In the lack of substantive evidence either through experiments or through experience, it may
be useful to invoke an axiomatic approach.
The following axioms are derived from the concepts conventionally used in health care and
some of them are modiﬁed in order to capture the peculiarities of organ procurement.
1Kaplow and Shavell (2001) shows that any non-welfarist approach to policy assessment may sometimes
require the adoption of a policy that makes everyone worse-oﬀ therefore violates the Pareto principle.
20
2.1. An Axiomatic Approach
Axiom 1: Equity
An OPP is equitable if the policy:
(i) does not discriminate based on gender, ethnicity, race, religion, social class or other
minorities (non-discrimination)2,
(ii) does not force a party to behave involuntarily through action or inaction provided that a
choice has been given (non-coercion),
(iii) respects the will of the patient (autonomy),
(iv) treats unequals (i.e. donors and non-donors) diﬀerently (vertical equity),
(v) treats equals (i.e. donors or non-donors) similarly and gives equal transplant access for
equal need (horizontal equity)3.
Deﬁnition: Pareto Superiority and Optimality
Suppose that there are two policies that result in states SA and SB. Let Ui denote the utility
of agent i. A state SA is called Pareto superior to SB if Ui (SA) ≥ Ui (SB) ∀i . This means that
the state SA increases at least one person's utility without adversely aﬀecting the utility of
others. If SA is Pareto superior to SB, than SB is Pareto inferior to SA. A state is called Pareto
optimal if no further distributions are capable of enhancing everyone's welfare without making
someone else worse oﬀ. Thus Pareto optimal outcomes has no outcomes Pareto superior to
them (Coleman, 2002; Feldman and Serrano, 2006)4.
Axiom 2: Eﬃciency
An OPP is eﬃcient if:
(i) it is Pareto optimal5;
2A policy may discriminate based on medical criteria and may not adhere to an individual's notions of fairness.
However medical discrimination is imperative in healthcare and therefore it is an irrelevant criterion.
3See Mooney and McIntyre (2007).
4According to Pareto (1906) "... the members of a collectivity enjoy maximum ophelimity (economic satis-
faction) in a certain position when it is impossible to ﬁnd a way of moving from that position ... in such a
manner that the ophelimity enjoyed by each of the individuals ... increases or decreases. That is to say, any
small displacement in departing from that position necessarily has the eﬀect of increasing the ophelimity
which certain individuals enjoy, and decreasing that which others enjoy, of being agreeable to some, and
disagreeable to others." (Pareto, 1906, p:261). Allais (1943) states that an allocation is Pareto optimal if
there is an absence of a set of mutually beneﬁcial (non-harmful) exchanges between individuals which he
calls distributable surplus.
5Conventionally in law and economics the Kaldor-Hick criterion is used to assess the eﬃciency of a policy or a
legal rule. However, Kaldor-Hicks criterion is intransitive and lenient whereas Pareto criterion is transitive
and strict (Coleman, 2003). Under Pareto criterion, if policy A is Pareto superior to policy B and policy B
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(ii) the allocation rule, by which organs are distributed, enables higher donor-recipient tissue
compatibility or match relative to another allocation rule (distributionally eﬃcient)6.
Axiom 3: Cost-Eﬀectiveness
An OPP is cost-eﬀective relative to another OPP if the organ procurement is achieved at a
lower cost given the number of transplants is ﬁxed; or if an OPP yields a higher number of
transplants given the cost of transplant is ﬁxed7.
The following sections of this chapter review ﬁve principal deceased OPPs that have been
either implemented or proposed and attempt to evaluate them based on the aforementioned
criteria. These policies can be broadly classiﬁed as OPPs based on defaults, compulsion,
reciprocity, contemporaneous market and future delivery market.
2.2. Policies based on common pool allocation
Transplantable human cadaver organs are a typical example of privately owned common-
pool resource characterized by rivalry and excludability. Due to their excludability, access
to such privately owned common-pool resources can either be available to everybody through
compulsion or default, or to a group of users based on their willingness to contribute to the
common pool.
is Pareto superior to policy C, then policy A is also Pareto superior to policy C. As for the Kaldor-Hicks
eﬃciency, both policy A and policy C can be Kaldor-Hicks eﬃcient to one another (Scitovsky, 1941). The
discussion of Pareto eﬃciency of OPPs is reserved for Section 2.4.
6An OPP is characterized by the following three mutually exclusive rules in organ allocation. Organs can be
allocated according to medical criteria; organs can be allocated based on the ability to pay; or organs can be
allocated on a priority basis deﬁned by non-medical or non-ﬁnancial criteria. Distributional eﬃciency is a
relative notion; therefore policy A may be distributionally more eﬃcient than policy B but distributionally
less eﬃcient than policy C. A change from one allocation rule to another does not have to actually yield
higher compatibility; for our purposes it is suﬃcient that such possibility exists.
7Cost-eﬀectiveness analysis compares the relative costs and outcomes of two policies. Let CA and CB denote
the costs and QA and QB denote the outcomes of two policies, A and B. A switch from policy A to policy B
is assessed by the cost-eﬀectiveness ratio: (CB − CA) / (QB −QA). In this chapter, we provide a descriptive
and theoretical evaluation of cost-eﬀectiveness rather than an empirical and technical one which requires
measurement. Policy A may be more cost-eﬀective than policy B but less cost-eﬀective than policy C;
for our purposes it is suﬃcient to show that policy A is more or less cost-eﬀective than policy B without
referring to the extent of this eﬀectiveness.
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2.2.1. Default Rules (Presumed vs. Informed Consent)
Default rules are constructed to aﬀect the behavior and they can aﬀect the choice in three ways.
First, default rule implies a suggestion or a recommended action for the decision maker. In
the context of organ procurement this recommended action might be based on the severity of
organ shortage and what the majority of the society thinks of organ donation. Second, decision
making is costly, disconcerting and stressful while remaining at the default is costless and easy.
Acting in a way so as to not remain at the default usually implies the contemplation of one's
own death and what would happen to their bodies after death, which may be unpleasant.
Opting out of the default rule also implies that the individual bears some physical costs (i.e.
time and eﬀort) in a way similar to shoe-leather costs. Third, changes in the default rules
involve a trade-oﬀ between a satisfaction and a loss. Becoming a donor yields a satisfaction
and induces a contemplation that their organs might beneﬁt those who need them. Becoming
a donor also drives individuals to think that their body will no longer be intact for burial
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2004).
In criminal law the presumption of innocence states that one is considered innocent unless
proven guilty. By setting the default rule to innocence, the burden of proof is shifted onto
prosecution which has to collect evidence to confute innocence. In the medical literature
concerning emergency room procedures, doctors attempt to save the patient's life unless an
advance directive of DNR by the (formerly competent) patient has been given. Thus it is
assumed that people would want to be saved in case of medical emergency. By setting the
default rule to resuscitation, the burden of proof is shifted onto those who do not want their
lives to be saved. In the context of organ donation two types of default rules loom, known as
presumed and informed consent and the way default rules are constructed changes the choice
thus the number of individuals onto whom the burden of proof is shifted.
In presumed consent or opt-out regimes, a brain-dead individual whose organs are suitable
for transplantation is considered to be a donor unless she premortem took an aﬃrmative action
to revoke it. Therefore it is presumed that the deceased donor does not have any objection
to have her organs removed unless she stated a preference to not donate by registering as a
non-donor, by holding a signed organ retainer card, by checking a box on driver's licence or
by objecting orally in front of a civil servant (Jacob, 2006). Countries, in which the default
rule is to donate, assign property rights of human organs to the public domain (Tietzel, 2001).
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Furthermore, an opt-out rule implicitly assumes that there is a social inclination towards organ
donation but people cannot come forward with an explicit donation decision due to a number
of psychological reasons and subjective judgments such as the fear to contemplate one's death,
the lack of trust and wrongful determination of death. By presuming consent the burden of
proof is shifted onto those who strictly dissent the idea of donation.
On the contrary, in informed consent or opt-in regime an individual is required to take an
explicit aﬃrmative action by registering herself to the national registry of donors or by holding
a donor card. Therefore an individual who is not registered in the system is assumed to not
donate her organs upon demise. Countries, in which the default rule is not donate, implicitly
assume that there is a social reluctance towards organ donation.
Table 2.1.: Defaults and types of errors
Realization Intention
Donor Non-donor
Donor Correct mistaken removal, wrongful
Non-donor mistaken non-removal, wasteful Correct
Table 2.1 displays the types of errors that might be committed when the donor intention and
the donor realization do not match. Irrespective of the default rule and all else equal an OPP
will always respect patient autonomy whenever patient intention is honored. Accordingly,
both the removal of a donor organ and the non-removal of a non-donor organ are correct
practices respecting patient autonomy. Oﬀ these conditions two types of errors prevail. First,
the organs of a patient who is a non-donor might be removed by mistake, called mistaken
removal or erroneous donation (Gill, 2004; Orentlicher, 2008). In this case the procurement is
said to be wrongful because the removal is against the patient's will and it invades one's body.
The second type of error occurs when the hospital fails to remove the organs of a patient who
is a donor, called mistaken non-removal or erroneous non-donation (Gill, 2004; Orentlicher,
2008). In this case the procurement is said to be wasteful because at least one transplant
patient could have been saved if the donor organs had been removed. Mistaken non-removals
are also socially more costly than mistaken removals because a wasteful procurement indicates
that the patients whose lives could have been saved will continue to receive cost-ineﬀective
treatment instead of receiving transplants.
Proponents of presumed consent regime contend that mistaken-removals and mistaken non-
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removals are equally worse therefore one should base the default rule so as to produce the least
number of errors (Gill, 2004); or equivalently so as to maximize the number of people whose
wishes are respected (Orentlicher, 2008).
On the other hand, opponents of presumed consent argue that mistaken removals and mis-
taken non-removals are not equivalent in value and the default rule aﬀects the probability of
error. When the prosecution mistakenly convicts an innocent person or mistakenly acquits a
guilty person, both legal mistakes are deemed to be wrongful however mistaken convictions are
considered to be worse than mistaken acquittals. Similarly, mistaken removals are considered
to be worse than mistaken non-removals because in the former the body of a deceased person
is invaded but in the latter there is only a forgone transplant even though neither mistakes
respect patient autonomy (Gill, 2004).
Under a presumed consent default rule there will be more mistaken removals than mistaken
non-removals. Thus those who remain at the default are more likely to be subject to wrongful
procurement. On the other hand under an informed consent rule there will be more mistaken
non-removals than mistaken removals. Thus the organs of those who remain at the default
are more likely to be wasted. If people tend to be loss averse, then the discomfort of the idea
of having one's organs removed mistakenly may be greater than the discomfort of the idea of
mistakenly not removing a donor's organs (Orentlicher, 2008). Therefore loss aversion makes
mistaken removals more serious than mistaken non-removals.
The lack of decision-making capacity of brain-injured patients makes organ donation a
special case that creates an ambiguity over the assignment of property rights of the body
of the deceased. Even if the brain-injured patient declared an advance directive, the ﬁnal
decision is made by a surrogate. In legal contexts the decisive criteria of the surrogate when
the patient is no longer competent is largely determined by the substituted judgment standard.
This approach states that the duty of the surrogate, with or without the aid of an advance
directive by the formerly competent patient, is to determine given the best available knowledge
what the patient would have wanted if she had the decision-making capacity (Brostrom, 2007).
Substituted judgment standard therefore implicitly indicates that the surrogate decision-maker
should be the person who has the most accurate information about the wishes of the patient,
which follows a chain of priority from spouse to parent to kin. Although an advance directive
made by registering as a donor or by holding a donor card is almost never a suﬃcient reason
for procurement, it signals the donor preferences to the next-of-kin.
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Both presumed and informed consent regimes are non-discriminatory against gender, eth-
nicity, race or social class if and only if the public is well informed about the law and potential
organ retainers are informed on how to register an objection under the former legislative de-
fault. Jacob (2006) argues that in countries where opt-out must be indicated on a driver's
licence or identity card, it is not possible for a homeless person to express an opposition against
donation. When the opposition must be given in writing, less-educated, illiterate persons or
people with vision or hearing impairment face similar obstacles (Verheijde et al., 2009). In
countries where the default rule is to not donate, vulnerable populations also face similar bar-
riers for donation. However, loss aversion renders not being able to oppose donation worse
than not being able to consent to donation. Thus Jacob (2006) asserts that an informed con-
sent policy better protects vulnerable populations and suggests that the default rule should
be chosen based on the merits of contract law in such a way that it is against the wishes of the
stronger party in donation decisions. She contends that the burden of proof should be placed
upon physicians to obtain consent for organ donation.
Critics argue that presumed consent legislation is constitutionally questionable because it
violates persons' wishes about what should happen to their bodies after demise thus it un-
dermines patient autonomy (Veatch and Pitt, 1995). On the other hand, proponents argue
that individuals are given the opportunity to opt-out so that patient autonomy is not violated
(Jensen, 2000). It is acknowledged that the issue of patient autonomy is not so easily dismissi-
ble given the interference of the family in the decision-making. Neither presumed nor informed
consent regimes may respect patient autonomy if families are allowed to veto donation because
there is a probability that the wish of an individual to become a donor or non-donor might be
overridden by the family8. The probability of family veto could be reduced, if not completely
eliminated, by implementing other strategies that send prodonation signals to the next-of-kin.
These signaling strategies consist of establishing a donor registry, signing a donor card or im-
plementing donor awareness programs. The extent to which these legislative defaults diverge
from one another with respect to patient autonomy is determined by the actual number of
family veto cases.
Both informed and presumed consent regimes are non-coercive and horizontally equitable
because no one is forced given they are informed about the policy. The reason is that the organs
8Fevrier and Gay (2005) contends that when the family has the same preferences as the donor, both regimes
respect the will of the individual. However when the family has diﬀerent preferences, neither informed nor
presumed consent respects personal autonomy.
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of those who objected to donation are generally not removed in the latter regime and the organs
of those who consented to donation are generally removed in the former regime. Whether the
default rule complies with the concept of horizontal equity is bound to disagreements for two
reasons. First, the probability of committing a legal mistake under both regimes is non-zero.
Second, the opinion of the family may change the outcome under both regimes. On the other
hand, a presumed consent regime violates vertical equity by setting the default rule to opt-out
so that those who did not object and those who did not object yet did not intend to be a
donor are treated the same. In contrast, in an informed consent regime only those who take
an action by registering are assumed to donate. Therefore an informed consent legislation is
vertically equitable9. Under presumed and informed consent regimes the recovered organs are
distributed based on medical compatibility and need.
A presumed consent regime may be productively more or less eﬃcient than an informed
consent regime depending on the relative costs of procurement. These costs largely depend on
the societal tendency towards donation, the rate of family refusal and the registry maintenance
costs. Intuitively, if the society favors donation in general and there is a single registry but
also the family consent rate is high, one expects the presumed consent regime to be more
productively eﬃcient that an informed consent regime. The reason is that by presuming
consent the costs of establishing and maintaining a donor registry are saved. A high family
consent rate also implies relatively low costs of physician training for requesting consent. On
the other hand if the society disfavors donation and there is a combined registry but also the
family consent rate is low, then an informed consent may be productively more eﬃcient than
a presumed consent.
Recently, there is a growing empirical studies literature that focuses on the eﬀectiveness of
presumed and informed consent regimes on deceased donation rates (Johnson and Goldstein,
2004; Abadie and Gay, 2006; Neto et al., 2007). These studies show that presumed consent
regime exhibits higher donation rates compared to informed consent regimes after controlling
for a large set of potential factors that might aﬀect donation rates, thus a presumed consent
9It could be argued that an informed consent regime may violate vertical equity for if someone is willing to
donate but did not opt-in, he/she would be treated the same as a deliberate non-donor. However, it is
the reasons to not opt-in that aﬀect whether the legislative default is responsible for the inequity (if any)
because it then determines what is the source of such inequitable outcome. As much as the burden of
proof is on those who strictly dissent donation in a presumed consent regime and the default is no action,
many individuals do not or cannot opt-out, not because they choose not to donate but because of reasons
exacerbated or induced by presuming will to donate. On the contrary those reasons do not hold true for
and are not induced by the informed consent regime per se.
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regime could be eﬀective in eliminating shortages10.
2.2.2. Mandated Choice
Mandated choice requires every individual to state a preference by urging them to register as
either donors or non-donors. According to the AMA (1994), the reluctance to contemplate
one's own death could be overcome by requiring individuals to render a decision regarding
post-mortem donation. Thus those who strongly feel the reluctance to confront their death
will be urged to do so under a mandated choice policy.
Proponents of mandated choice claim that it is productively eﬃcient due to low adminis-
trative costs of registering oneself. The registration process could be implemented by asking
individuals to state a preference at the time of renewal of driving licence, population census
or any other task mandated by the state in a cost and time-eﬀective manner.
Currently most of the countries that enacted presumed or informed consent legislation seek
the consent of the family when the decedent's own preferences are unknown. Physicians
ﬁnd it extremely diﬃcult to seek next-of-kin permission and families who are in mourning
over the death of their loved ones often ﬁnd the timing of donation requests inappropriate.
Accordingly attempts to obtain permission to recover the organs of the brain-dead patient fail.
By requiring individuals to state preference, the pressure placed on families of dying patients
and on physicians who are responsible of brain-injured patients could be relieved.
Once a choice has been made about donation, both the hospital and the family has to
respect the wishes of the individual therefore patient autonomy is respected. In the absence of
a default rule and family involvement, organs of those who oppose donation remain intact and
organ of those of who wish to be donors are removed therefore mandated choice also satisﬁes
horizontal and vertical equity. Although a mandated choice policy is the most constitutionally
and morally acceptable system because it respects personal autonomy it exhibits two signiﬁcant
ﬂaws.
First, a mandated choice policy may produce a lower number of donations than otherwise. If
a substantial proportion of individuals choose not to donate, then the system has no option but
to respect the stated preference of the individual upon death since families are not allowed
to be persuaded or to express opinion (Hansmann, 1989). Mandated choice has not been
implemented nationwide so far simply because there is a tremendous fear among policy makers
10See also Chapter 3.
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that most of the individuals whose preferences were unknown might register as non-donors and
the donation rates might dramatically fall. Preliminary ﬁndings in the states of Virginia and
Texas showed that a mandated choice policy could result in a lower number of donations. In
the state of Virginia, more than 24 percent of the residents refused to state a preference whereas
in Texas 80 percent of the people registered as non-donors following the implementation of a
mandated choice policy and the legislation was repealed afterwards (Siminoﬀ and Mercer, 2001;
Klassen and Klassen, 1996). The evidence shows that a mandated choice policy is unlikely to
be eﬀective.
Second, mandated choice is non-discriminatory because it requires every individual to make
a choice irrespective of gender, ethnicity, race, religious beliefs or social class. However it
forces individuals to make a choice. Opponents argue that people cannot be forced to make
a choice. At the time of democratic elections voters are given the right to cast a blank or
invalid vote (perhaps largely due to the secrecy of the ballot) even though an otherwise valid
vote is preferable. On the other hand Chouhan and Draper (2003) justiﬁes forcing individuals
to make a choice (i.e. legal coercion) about organ donation because it is a matter of life and
death that many lives depend upon in the same way forcing tax-payers to cast a valid vote
because people should decide how they want to be governed in a democracy. It is argued that
a mandated choice regime cannot be deemed coercive because individuals are given the choice
to donate or to retain their organs after death.
As far as the cost-eﬀectiveness is concerned, mandated choice and default rule regimes
primarily diﬀer in their registry costs. Most of the presumed consent regimes establish only
non-donor registries to record those who object to organ removal, albeit opt-out regimes with
combined registries do exist. Similarly, most of the informed consent regimes establish only
donor registries to record those who would like to have their organs removed upon death,
albeit opt-in regimes with combined registries do exist. However in a mandated choice regime,
it is imperative to establish both registries in order to record both consent and objections.
Therefore mandated choice is more likely to be equally cost-eﬀective at best and less cost-
eﬀective than the default rules at worst. Under a mandated choice policy, the recovered
organs will be distributed as it is today, based on medical compatibility and need.
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2.2.3. Required Recovery
In a required recovery or conscription regime, every individual with suitable organs for trans-
plantation automatically becomes a donor upon demise and no one is allowed to object the
removal of the deceased organs including the donor and her family. Thus, a required recovery
transfers ownership and autonomy of one's own body from the individual to the state (Jensen,
2000). Required recovery has long been considered a radical paternalistic policy and no at-
tention has been given to this proposal by policy makers whose reason, according to Spital
(2003), is the priority given to personal autonomy of patients over the aim of maximizing the
recovery of organs from brain-dead individuals. An examination of this policy in depth reveals
that it has many advantages over the existing procurement policies.
The major advantage of a required recovery regime is the ability to increase the pool of
organs substantially. Currently, about half of all the suitable organs for transplantation cannot
be recovered because of family refusal or the explicit premortem objection of the deceased
against donation. Under this regime, since neither consent of the families nor the premortem
objections of deceased individuals are taken into account, the number of recovered organs are
expected to increase. Spital and Erin (2002) and Spital (2003) argue that this system is the
most eﬃcient and eﬀective among all alternatives. A second advantage is that it is simpler
and less costly than other procurement policies because there is no need to set up registries
whose establishment and maintenance cost millions of dollars at the outset, no need to train
physicians in order to discuss donation with the next-of-kin, no need to spend millions of
dollars for organ donation awareness programs and no need to develop regulatory measures
to monitor market abuses under a system with monetary incentives (Spital and Erin, 2002).
A third advantage is that it would eliminate the stress of the decision-making of the next-
of-kin and the pressure exerted on physicians and staﬀ members who approach the grieving
families to obtain consent. This often results in delays in organ recovery that compromise
the viability of the organs of the deceased. Some scholars also believe that it is an honest
policy on the contrary to a presumed consent regime which, by making the default rule an
opt-out, conscripts in disguise (Veatch, 1991). A fourth advantage of a required recovery
regime according to Spital and Erin (2002) and Spital and Taylor (2007) is that a conscription
policy satisﬁes the principle of distributive justice by sharing the beneﬁts and burdens.
A required recovery regime satisﬁes horizontal equity because it treats all proponents of do-
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nation similarly by forcefully procuring their organs and all opponents similarly by procuring
against their will. However it violates vertical equity due to the exact same reasons by procur-
ing organs of all proponents and opponents. A conscription regime is also non-discriminatory
because the organs of every medically suitable brain-dead individual are removed irrespective
of gender, ethnicity, race, religion or social class.
The major objection to required recovery is that it fails to respect personal autonomy, one
of the fundamental principles of bioethics. However proponents argue that it is not possible
to talk about the personal autonomy of a dead person. If a dead person does not have an
autonomy over his or her body then we should also abolish canons of inheritance althogether
because the will that has been left while the testator was alive should not be honored after his
death by the same reasoning. But we do not abolish these canons because we ﬁnd outrageous
to not honor a person's wish to bequeath. Once the individual expressly states that she does
not want her organs to be recovered after her death such wish should be honored upon demise.
The tension that arises in the discussion of a required recovery regime as in any other common
pool allocation system is induced by the failure to identify the owner of the property rights of
the organs and the autonomy of the individual.
Under a required recovery regime the recovered organs will be distributed as it is today,
based on medical compatibility and need.
Glannon (2008) argues that in a regime in which consent either from the individual while
alive or from the next-of-kin after demise is absent or ignored, physicians duty of care of
brain-injured patients would be compromised and their life might be prematurely terminated
at the interest of organ recipients waiting for life-saving transplants. On the contrary to those
who advocate that delays in the recovery of organs would be eliminated by conscription, he
argues that families under this policy knowing that they are not allowed to express opinion
would be much more reluctant to remove life-support of brain-injured patients and delay this
process thereby compromise the viability of the organs for transplant. Therefore the resistance
of families against a conscription regime could result in a lower number of organs available for
transplant than under regimes in which family consent is sought.
Perhaps the major impediment to the implementation of a required recovery policy is public
outrage and political and legal opposition (Kaserman and Barnett, 2002). According to the
results of a survey of 1,014 interviewed adults in the US by Spital (2005), 70 percent opposed
conscription of deceased organs for transplantation. Despite its great public ﬁscal advantages
31
2. Deceased Organ Procurement Policies
and potential eﬀectiveness, a required recovery regime violates patient autonomy by removing
organs against individuals' unarticulated will, engender public resistance and violates consti-
tutional rights. Therefore, this coercive nature violates equity albeit it could be an eﬀective
policy.
2.2.4. Reciprocal Systems
Reciprocal system proposals have emerged as a solution to the current procurement systems
which facilitate free riding by decoupling the decisions to give and to take organs. These
systems help to enforce a donor's wish against family veto and to cease seeking next-of-kin
consent. The aim is to use an individual's intrinsic motivation to save his or her life in order
to save the lives of others (Calandrillo, 2004). Brieﬂy, an individuals's action or inaction that
allows the recovery of her organs upon death entitles the individual to a priority transplant if
she ever needs it. By contruction, a reciprocal system exploits the statistical diﬀerence between
the lifetime probability of being suitable for organ donation and the lifetime probability of
experiencing organ failure. By this token, the beneﬁts of allowing post-mortem recovery
of organs of an individual in exchange for a priority transplant exceeds the costs because
the probability of being medically suitable for post-mortem organ donation is less than the
probability of needing a transplant (Kolber, 2003).
This system, being one of the very few that deals with both the procurement and the
allocation of deceased organs, was ﬁrst proposed independently by Vining and Schwindt (1988)
and Kleinman and Lowy (1989) and later discussed by Breyer and Kliemt (1995), Schwindt
and Vining (1998), Tietzel (2001), Tabarrok (2002), Kolber (2003), Nadel and Nadel (2005),
Bramstedt (2006) and recently Robertson (2007) and Breyer and Kliemt (2007).
2.2.4.1. Informed (opt-in) Reciprocity
The initial proposition of a mutual insurance pool by Vining and Schwindt (1988) was specif-
ically designed for infants and children. Later Schwindt and Vining (1998) has expanded the
idea to include adults. Accordingly an individual would receive priority future delivery of a
transplant, should the individual need it, if and only if she agrees to have her organs available
to other members of the insurance pool if she dies under circumstances that would render her
organs available for transplant. Thus committment to donate one's organs upon demise is the
32
2.2. Policies based on common pool allocation
insurance premium in this system.
A second version of the mutual insurance pool envisages that all available organs would be
allocated to members of the pool on a priority basis by the government. Schwindt and Vining
(1998) argues that a government-involved mutual insurance pool is preferable due to the fact
that a high degree of trust is required for the system to function properly whose concession to
private proﬁt-making ﬁrms would aggrevate the problems of opportunism. Alternatively one
could think of multiple insurance pools separated by exclusive rights over geographical areas
by which competition is hindered. However, the attainment of the minimum eﬃcient scale
remains to be solved. As noted by Schwindt and Vining (1998), Tietzel (2001) and Kolber
(2003), it may take a long time until local or regional pools can attract enough members to
implement a priority incentive. Thus a priority incentive scheme implemented at a national
level by the government sponsorship is more likely to maintain the minimum eﬃcient network
scale in order to ensure an eﬀective pool.
A variation of this non-market solution is proposed by Tabarrok (2002) in which the ba-
sic mechanism is a no-give, no-take plan. The incentive is a priority future delivery of a
transplant, should the individual need it, if and only if she agrees to donate her organs. Thus
the potential donor signs an organ donation card and registers herself to a common pool of
donated organs. Those who agreed to donate their organs will have priority access to a trans-
plant in the future over those who did not agree to donate. Proponents of this system argue
that human organs should be allocated ﬁrst to individuals who are willing to sacriﬁce to save
others' lives. Those who are willing to get a transplant but not willing to donate when asked,
referred to as free riders, are punished by the system.
In order to establish a well-functioning priority incentive scheme, ﬁrst a national registry
should be maintained to record donors who wish to receive priority transplant if they need one
day. A national registry also minimizes the adverse selection of donors. Absent of a registry,
those who need a transplant and accordingly cannot donate any organ could declare willingness
to donate in order to claim priority. Similarly, those who are more likely to experience organ
failure will have a greater incentive to join the pool and low risk individuals will not insure.
This adverse selection problem, as taken into consideration by Schwindt and Vining (1998),
could be circumvented by requiring prospective members of the pool to submit their medical
history so that their eligibility for a priority access could be assessed based on the entailed risks.
However, a medical examination of prospective members will automatically exclude many
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individuals who were born with diseases that render them ineligible for donation and those
who are already on the transplant waiting list unless they registered before their ineligibility
was discovered. Instead, Kolber (2003) suggests that the intent to donate by registering could
be limited to those who are over the age of eighteen, regardless of their health status or
eligibility to donate. After the ﬁrst registration, a waiting period of one or two years must be
borne in order to gain priority access. A second indispensable aspect of an informed reciprocal
system is to disallow family veto and to respect the premortem decision of the individual.
If a registered donor is granted priority but never had to use this priority and died under
circumstances that would render his or her organs available for transplant, allowing family
veto would not only result in failure to recover the organs of the registrant but also impinge
upon the will of the donor. Therefore, the next-of-kin should not be allowed to revert or
rescind the registrant's donor status after death.
At one extreme, being a registered donor for priority could be the only tie-breaker between
two equally eligible transplant patients (Kolber, 2003). At the other extreme, only those who
identify themselves as potential donors could be eligible to receive a transplant (Jarvis, 1995).
Accordingly those who refuse to donate will not receive a transplant until every registered
donor in need for a transplant received one. Kolber (2003) suggests that the degree of priority
given to registered donors should be chosen such that it yields a Pareto superior distribution
that lowers the expected waiting time for an organ for everyone including those who are not
registered.
Oﬀering priority against the risks of becoming a recipient in the future appears to be dis-
criminatory. However, Schwindt and Vining (1998) argue that non-members would also beneﬁt
from the pool's existence if the government mandates that organs of non-members are ﬁrst
oﬀered to pool members. The authors further argue that this would create additional incen-
tives for non-members to join the pool and raise the total number of organs available. Further,
the incentive scheme oﬀered by informed reciprocity discriminates against certain groups who
cannot donate because of religious, cultural or medical reasons. Generally, the former group
of individuals are also against transplantation on the same grounds therefore discrimination
against these groups should not be a problem (Nadel and Nadel, 2005). According to Bramst-
edt (2006) those who cannot donate due to religious or cultural reasons should be regarded as
having a special value and should not be subject to the rules of a reciprocal system. On the
other hand the latter group of individuals whose medical condition, such as HIV or Hepatitis
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C, denies them to enter into a reciprocal system could be allowed to receive a future priority
transplant if they agree to commit to donate their body for medical research (Nadel and Nadel,
2005).
According to Byrne and Thompson (2001), proposals granting rewards (especially ﬁnancial
rewards) to registered donors are time inconsistent. If allowed, an individual may rescind her
donor status after being registered as a donor and having undergone a priority transplant given
that doing so raises her utility. If a pool member dies unexpectedly, then she does not have
an opportunity to rescind her donor status. On the other hand if a pool member is terminally
ill she may leave the insurance pool without cost.
A mutual insurance pool ignores the possibility of a better match between a member and
a non-member by committing to donate the organs of a member of the pool ﬁrst to another
member. Due to this intra-pool priority informed reciprocity is distributionally less eﬃcient
than any other policy based on medical need or ability to pay because another distribution can
be found such that a better tissue match could be achieved outside of the pool by searching
non-pool members for medical compatibility.
Tietzel (2001) argues that dissipation of rent will not take place in a reciprocal system as
opposed to other common pool allocation systems and the number of transplants will not be
any lower than systems based on monetary incentives or market solutions. On the other hand
Ravelingien and Krom (2005) argues that an increasing number of pool members decreases the
marginal beneﬁt of joining the pool, suggesting that a reciprocal system may not be eﬀective11.
Although reciprocal systems are non-coercive because every individual is given the choice to
become a pool member, the autonomy will be assured only if the policy disallows family veto
so that the wishes of the pool member are respected. If the family is allowed to veto the wishes
of the pool member, particularly after having undergone a priority transplant, this situation
will lead to problems of free riding and failure to recover the organs of pool members.
A reciprocal system prima facie violates horizontal equity by violating the principle of equal
access for equal need. Patients already signed up on the waiting list for a transplant will no
longer access one based on need because the pool members will override the existing organ al-
location criteria. However, proponents argue that informed reciprocity satisﬁes vertical equity
because those who commit to donate their organs upon death and those who do not cannot
11A laboratory experiment conducted by Kessler and Roth (2010) shows that an organ allocation policy giving
priority for transplant has a signiﬁcant positive impact on registration.
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be regarded as equals therefore should not be treated equally.
The mutual insurance pool has been implemented in 2002 by LifeSharers, a non-proﬁt
organization operating in the US12. The membership is free and open to everyone regardless of
race, color, religion, sex, age, health or economic status. The organs of LifeSharers members
are oﬀered ﬁrst to other LifeSharers members before being oﬀerred to non-members. If a
suitable match cannot be found among members, the organs are oﬀered to non-members.
LifeSharers argues that this priority is not absolute and that the organs could be allocated
to non-members directly if a non-member is a better match for the organ and less sick than
a LifeSharers member. LifeSharers members do not qualify for ﬁrst access to organs from
other LifeSharers members until they have been a member for 6 months. This waiting period
encourages people to join while they are still healthy and discourages people from waiting to
join only when they ﬁnd out they need an organ. By November 30, 2005, there were about
3,500 members of which 22 were listed on the UNOS waiting list. As of October 31, 2010,
LifeSharers has 14,246 members of which 102 are on the national waiting list. Of these, 89
have qualiﬁed for preferred access to the organs of other LifeSharers members and no member
has died so far in circumstances that would have permitted recovery of organs. UNOS did not
challenge the legality of LifeSharers but also declined to oﬀer support. Therefore it remains
unknown whether UNOS and its associated OPOs will cooperate if any LifeSharers member
becomes an organ donor (Kolber, 2003). Nine years of experience with LifeSharers indicates
that a reciprocal system is unlikely to be eﬀective possibly due to the failure to establish the
minimum eﬃcient network scale.
A similar proposal is scheduled to come into eﬀect in 2010 in Israel. This bill provides a
priority in the allocation of organs for transplantation based on giving points to those who
sign the organ donor card, including the transplant candidates whose ﬁrst-degree relatives
have signed their organ donor cards or were organ donors (Lavee et al., 2009).
According to Kolber (2003), reciprocal systems as opposed to monetary incentives which
are strictly prohibited by law, do not require legislative action in order to be implemented. In
most of the western countries with the exception of the US, Australia and Singapore, organ
transplant acts prohibit the commercialization of human organs without explicitly referring
to intrinsic motivations in the exchange of human organs. In the US where the NOTA does
not only restrict the exchange of human organs to monetary transactions, it makes it illegal
12http://www.lifesharers.org
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to knowingly acquire, receive or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable considera-
tion13. Kolber (2003) argues that registration for a priority transplant cannot be considered
a valuable consideration in the NOTA context.
First, NOTA was passed in response to commercialization of human organs. Therefore
NOTA does not prohibit all transfers of organs in exchange for consideration (Mahoney, 2009).
Second, by registering, the individual agrees to donate his or her organs upon death for a
possible priority transplant while alive. The right for a priority may or may not be used
by the individual while alive because it depends on the probability of needing a transplant.
Therefore, the individual only submits to a mere possibility for such a priority transplant
and his or her organs are not exchanged or promised to be exchanged for something of value.
Third, at the time of death, the organs of the deceased are transferred to a common pool to
be transplanted to the most suitable patient and the individual whose organs are transferred
cannot receive a consideration because he or she is dead and her organs do not value anything
to her. Second, the registrant is allowed to change his or her mind at any time until death.
Thus, it remains unclear whether the registrant has made any legally enforceable agreement
to be deemed a valuable consideration. The legality of priority incentive schemes could be
viewed similarly for Australia and Singapore where the law prohibits entering into a contract
or agreement for valuable consideration.
2.2.4.2. Presumed (opt-out) Reciprocity
The idea of presumed reciprocity is proposed by Breyer and Kliemt (2007) and Robertson
(2007). Under this rule the organ procurement is governed by the presumed consent rule (i.e.
individuals are assumed to be willing to donate unless they express otherwise) but those who
explicitly oppose donation by registering themselves as non-donors will not have a priority
access for a transplant should they need in the future. By this token presumed reciprocity is
easier to establish because those who remain silent regarding donation (i.e. those whose will
to donate is presumed) will be given priority for a transplant.
A presumed consent rule coupled with a reciprocal system provides double disincentive for
13A consideration in the common law of contracts is the price one pays for another's promise which can take
a number of forms: money, property, work, performance, other services, a promise, the doing of an act or
abstaining from doing an act. A valuable consideration refers to a consideration, something of value, that
is either a detriment incurred by the person making the promise or a beneﬁt received by the other person,
suﬃcient to sustain a legally enforceable agreement.
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those who wish to keep their organs. The ﬁrst disincentive is that one has to bear the cost of
registering oneself if one likes to retain her organs. These costs largely consist of psychological
costs. The second disincentive is that once registered as a non-donor the individual is denied
priority access for a transplant. Because of this double disincentive, an OPP based on presumed
reciprocity is very likely to be self-destructive. If those who remain silent regarding donation
are prioritized assuming there are contemplation costs for non-donors, then an overwhelming
majority of the population will not bother to register but only those who strongly oppose
the idea of donation possibly on religious or cultural grounds will register as non-donors. If
an overwhelming majority remains silent under reciprocity because the rule is based on the
presumed will of the donor then there is no point of giving priority. This problem suggests
that there must be a maximum eﬃcient network scale along a minimum one. The idea at the
heart of these systems, regardless of which rule it is coupled with or the market structure is
that a suﬃcient level of inequality must be present within the system, that is a relative balance
between self-sacriﬁcing individuals (pool members) and egotistical individuals (non-members)
or an optimal size of membership so that the essence of priority does not erode. In other
words, the common pool must be suﬃciently large to be eﬀective but no so large that the club
is no longer a club. Under a presumed reciprocity regime the membership size is likely to be
supoptimal.
Currently Singapore uses an allocation policy for deceased organs based on presumed reci-
procity. In Singapore the procurement of deceased organs is based on the presumed consent
rule (i.e. every individual is assumed to be a donor unless they opt-out) for all non-muslim
citizens between the ages of 21 and 60 and on the informed consent rule for muslims. Muslims
can opt-in to donate if they wish and non-muslims can opt-out if they wish. However, non-
muslims who opt-out get lower priority for transplant if they ever need one. The combination
of presumed consent rule and priority status appears to be somewhat more successful than
before the enactment of the law and provided a steadier kidney supply although it did not
entirely meet the need for transplants (Chandler, 2005).
2.3. Policies based on monetary incentives
Market solutions to the increasing shortage of transplantable human organs can be classiﬁed
based on the type of organ, the pricing mechanisms, the level of centralization and competition
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in the market, the timing of exchange and the assignment of property rights.
There exist two major distinctions between OPPs based on monetary incentives and OPPs
based on non-monetary incentives. First, monetary incentive policies will always be non-
coercive because the exchange is voluntary, that is individuals are given the right not to
sell their organs. Thus oﬀering or requesting payment cannot constitute a coercive action
irrespective of the structure of the market or the type of organ. Second, policies based on
monetary incentives may not respect patient autonomy because generally a surrogate has to
decide on behalf of the deceased.
2.3.1. Contemporaneous Markets
The term contemporaneous refers that the exchange and the delivery in these markets are
immediately eﬀective. Some authors advocated a direct market for organs with varying prices
according to the demand and supply (Barnett et al., 1992; Spurr, 1993; Barnett et al., 2001;
Kaserman and Barnett, 2002; Clay and Block, 2002); others proposed centralized systems
with a single price (Van Dijk and Hilhorst, 2007; Becker and Elias, 2007). While Barnett et al.
(1992) argues that a market for organs with prices set by the forces of demand and supply
has important advantages over the current altruistic system as well as over the compensation
schemes, Spurr (1993) argues that the value of an organ is higher in contemporaneous markets
than in markets based on future delivery of organs because it will be used immediately in the
former model, ensuring eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness.
One of the characteristics of contemporaneous markets with respect to principles of bioethics
is that strictly speaking, donor autonomy does not exist in such markets. The reason is that
in the absence of any signalling, the immediate exchange and delivery of organs of a deceased
person implies that the individual cannot make an advance directive and that it requires the
involvement of a surrogate in order to decide to sell the organs.
2.3.1.1. Free Market System
Becker (2003) states that in a well-working market the gap between the number of patients
on the waiting list and the number of organ donors would be zero; in a fairly well-working
market that gap would be constant. However, the gap between the number of patients on the
waiting list and the number of organ donors has grown rapidly, causing an increasing shortage
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of transplantable organs under the current system. Most of the early proponents of the market
system have used the tools of demand and supply to show that the current altruistic system is
inferior to market system on social welfare grounds and it is believed that the market system
will increase the number of organs (Adams et al., 1999; Barnett et al., 1992; Carlstrom and
Rollow, 1997).
Barney and Reynolds (1989) claims that an OPP based on voluntary donation enables
organ transplant centers and transplant surgeons to obtain economic rents. A zero-price policy
restricts the number of organs available for transplants which in turn restricts the number of
procedures. A smaller number of procedures increases the transplant fees. By this conclusion
Barney and Reynolds (1989) and later Kaserman and Barnett (1991) argued that the system
based on altruism enables transplant surgeons to operate as cartel and reap the beneﬁts of
organ shortages.
The monograph written by Kaserman and Barnett (2002) is a comprehensive synthesis of
the works of Kaserman and Barnett (1991), Barnett et al. (1992, 1993), Barnett and Kaserman
(1995) and Adams et al. (1999). Kaserman and Barnett (2002) heavily advocates the imple-
mentation of a market system in the US instead of relying on the current altruistic system
where the former ensures equilibrium of the demand and supply that is left to free adjustment
and market ﬂuctuations. They argue that all forms of informed and presumed consent policies
are socially inferior because they are based on a policy by which the price of organs is set
to zero whereas compensation and market system allow the deceased donor's family to be
rewarded in return for donation that results in improved collection rates. A market system
is further superior relative to compensation because it enables the price of organ to ﬂuctuate
based on changes in the demand and supply of organs. Accordingly, the adoption of a market
system is said to eliminate some of the organizational problems associated with organ collec-
tion. Kaserman and Barnett (2002) states that the reluctance to donate would be completely
eliminated following a market system because under an altruistic system based on donation,
the physician who approaches the grieving family to obtain consent to collect the decedent's
organs may experience reluctance to do so or face inability to request consent, resulting in
failure to broach the subject of donation. On the contrary they argue that a market system
would not need to rely on consent because it is no longer a relevant issue for collecting or-
gans. Second, the failure to identify potential donor candidates in a timely fashion will also be
eliminated because the decedent's family is said to have an incentive to donate following the
40
2.3. Policies based on monetary incentives
introduction of a market system. Therefore a free market system does not only increase social
welfare but also proves to be eﬃcient. They further add that not only transplant surgeons and
hospitals are unwilling to give up the altruistic system which enforces a cartel mechanism, but
also the dialysis centers have a deep interest in keeping the status quo. The reason is that as
the transplant fees increase due to a restricted number of organs and transplants implied by
the altruistic system, dialysis centers obtain supra normal proﬁts due to a higher demand for
dialysis caused by the restricted supply of kidneys and transplants. Therefore, Kaserman and
Barnett (2002) asserts that the majority of medical community strongly opposes the idea of a
market system in the US.
The equilibrium characterization of Kaserman and Barnett (2002) consists of an inelastic
demand and an elastic supply schedule. They argue that the demand for organs (kidney)
is not likely to decrease substantially due to marginal increases in price and could be even
unresponsive to price changes over some low to medium price interval. The ﬁrst reason behind
this characterization is that the dialysis, as the only alternative to kidney transplantation, is in
fact a poor substitute. Second, kidney transplants in the US are covered by Medicare and 90
percent of liver and heart transplants are covered by Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance
companies (Carlstrom and Rollow, 1997). Thus third party payment of transplants implies
low price elasticities of demand. On the contrary to their demand characterization, the supply
curve appears to be very elastic. The assumption of an elastic supply curve is founded on
two considerations. First, they claim that the number of cadaveric organs for transplantation
can be expanded without confronting the capacity constraint. Second, they believe that the
opportunity cost of supplying the decedent's organs is low because uncollected organs will be
buried without causing an actual burden for the donor's family under the current system. The
supply will be relatively more responsive to changes in the price under the free market system
compared to the altruistic system but the responsiveness appears to be more sensitive to the
price range rather than the price change.
To test this prediction Kaserman and Barnett (2002) administered a survey at Auburn Uni-
versity to 391 students. The implied equilibrium price based on the survey results suggested
that it was substantially less than $1, 00014. Wellington and Whitmire (2007) examined the
viability of allowing a market for kidneys and estimated the market equilibrium price of ca-
daveric kidneys by replicating the survey of Kaserman and Barnett (2002) for a larger and
14See also Peters (1991) and Cohen (2003).
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more representative sample of the overall population. In contrast to the ﬁndings of Kaserman
and Barnett, they found that the equilibrium price for deceased and living donor kidneys is
prohibitively high, around $144, 000. The substantial discrepancy between the estimates of
Kaserman and Barnett (2002) and Wellington and Whitmire (2007) is attributable to the
wider range of prices and the more representative sample used by the latter study15.
Byrne and Thompson (2001) demonstrates that allowing ﬁnancial incentives to sign a donor
card or to become a donor may not increase the supply of organs and could even produce
perverse supply responses. The idea is that donors have true and revealed preferences and
when the donor's family makes a decision upon donation they try to estimate donor's true
preferences. Upon oﬀering ﬁnancial incentives, families become sceptical of the decision of their
next-of-kin on the grounds whether the donor's true and revealed preferences are coherent and
may refuse donation if they realize that the revealed preference of the donor are induced by
ﬁnancial incentives. However, revealed donor preference is one of the best predictors of family
choice (Tabarrok et al., 2004).
One of the major criticisms and causes of resistance against monetary incentives is that
those who were otherwise willing to donate purely out of volunteerism will be oﬀended upon
the introduction of payment and will exit the market. The hypothesis is that extrinsic mo-
tivations can crowd-out intrinsic motivations, degrade the sense of virtue and weaken moral
obligations upon the introduction of money (Frey, 1993; Rothman and Rothman, 2006). In
his seminal book, the Gift of Relationship that changed the organization of blood supply in
the US, Titmuss (1971) analyzed blood donations in the US and England in the late 1960s
and early 1970s and argued that the organization of blood supply in the US, which was based
on paid donors, was both quantitatively and qualitatively inferior compared to the organiza-
tion of blood supply in England which was based on unpaid volunteer donors (Steiner, 2003).
Titmuss, known for his dissent of market system, claimed that the introduction of monetary
compensation for blood donors might reduce the total blood supply. At the writing of the
book, Titmuss' claim was not empirically tested and has become the subject of criticism of
Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972) on the grounds that it undermined the virtues of the mar-
ket. Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972) argued that market system and altruism could coexist
as the market increases the choices and does not restrict existing possibilities (Steiner, 2003).
Epstein (2008) objected to the crowding-out hypothesis and claimed that an individual could
15A lower range of prices used by Kaserman and Barnett (2002) biases the equilibrium price downward.
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preserve his self-image of altruist by donating the payment to a charity instead of refusing to
join and receiving the payment. He also contends that even if crowindg-out exists, it would be
at least as equally eﬀective as the current system. Recently there has been a growing body of
literature presenting empirical evidence on the potential adverse consequences of introducing
monetary incentives16.
In this section, we attempt to broaden this literature by testing Titmuss' claim of crowding-
out in the exchange of transplantable human organs. The empirical estimate of the supply
curve for cadaveric transplants shows that a free market system, in which the price of organs
is left to free adjustment by the forces of demand and supply, may exhibit a crowding-out
eﬀect and may be forced to set a higher-than-otherwise price in order to compensate for the
loss of supply caused by the crowding-out of intrinsically motivated volunteers.
We administered a survey at a public university in the city of Bursa, Turkey to test the
hypothesis of the existence of a crowding-out eﬀect and its impact on the market price and
on the resulting number of transplants. A contingent valuation method was used to measure
the participants' willingness to accept remuneration for donating their relatives' organs upon
death. Contingent valuation methods are typically used to determine one's willingness to
accept and willingness to pay for non-market goods17.
645 students from a wide range of disciplines ranging from freshman to graduate researchers
were randomly asked to state the smallest amount of remuneration they are willing to receive
for donating their relatives' organs upon their death18. 99 of them (15.3 percent) stated that
they are willing to receive remuneration, 330 (51.2 percent) stated that they would voluntarily
16See Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) and Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008).
17Contigent valuation methods suﬀer from three biases. First, hypothetical bias arises due to the inconsistency
between the answer of the respondent to a hypothetical case and her reaction to a real case. Hypothetical
bias can be eliminated if one conducts an experiment. Second, the mental account bias refers to the situation
in which it is ambiguous whether the respondent's willingness to accept covers only a single organ, for
instance kidney, or all of her transplantable organs. If the respondent is willing to receive remuneration,
it is assumed that she is willing to donate at least the kidneys and the liver of their deceased next-of-kin.
Finally the anchoring bias refers to the case in which the oﬀered values aﬀect the respondent's answer.
18After explaining the respondent that it is illegal to buy and sell human organs, they are requested to answer
the following questions as if such cases were legal and that there were organizations to legally procure
human organs:
1. If an organ procurement organization had a program to allow you to receive remuneration for donating
relatives' organs upon their death, what is the smallest amount you would donate for (in Turkish Liras)?
(a) 0 (b) 50 (c) 100 (d) 250 (e) 500 (f) 1000 (g) 5000 (h) more than 5000 (i) I would neither donate nor sell
the organs of my relatives.
2. Would you be oﬀended by a transaction involving the sale of cadaveric organs between individuals if
that transaction saved someone's life? (a) Yes, I would be oﬀended by such a transaction (b) No, I would
not be oﬀended by such a transaction.
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donate, 206 (31.9 percent) stated that they will neither donate nor sell their relative's organs
and 10 (1.6 percent) respondents failed to answer the question. Of those 330 respondents who
are willing to donate voluntarily, 57 (17.3 percent) stated that they are oﬀended by the sale
of deceased organs and 2 (0.6 percent) respondents failed to answer the question. Of those
57 respondents, more females than males were oﬀended by the sale of deceased organs. Of
those 99 respondents who are willing to receive remuneration, 9 (9.1 percent) stated that they
are nevertheless oﬀended by the sale of deceased organs and 1 (1 percent) respondent failed
to answer the question. Based on 426 observations, an empirical cadaveric transplant supply
curve has been depicted in ﬁgure 2.1 by calculating the cumulative sum of the number of
respondents who are willing to receive remuneration.
The cost of kidney and liver transplants are currently around 18, 000 and 48, 000 Turkish
Liras (TL) respectively at public transplant facilities in Turkey19. First consider the case
where sale is prohibited and the organ under consideration is kidney for which the demand
is relatively elastic because kidney transplantation has substitutes such as black market and
dialysis20. In this case there would be 328 organs available for transplantation coming from
volunteers. This is shown by the perfectly inelastic supply curve S in ﬁgure 2.1. Since the
prohibition does not permit a price above zero, the price determined by the intersection of the
demand curve D and the supply curve S cannot be sustained. This creates a kidney shortage
of size
(
Q0 − 328).
19These costs include lab tests, medical equipment, hospital stay and physician fee. These ﬁgures are ﬁxed
and subsidized by Turkish Social Security Institution. The Euro equivalency could be obtained roughly by
dividing these ﬁgures by two.
20The conclusion reached here would still remain valid if one were to assume a relatively inelastic demand
because the substitutes are in fact poor and the cost of renal transplantation is covered by third parties.
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Figure 2.1.: Market for kidney transplants with empirical cadaveric kidney transplant supply
curve and the crowding-out of intrinsically motivated volunteers (n = 426)
If the prohibition on the sale of organs is removed and the price is left to free adjustment,
it is argued that some of those who were previously willing to donate will be oﬀended by the
sale and drop out of market21. Based on the answers of the respondents, 57 of them will leave
the market, leaving a total of 271 transplantable organs under a free market, as shown by
the supply curve S
′′
. When the total cost of kidney transplant is 19, 000 TL of which 1, 000
TL is the organ price, there will be 19 additional organs available for transplantation coming
21The relevant survey question separates those who are willing to donate and those who will not participate in
this market regardless of whether payment is introduced. Accordingly, those who stated that they would
neither donate nor sell the organs of their relatives are left out of the analysis. However there is no way
of knowing, based on the survey questions, whether a person who retains the organs of their relatives
or a person who donates would refuse donating because money is oﬀered. However being oﬀended or
feeling repugnance decreases market participation or constrains market transactions (Roth, 2007; Leider
and Roth, 2010). Therefore, those who would be willing to donate at a zero price but are oﬀended by
the sale of cadaveric organs are assumed to drop out of the market upon the introduction of monetary
incentives.
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from extrinsically motivated volunteers, reaching 290 transplantable organs. At a price of
5, 000 TL for an organ which brings the total cost of transplant to 23, 000 TL, there will be 31
additional organs on top of 271 organs donated by volunteers, reaching a total of 302 organs
for transplantation. Notice that if no intrinsically motivated volunteer was oﬀended by the
sale of deceased organs, which is shown by the supply curve S
′
, there would be 359 organs
available for transplantation at a cost of 23, 000 TL as opposed to 302 organs supplied under
the crowding-out of intrinsically motivated volunteers, a reduction in the supply of about 16
percent. This crowding-out eﬀect was found to be more prevalent among females (60 percent)
than among males (40 percent)22.
For the aforementioned free market to perform eﬀectively, given that some individuals will
refuse to sell their organs because they are oﬀended, a price must be set such that it yields more
organs than under sale prohibition. Therefore the equilibrium number of kidney transplants
under a free market must lie to the right of the supply curve S. This is shown by the equilibrium
point, e∗ (C∗, 347) where the total cost of transplant is around 24, 500 TL and the number of
transplants is higher than under sale prohibition. Notice that if no volunteer was oﬀended by
the sale of cadaveric kidneys, the equilibrium would be attained at point e
′
(
C
′
, Q
′
)
which
yields a higher number of transplants than 359 and a slightly lower cost (price) than 24, 000
TL.
The demand for livers is drawn relatively inelastic in ﬁgure 2.2, shown by the curve D,
because liver transplantation has no substitutes and the operation costs are fully or almost
fully covered by third parties. Since the liver waiting lists and yearly additions for liver
transplant is substantially less than kidney waiting lists and additions, the demand for liver
is much lower than the demand for kidneys. If payment is introduced the demand for liver is
equal to the supply curve S
′′
at a point where, the equilibrium price is C∗ and the equilibrium
number of transplants is Q∗ which is slightly higher than under the sale prohibition. If no
volunteer was oﬀended by the sale of cadaveric livers, the equilibrium would be attained at the
point e
′
(
C
′
, Q
′
)
, the intersection of the supply curve S
′
and the demand curveD, which yields
an equilibrium cost of transplant slighty lower than 53, 000 TL and an equilibrium number of
transplants between 347 and 359.
22This result partly reﬂects the ﬁndings of Mellström and Johannesson (2008) in the market for blood that a
crowding-out eﬀect exist for women and not for men.
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Figure 2.2.: Market for liver transplants with empirical cadaveric liver transplant supply curve
and the crowding-out of intrinsically motivated volunteers (n = 426)
Given there is a crowding-out eﬀect, the market equilibrium will result in a higher price and
thus a higher cost of transplant than otherwise. Notice that at any ﬁxed level of number of
transplants, a market with crowding-out is less cost-eﬀective compared to a market without
crowding-out. However in our empirical case, the impact of crowding-out raises the total cost of
kidney transplant by only around 3-4 percent and lowers the number of transplants by around
8 percent compared to an equilibrium in which crowding-out is absent. This indicates that
although the relative size of whose who are presumed to leave the market upon paid donation is
sizeable, its adverse impact on the resulting equilibrium number of kidney or liver transplants
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is not. A possible explanation of this ﬁnding is that in the market for transplantable human
organs the number of altruists exiting the market relative to the number of individuals induced
by oﬀering monetary incentives may not be as large as Titmuss (1971) claimed. This eﬀect
might have been caused by the possibility that contrary to the widely-held belief, repugnance
for monetary incentives may not be so strong and/or that the prices may have to be driven
high to oﬀset the crowding-out.
The analysis presented in this section imposes several limitations and caveats. First, the
sample is randomly selected among a population group which exhibits certain common char-
acteristics (e.g. age, education level). This common characteristic of the sample does not
represent public attitudes because of the high overall education level of the respondents and
is likely to produce biased results which can neither be generalized nor be used to estimate
national ﬁgures. On the other hand, conducting a representative survey in order to infer the
whole population is costly. Second, the low range of oﬀered values to measure one's willingness
to accept may bias the equilibrium price downward (Wellington and Whitmire, 2007). Thus
the increase in the total cost of transplant may be larger than the analysis suggests. Other
potential biases that may have been incorporated in the survey should also be highlighted.
These biases are associated with respondents' knowledge about donation and organ procure-
ment. An individual's knowledge about organ donation in general and organ procurement
systems in particular may be negatively or positively associated with his or her willingness to
accept remuneration after being exposed to all the relevant arguments both in favor of and
against paid donation. Therefore a sample of informed respondents may have yielded diﬀerent
results.
Given the aforementioned caveats, the empirical evidence points that a free market with a
sizeable crowding-out of intrinsically motivated volunteers might be less cost-eﬀective vis-a-
vis a free market with no crowding-out. The cost-eﬀectiveness of free markets vis-a-vis other
deceased OPPs can be demonstrated by using the supply schedule depicted in ﬁgure 2.1 and
by further incorporating the supply characteristics of the other policies. A comparison of free
markets, government monopsony, default rules and required recovery is given in ﬁgure 2.3.
In ﬁgure 2.3, S
′
is the supply curve for free market and D is the demand curve for trans-
plantable organs. The y-axis shows the total cost of transplant (i.e. the cost of operation plus
the organ price) where anything in excess of CRR accounts for the price of organs. QFM and
CFM respectively represent the equilibrium number of transplants and the equilibrium cost of
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organ under free market. In a required recovery regime, since the organs of every medically
suitable brain-dead patient is removed at a zero price and no one is allowed to object the
removal including the donor and her family, QRR number of organs will be recovered, which is
the intersection of the lowest possible cost of transplant, that is CRR, and the demand curve
D23. Therefore under a required recovery regime QRR−QFM additional number of transplants
will be performed compared to a free market at a much lower cost than CFM . At the lowest
possible cost, CRR, however, the free market can only provide Q∗ number of transplants. Thus
a required recovery regime is more cost-eﬀective than a free market24.
Figure 2.3.: Comparative cost-eﬀectiveness of deceased OPPs
On the other hand, S represents the supply curve for default rules (presumed consent,
23It is reasonable to assume that there is no capacity constraint (i.e. there is a suﬃcient number of brain-dead
individuals from which to recover organs). Under capacity constraints, the number of transplants would be
less than QRR in a required recovery regime.
24It is assumed that organ recipients do not place a lower value on the transplanted organs than donors.
Otherwise, there will be a social loss equal to
´ QRR
QFM
(
S
′ −D
)
dQ (Kaserman and Barnett, 2002).
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informed consent) and mandated choice policies and is drawn perfectly inelastic because there
is sale prohibition. Although it might seem that the cost of kidney following a sale prohibition
is zero, there is an implicit value denoted as C∗ by which rent-seeking activities are created.
Under a default rule or a mandated choice policy, the actual price of kidney is C∗ −CRR and
the number of transplants is Q∗. Note that at Q∗ the actual cost of transplantation under a
free market is only CRR or alternatively the price of organ is zero. Thus a default rule or a
mandated choice policy is less cost-eﬀective than a free market system.
Finally, it is assumed that the ﬁxed price oﬀered by a monopsonist is above zero but below
the market clearing level. This will result in a number of transplants somewhere between Q∗
andQFM at a cost somewhere between CFM and CRR. At this ﬁxed cost level denoted as CGM ,
the number of transplants is QSGM and there is an organ shortage of amount Q
D
GM − QSGM .
However, a monopsony would still exert an implicit value denoted by C∗GM by which rent-
seeking persists. Therefore, although the cost of transplant under a monopsony seems to be
CGM , the actual cost is C∗GM . Note that at the monopsonist output level, Q
S
GM , the actual cost
of a transplant would be CGM under a free market. Thus a monopsony is less cost-eﬀective than
a free market system but more cost-eﬀective than a default rule or a mandated choice policy25.
For the reimbursement scheme, the same intuition follows; however since reimbursement is
made to cover only the actual costs of donors (i.e. hospital or burial expenses) the oﬀered
price under a reimbursement scheme is likely to be very close to CRR. Therefore it is more
likely to be less cost-eﬀective than a monopsony but more cost-eﬀective than default rules or
a mandated choice regime.
In free markets the medical criteria for the distribution of organs is replaced by the ability
to pay. Free markets are distributionally more eﬃcient than regimes whose allocation criterion
is based on medical need because if the market is left to the adjustment of the demand for
and the supply of organs, a buyer can obtain a healthier and better-matched organ, thus can
increase her welfare by paying more even if the distribution of organs favors wealthy buyer
and not medically the most in need who may not be wealthy. Given that those who would sell
their organs will be the families of the poor and that the rich will not sell their organs unless
the price is prohibitively high, a free market for cadaver organs is discriminatory. Respect for
patient autonomy in free markets depends on the revealed preferences of the donor. It is not
25A government monopsony or a reimbursement scheme would achieve an equal cost-eﬀectiveness of a free
market if the ﬁxed organ price oﬀered is set to the market clearing price level. However, as Kaserman and
Barnett (2002) points out, this is very unlikely.
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possible to talk about patient autonomy unless the will of the deceased while alive has been
communicated to the next-of-kin and the family does not act on the contrary of the wishes of
the deceased.
From the buyer's perspective, transplants will be inaccessible for those who cannot aﬀord
to pay in free markets unless buyers are covered by health insurance. Therefore, horizontal
equity may be diﬃcult to establish in free markets. On the other hand, a free market system
complies with vertical equity because the organs of a donor are removed in return for payment
and the organs of those whose families refused payment remain intact.
2.3.1.2. Government Monopsony
The idea of government monopsony proposed by Becker (1997) is built upon the alienation
of all buying and selling rights to a single entity, the government. Although Becker does
not get into the details of this system, here we envisage a contemporaneous system in which
the government oﬀers a ﬁxed price for organs of the deceased, akin to the proposal made by
Steinbuch (2008) albeit his proposal excludes deceased donors. The system could be ﬁnanced
by proportional or even progressive taxation in the short-run and by the funds the procurement
system would save from the diminished utilization of dialysis in the long-run. This ﬁnancing
scheme appears to be feasible since transplantation is a cost-eﬀective procedure and dialysis
is not26.
The critics argue that competition in the procurement of organs is preferable over monopsony
because it would determine the eﬃcient contract, render a greater incentive and a higher
quality of organs. There are many good reasons to employ a centralized system of organ
procurement. Schwindt and Vining (1986) argues that a publicly owned monopsony has an
economy-of-scope advantage over private monopsonies and competitive structures and the
enforcement of the contract and the administrative procedures would be much simpler and
easier with a government monopsony.
It is conceivable and perhaps morally less repugnant that the government will sell the pro-
cured organs neither through market mechanisms nor by other means but allocates them
within the system as it is allocated today based on need and medical criteria without any
26The average cost of a kidney transplant in the US is about $90, 000 and the post-operation cost of medication
is around $16, 000 per year. The average cost of dialysis is about $65, 000 per year. After ﬁve years, the
total cost of dialysis is $325, 000 whereas the total cost of kidney transplant is about $270, 000 which yields
an average saving of $11, 000 per year.
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preference for the recipient's ﬁnancial status or the level of insurance coverage. This way, any
concern on the grounds that transplants will be inaccessible for those who cannot aﬀord to
pay, would be eliminated27. The existence of the government as the intermediary not only
ensures vertical equity but also non-discrimination and horizontal equity in the market. This
would also partly mitigate the crowding-out eﬀect.
Unless a view by the deceased while alive has been communicated to the family there is
no way of knowing what the deceased's preferences were, assuming there is no donor registry
in the monopsonistic market. Therefore, once the wishes of the deceased are known by the
family and the family preferences match with those of the individual may the autonomy be
respected. Otherwise, one cannot talk about autonomy in such markets.
Finally, monopsonistic markets are distributionally less eﬃcient than free markets because
the price of organ is not allowed to ﬂuctuate based on the forces of the demand and supply
which could have allowed potential buyers to search for healthier organs or more compatible
tissues; however they are distributionally more eﬃcient than reciprocal systems because no
potential buyer or group of buyers has priority over the distribution or organs.
2.3.1.3. Reimbursement
Two types of reimbursement schemes have been proposed as rewards to the family of the
deceased donor. These are tax deduction or tax credits and the reimbursement of hospital
and funeral expenses. Oﬀering tax credit to induce citizens to become organ donors has been
discussed by Oswald (2001), Delmonico et al. (2002) and Calandrillo (2004). While Delmonico
et al. (2002) opposed tax credits and refunds because they assign an arbitrary monetary value
on an organ, others argued that tax breaks could spur donation. Calandrillo (2004) warned
that tax deductions could create additional inequity because they are peculiarly regressive.
Tax credits would eliminate this inequity irrespective of income. Recently, tax deduction
schemes have been proposed in the US by the Help Organ Procurement Expand Act (2001)
and Gift of Life Tax Credit Act (2001). These acts respectively proposed a $10,000 tax credit
for deceased donation and a $2,500 tax refund for deceased or living donation.
Reimbursement of hospital and funeral expenses on the other hand has found supporters
27The problem related to the ability to pay is more pronounced in the US where most of the patients without
private health insurance have diﬃculties aﬀording post-operative treatment and the cost of medication. In
countries with universal health coverage as in Europe and Canada, ability to pay is not much of a concern.
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among those who strongly oppose monetary incentives as well as proponents of payment
(Hansmann, 1989). This reimbursement scheme supported by Delmonico et al. (2002), Howard
(2007) and Abouna (2008), proposes that institutions that deal with the procurement of organs
could oﬀer to pay funeral and hospital expenses incurred by families if they agree to donate
the organs of their deceased relative.
Barnett et al. (1992) argues that a compensation scheme provides an additional incentive
for donors to agree to supply their organs however it does not increase the incentive to seek
out donations and thus is unlikely to entirely eliminate the shortage. This is not necessarily a
problem and on the contrary could have few advantages. It is argued that such reimbursements
should be made automatically and not conditional upon the agreement to donate as the
essence of reimbursement is not to seek out donation. According to Delmonico et al. (2002)
an intentionally small reimbursement of funeral expenses of $300 should not be seen as a
monetary incentive but rather an expression of appreciation for donation. Howard (2007) also
supports the use of such in-kind payments instead of cash payments as a solution to partially
mitigate the crowding-out of intrinsically motivated volunteers, if not fully. He argues that
rewards that appreciate and acknowledge the value of donors' contribution complement and
reinforce motivation.
The period leading to the declaration of brain-death is excruciating both for the donor who
is still alive during diagnostic tests and for the donor's family. One of the fears upon the
introduction of monetary incentives is that the care of donor will be prematurely terminated.
This medical concern is not exclusive to monetary incentives. Anectodal evidence shows that
even without monetary incentives, aggressive transplant teams and organ recovery coordina-
tors, driven by pride and ambition, force doctors to declare brain-death earlier than before
because waiting list grows and supply stagnates (Barber, 2007). On moral grounds, the hos-
pitals should compensate the potential donor's family for the physical and psychic costs even
if the process does not result in donation.
To identify the public attitude on the monetary incentives based on the survey conducted at
a public university in the city of Bursa, Turkey, we asked the respondents to list, in preference
order, ﬁve alternative monetary incentive schemes that were proposed in the literature, given
in table 2.228.
28The relevant question was: List the following alternative incentive schemes by preference order if you were
to receive some form of remuneration for donating organs upon death. (ﬁll in the blanks from 1 to 5, 1 being
the most preferred and 5 being the least preferred) (a) Spot Market: Right upon death, organ procurement
53
2. Deceased Organ Procurement Policies
Table 2.2.: Preference ordering of alternative monetary incentive schemes (n=645)
Choice
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. No Total
Answer
Contemporaneous Market 55 106 84 203 89 645
(8.52) (16.34) (13.02) (31.47) (13.80) (100.00)
Futures Contract 54 79 94 155 155 645
(8.37) (12.25) (14.57) (24.03) (24.03) (100.00)
Reimbursement of Expenses 46 83 178 93 137 108 645
(7.13) (12.87) (27.60) (14.42) (21.24) (16.75) (100.00)
Reduced Insurance Premium 119 169 117 54 78 645
(18.45) (26.20) (18.14) (8.37) (12.09) (100.00)
Tax Deduction 263 100 64 32 78 645
(40.78) (15.50) (9.93) (4.96) (12.09) (100.00)
No Answer 108
(16.75)
Total 645 645 645 645 645
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
The numbers together with percentages in parenthesis shown in bold represent the major-
ity of the respondents whose preference ordering is aggregately consistent. Accordingly, of
those 645 respondents a majority of 263 (40.78 percent) preferred tax deduction scheme as
their ﬁrst choice over the remaining alternatives, a majority of 169 (26.20 percent) preferred
reduced insurance premium as their second choice, a majority of 178 (27.60 percent) preferred
reimbursement of hospital or burial expenses as their third choice, a majority of 203 (31.47
percent) preferred contemporaneous market as their fourth choice, a majority of 155 (24.03
percent) preferred futures contract as their ﬁfth choice and 108 respondents (16.75 percent) did
not list any ordering. Notice that this vertical preference ordering is consistent with horizon-
tal preference ordering; among all ﬁve choices contemporaneous market is the fourth choice,
futures contract is the ﬁfth choice, reimbursement of expenses is the third choice, reduced
insurance premium is the second choice and tax deduction is the ﬁrst choice by the majority
of respondents. At the overall, the results indicate that a compensation scheme in the form of
agency oﬀers you payment to have your consent to procure your relative's organs (b) Futures Market:
You sell the property rights of your organs to an organ procurement agency for money now, to procure
the usable organs upon death in the future (c) Compensation: Upon organ donation, organ procurement
agency compensates you in the form of reimbursement of funeral or hospital expenses (d) Reduced Health
or Life Insurance Premium: You receive a reduction in health or life insurance premiums in exchange for
the promise to allow your organs to be harvested at death (e) Tax deduction: The government allows tax
deduction upon the promise to allow your organs to be harvested at death.
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tax deduction is the aggregate top choice among respondents, followed by a one-time insurance
premium reduction and reimbursement of hospital and burial expenses as the aggregate second
and third choices respectively. Contemporaneous and futures markets were listed as the least
preferable systems respectively.
Reimbursement systems that appreciate donation eﬀorts are horizontally and vertically eq-
uitable and non-discriminatory, however they may not respect patient autonomy for several
reasons. First, unless a view by the deceased while alive has been communicated to the family,
there is no way of knowing what the deceased's preferences were. Second, even if the deceased's
preference were known, the family preferences should be the same as those of the individual
in order to respect patient autonomy.
Under a reimbursement scheme the organs of a brain-dead individual are allocated as it is
today, based on medical criteria. Therefore, it is distributionally more eﬃcient than a policy
based on priority but less eﬃcient than a free market under which a distribution based on
ability to pay may yield higher patient utility.
2.3.2. Future Delivery Markets
A futures contract can be deﬁned as a legally binding contract based on the acquisition of the
right today while the individual is alive and well, to procure her organs upon death. Futures
contracts depend on the structure of the market (perfect, imperfect, monopsonist), designation
of the beneﬁciary (donor, family) and the default rule (opt-in, opt-out).
2.3.2.1. Opt-in futures contract
In opt-in futures contract, an individual sells the property rights of his designated organs to a
delegated institution(s) today if he or she dies in the future under circumstances that would
render her organs suitable for transplantation. If the individual agrees to enter into a futures
contract, the purchaser of the rights over the individual's organs typically would make yearly
payments to him or a lump-sum payment to his family after his death. On the other hand,
those who do not enter into a futures contract would presumably be deemed to wish not to
donate. Further, the agreement does not allow family members to veto the contract or deny
donation even if the beneﬁciary is the family29.
29It has been emphasized by the AMA (1995) that the decision to accept the ﬁnancial incentive cannot be
made by the family or the designated beneﬁciary. This practice is analogous to post-mortem life insurance
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An inﬂuential article on the proposal of a future delivery market of human organs is due to
Schwindt and Vining (1986). They envisaged an opt-in futures market in which an individual
engages into a lifetime and inalienable contract that would result in receiving a single cash
payment from the government as the single buyer (monopsonist) in exchange for the right to
procure his organs upon demise. Under the Schwindt and Vining's proposal, the government
asks the recipient (or his insurance company) a price for the organ such that it covers the
administrative costs of the government per donor plus the amount of payment to the donor.
Cohen (1989) and Hansmann (1989) propose an (im)perfectly competitive futures market in
which health insurance companies would be the purchasers of the future rights to organs. By
checking a box in the yearly insurance premium statement, an individual gives the insurance
company the right to procure his designated organs for transplantation upon his demise. Unlike
the proposal by Schwindt and Vining (1986), individuals could change their mind at any time
and they would be assumed to wish an automatic renewal of the contract every year unless they
act otherwise. Upon the initiation of the contract, the insurance companies submit to a central
national registry the identiﬁcation of its insureds and hospitals are then required to check the
national registry upon death of the insured and locate the donors. According to Hansmann
(1989) the recipient of the deceased's organs or the recipient's insurance company would be
then required to pay the stated price. This stated price could be determined by the forces of
demand and supply or set by the government which in turn determines the insurance premium
reduction oﬀered by the insurance company. Hansmann (1989) argues that establishing a
futures market with multiple insurance companies has many administrative advantages over
the futures market with government monopsony proposed by Schwindt and Vining (1986)
and Cohen (1989). All the proposals for a future delivery market speciﬁcally emphasize that
ﬁnancial incentives should not play a role in the equitable distribution of organs.
One of the issues of an opt-in futures contract under (im)perfectly competitive markets is
the price determination. Let q be the probability of having brain-death at any year t, h be the
health stock and T be the life expectancy at the time of entering into a futures contract. The
probability of dying under circumstances that would render her organs suitable for transplan-
tation during t years is 1−(1− q)t. For simplicity, suppose that health stock evolves according
to h (t) = H exp (−δt) with h (0) = H where δ is the time-invariant depreciation rate of health
stock and H is the initial health stock at time t = 0 . The value of organs depreciates with
redeem to the family of the deceased.
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time which might also depend on the lifestyle (i.e. whether the person is a smoker or a heavy
drinker) that might compromise the suitability of the organs for transplantation.
The health level at the end of T years is, h (T ) = Φ which is a constant such that Φ ≈ 0 and
H > Φ. At the end of her life span the organs will not be suitable for organ transplantation
unless she becomes brain-dead. Let p (t) be the insurance premium reduction oﬀered to the
individual at any year at the exchange of procuring her organs for transplantation in case
she becomes brain-dead in the future. Then, the insurance premium reduction oﬀered by
the insurer at any year t is, p (t) =
[
1− (1− q)t]h (t) = [1− (1− q)t]H exp (−δt) with
lim
t→∞p (t)→ 0. The amount of insurance premium reduction oﬀered to the individual is strictly
concave with respect to time with a negative second order derivative, indicating that the
amount of reduction ﬁrst increases and then decays towards zero. The total price paid by the
insurer, denoted by Π, equals the total insurance premium reduction the individual obtains
over the life span of the futures contract, Π =
´ T
0 p (t) dt. For a numerical example based on the
estimated donor probability by Howard and Byrne (2007), let the probability of dying during
a given year under circumstances that would render her organs suitable for transplantation be
q = 0.000066. Based on the central estimated value of a donor by Mendeloﬀ et al. (2004), the
value of organs is assumed to be $1, 087, 000 at the time of entering into a futures contract
and that the organs deteriorate at a rate of 3 percent (δ = 0.03). The time path of the
insurance premium reduction is given in ﬁgure 2.4 with varying degrees of q and δ. Under the
default risk, shown by the solid black line, the oﬀered insurance premium reduction reaches
up to almost $900 and then gradually declines toward zero. Under the default risks, the total
insurance premium reduction over the lifetime of a donor is approximately Π = $56, 810 with
a yearly average premium reduction, p = $684.
Under signiﬁcant health risks (i.e. drug abuse, heavy drinking or smoking), shown by the
light grey line in which the depreciation rate of health is doubled, both the total and the yearly
average amount of insurance premium reduction is lower (Π = $19, 105; p = $230) because
these health risks imply a reduced level of health (cirrhosis, renal failure, cancer) and thus
a lower probability of suitability for transplantation had the insured an accident leading to
brain-death. Therefore this group of individuals will not be solicited for futures contract.
Other individuals who have been classiﬁed as living risky lives such as motor bikers tend to
exhibit a higher likelihood of being in circumstances that results in brain injury, which is shown
by the dotted curve in which the probability of dying under circumstances resulting in brain-
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death is doubled. These risks substantially increase the total and the yearly average amount
of the insurance premium reduction (Π = $113, 463; p = 1, 367). The insurance company has
a vested interest in aggressively soliciting organ futures from high risk individuals, such as
motor bikers and gang members who are more likely to become brain-dead.
Figure 2.4.: Insurance premium reduction in opt-in futures markets
For a comparison, the insurance premium reduction based on the donor probabilities and
estimates of the value of a donor by age cohort given by Howard and Byrne (2007) is further
calculated as shown by the kinked grey line in ﬁgure 2.4 in which the probability of dying under
circumstances leading to brain-death and the value of the donor vary over age groups. The
total and the yearly average insurance premium reduction based on age groups shows a similar
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picture and is slightly higher than our calculations of the premium reduction under default
risks (Π = $70, 526; p = 850). Although future delivery markets positively discriminate against
individuals carrying signiﬁcant life-style risks in order to secure procurement upon demise, this
does not constitute a discriminatory policy with respect to Axiom 1.i in the same way that
higher health insurance premiums are not discriminatory because the insured lives a risky life.
In opt-in future delivery markets, the contract that has been signed by the individual to-
wards the recovery of organs upon death signals donor preferences to the next-of-kin. A
bilaterally binding contract between the individual and the institution(s) delegated to execute
such contracts indicates that the autonomy of the contractor is respected if and only if the
families are removed from the decision-making process.
Opt-in futures contracts are both horizontally and vertically equitable. The reason for the
former is that the organs of all contractors will be removed by the binding force of the contract
from which families are excluded. The reason for the latter is that the probability of mistakenly
removing the organs when the patient intention is not to be a donor is almost zero because
the non-donor does not have a contract documenting otherwise. The probability of mistakenly
not removing the organs when the patient intention is to be a donor is almost zero because
the deceased holds a bilaterally binding contract whose violation is against the interests of the
insurance company.
The assumption that the introduction of monetary incentives will drive out intrinsically
motivated volunteers from the market still stands under futures contract. Individuals who
would be willing to donate under an altruistic system might be oﬀended by the introduction of
payment and might refuse to participate in a futures contract. Among others, the eﬀectiveness
of an opt-in futures contract scheme thus depends on the number of altruists exiting the market
relative to the supply induced by oﬀering such monetary incentives and on the structure of
the market.
Cash payments oﬀered upon futures contracts aggravate the time inconsistency problem
relative to priority rewards under reciprocal systems because the beneﬁts of entering into a
futures contract are not conditional upon rescinding (Byrne and Thompson, 2001). When
an individual enters into a futures contract she receives a lump-sum or yearly payment. But
after receiving the reward she chooses to rescind her donor status. At the overall everyone
chooses to enter into a futures contract and receives the payment but the actual procurement
rates remain unchanged. Therefore proposals like that of Hansmann (1989) are susceptible
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Figure 2.5.: Futures market vs. free market
to produce perverse supply responses because individuals are allowed to rescind. According
to Byrne and Thompson (2001), perverse supply responses could be resolved by excluding
the next-of-kin from the decision-making process and by rendering the initial decision of the
individual irreversible or by making post-donation payments to the next-of-kin.
Figure 2.5 depicts the comparison of futures market relative to a contemporaneous free mar-
ket system in which the line S represents the usual perfectly inelastic supply when there is
sale prohibition, S
′
represents the free market supply and D represents the demand for trans-
plantable kidneys. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no crowding-out in the market
and the supply is linear. Since a futures market implies two supply schedules (one of proposed
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and one of delivered), the curve S0 represents the supply curve for the promised kidneys.
Due to a low probability of brain-death, the organs of a signiﬁcant fraction of contractors
will not be suitable for transplantation. Further, the time inconsistency implies that some of
the contractors will rescind their donor status after receiving the reward. Upon delivery time
the supply will be lower than at the time of contracting and will pivot to the left of the free
market curve because of this time inconsistency and the low probability of brain-death30. If
the futures market is established as a monopsony, then the monopsonist will set a cost C0
which will yield Q0 number of promised organs and Q1 number of organs available upon death
(Schwindt and Vining, 1986). Note that if futures market had not induced time inconsistent
behavior, the free market supply and the futures market delivery curve would be the same.
However at QFM , the price of futures is C1 − CRR as opposed to the free market price which
is CFM − CRR.
If the ﬁxed price oﬀered by a monopsonist in a contemporaneous market is above zero but
below the market clearing level as in ﬁgure 2.3, this will result in QSGM number of transplants
at a cost of CGM under a contemporaneous government monopsony. Note that at this output
level the actual cost of a transplant would be higher by C∗1 − C∗GM under a futures market
despite an ongoing rent-seeking under a contemporaneous monopsony. Thus, a futures market
is less cost-eﬀective than a free market and government monopsony because the former induces
time inconsistency that results in a lower-than-otherwise number of actual donors upon death
whereas the latter two policies are based on immediate exchange of organs.
The rent-seeking implied by the implicit cost C∗ under default rules results in Q∗ number
of transplants. Note that at this level of output the cost of transplantation under a futures
market is only CRR . Therefore a futures market is more cost-eﬀective than defaults. The
loss of eﬀectiveness in futures markets may be higher or lower than what is implied by ﬁgure
2.5, depending on how serious the time inconsistency problem is. On the other hand, if the
contract is binding and irreversible thus rescinding the donor status is not possible, then the
futures market would be equally cost-eﬀective as the free market based on the above analysis.
An opt-in futures contract might also lead to a problem akin to free riding, caused by infor-
mational asymmetries. Those who are medically ineligible for donation may opt-in for such a
contract if they are not medically screened regularly when they are alive whose examination
30The supply curve S0 pivots to S1 because if it had shifted parallelly to the left instead, then at Q
∗, a futures
market would be more costly than under any non-market solution (i.e. the cost of transplant would be
above CRR at Q
∗ under a futures market).
61
2. Deceased Organ Procurement Policies
imposes substantial costs on the insurer. This could be rectiﬁed if the insurance coverage is
suﬃciently widespread in the country. However the cost of identifying the medical history of
each insured poses ﬁnancing problems.
The existing proposals for a future delivery market are not independent of the extent of
health care coverage and health care politics in a country. For instance, in a private health
care system as in the US to which these proposals are essentially targeted, 17 percent of the
population lives without a health insurance. Thus an organ procurement system with many
proﬁt seeking insurance companies and without a universal health care coverage is unlikely to
succeed in executing these contracts, if not for other reasons.
2.3.2.2. Opt-out futures contract
Contrary to the opt-in, an opt-out futures contract requires an individual to pay the insurance
company if she strictly opposes to have her organs removed in case of brain-death. By default
those who do not engage in a futures contract are assumed to have no opposition to have their
organs removed after death. Similar to a presumed consent regime, it is envisaged that those
who do not want their organs removed upon death register themselves on a national non-donor
registry and pay a yearly ﬁxed amount in order to remain on the registry.
The primary feature of opt-out futures contracts is that by requiring individuals to pay, they
render the choice of opting out even more diﬃcult. The amount to be paid is also used as a
policy instrument to determine the level of this diﬃculty. Assuming that the degree of dissent
of individuals for organ donation is a set of inﬁnite values, the amount paid by those who
would like to retain their organs upon death should be as large as possible in order to retain
a large pool of organs to procure. Those who do not have a strong dissent will be discouraged
by the high premium and only the group of individuals who are strongly repulsed by the
idea of donation, possibly due to religious or cultural grounds, will choose to opt-out. But a
high premium will also provide an incentive for medically eligible persons to lie about their
health in order to avoid payment and medically ineligible persons to remain silent. However
it is technically implausible to medically screen those who stay at the default in order to
circumvent this adverse selection problem because they are presumably a large population.
At the overall every medically ineligible person will choose no action strategy and enter the
pool of available organs with no actual use for transplantation.
Requiring those who choose to object donation to pay is discriminatory because the choice
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to not contract is determined by the ability to pay.
In contrast to an opt-in futures market, the family cannot be removed from the decision-
making process simply because the system presumes that non-contractors are willing to donate
their organs upon demise. The reason is that either the non-contractor actually wanted to
contract in but he or she could not because of the inability to pay, or the non-contractor
simply did not bother to opt-out but actually wanted to not donate. In both cases, the family
should be considered as the third party besides the non-contractor and the institution31. For
contractors who paid a redeem and refused to donate, the family cannot be persuaded to
decide otherwise because the contract is bilateral and legally binding. Given the presumed
will of the non-contractor to donate and the decisive role of the surrogate, an opt-out futures
market will respect autonomy if the family has the same preferences as the non-contractor.
Opt-out futures contracts are horizontally equitable because the organs of all contractors
will remain intact by the binding force of the contract and the families cannot be persuaded
to donate. In contrast, they are vertically inequitable because the organs of those who did
not object and those who did not object yet did not intend to be a donor are removed upon
demise. Furthermore, there will be medically ineligible thus posthumously useless bodies of
those who did not object to be a donor because objection requires the contractor to redeem.
Both opt-in and opt-out futures markets do not deal with the allocation of organs because the
organs under a futures contract would be allocated as it is today, based on medical criteria.
Therefore they are distributionally less eﬃcient than free markets but more eﬃcient than
reciprocal systems.
2.4. Pareto Optimality
So far, we did not address Axiom 2.i in evaluating the deceased OPPs. If policy or allocation
A is Pareto superior to a set of policies or allocations (let's say, B,C and D), it is suﬃcient to
say that B, C and D cannot be Pareto optimal because A is already Pareto superior to them.
First we need to identify the relevant parties that are going to be aﬀected by the changes
31If an individual did not opt-out for whatever reason and if the organ removal is not enforceable without the
consent of the family this will induce an ex-ante strategic behavior to avoid both the organ removal and
the payment. Absent enforcement measures, this strategic behavior is not desirable for the government.
Therefore if the futures market is regulated by additional enforcement measures such that it requires the
family to pay the redeem if they object to removal of organs of the decedent who did not opt-out, then
there is no way of avoiding both donation and payment; either the organs will be removed or the family
will pay the redeem.
63
2. Deceased Organ Procurement Policies
in the policy rule. These are the potential recipients or patients, the next-of-kin of brain-dead
individuals and the health professionals. Second, we need to provide, at least theoretically,
the cost-eﬀectiveness ordering of the policies under consideration because Pareto superiority
depends on the relative number of individuals whose utilities are aﬀected. Based on ﬁgure
2.5, a required recovery is the most cost-eﬀective policy which increases the utility of QRR
patients, followed by a free market which increases the utility of QFM patients, a government
monopsony which increases the utility of QGM patients, a futures contract which increases the
utility of Q1 patients and ﬁnally a mandated choice and default rules (presumed and informed
consent) which increase the utility of Q∗ patients. From the existing empirical studies, we
know that a presumed consent yields more donations than an informed consent which in turn
is expected to yield more donations than a mandated choice.
It is obvious that any departure from a required recovery regime will yield a minimum
QRR − QFM number of patients and a maximum of QRR − Q∗ number of patients who will
be worse oﬀ by not getting a transplant. Thus there is no policy that is Pareto superior to a
required recovery regime. Now, suppose that there are QRR/k deceased donors (thus QRR/k
next-of-kin) under required recovery and QFM/k deceased donors (thus QFM/k next-of-kin)
under a free market where k is the ﬁxed number of transplantable organs harvested from one
deceased donor. Suppose further that a fraction, β, of all the deceased donors did not want
to donate (0 < β < 1). Thus the number of opposing next-of-kin to required recovery is
βQRR/k. Any departure from a free market regime to a required recovery regime will result
in QRR − QFM patients whose utility will increase by getting a transplant since a required
recovery regime forcefully procures the organs of all suitable brain-dead individuals. But there
will be βQRR/k number of next-of-kin who will be worse oﬀ because their decedent opposed
procurement yet her organs are procured. This indicates that neither a required recovery nor a
free market is Pareto superior to one another. Further, it is obvious that any departure from a
free market to any regime other than required recovery will also yield a minimum QFM−QGM
number of patients and a maximum of QFM − Q∗ number of patients who will be worse oﬀ
by not getting a transplant.
It may seem that any departure from a non-monetary policy to a monetary policy will
enhance the welfare of recipients and the welfare of the next-of-kin of the deceased without
producing losers. However, the introduction of money will increase the number of organs
available for transplants which in turn increase the number of procedures. A larger number
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of procedures will decrease the transplant fees. This will also reduce the proﬁts of dialysis
centers due to a lower demand for dialysis by unleashing the supply of kidneys and transplants.
Therefore any departure to any monetary policy will produce losers. The empirical evidence
conﬁrms that any movement from a presumed consent to an informed consent or mandated
choice will reduce the number of transplants. Thus any departure will reduce the utility of
some patients waiting for a transplant. Further, any departure from a presumed or an informed
consent to a required recovery regime will increase the utility of QRR − Q∗ patients but will
also reduce the utility of βQ∗/k next-of-kin whose decedent did not want to become a donor.
Any movement to a policy based on priority will reduce the utility of at least one recipient
who is a non-member of the pool even if such departure increases the utility of some pool
member patients waiting for a transplant.
Thus within non-monetary policies, any departure from one to another will either result
in lower number of transplants and therefore reduce the utility of some patients or reduce
the utility of the next-of-kin or reduce the utility of the unprioritized. Within monetary
policies, any departure from one to another will either result in lower number of transplants
and therefore reduce the utility of some patients or reduce the utility of surgeons, hospitals and
dialysis centers by driving proﬁts down. This establishes that none of the policies is Pareto
superior to another; thus all policies are Pareto optimal and therefore Pareto incomparable to
one another.
2.5. Policy Evaluation
This chapter presented an exhaustive review of the deceased OPPs by laying out an ax-
iomatic approach for policy evaluation. This axiomatic approach highlights three crucial no-
tions in evaluating any policy: fairness, eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness. Five absolute notions of
equity have been considered in order to evalutate the fairness of a policy. These are non-
discrimination, non-coercion, autonomy, horizontal equity and vertical equity. On the other
hand, the eﬃciency has been evaluated in terms of Pareto and in terms of distributional
eﬃciency. The summary of the evaluation of deceased OPPs is displayed in table 2.3.
A policy evaluator is said to be inequity averse if he/she is intolerant to inequitable outcomes
and is willing to give up any desirable attribute (i.e. eﬃciency or eﬀectiveness) of a policy
in order to achieve more equitable outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Similarly, a policy
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evaluator is said to be ineﬃciency averse if he/she is intolerant to ineﬃcient outcomes and is
willing to give up any desirable attribute (i.e. equity or eﬀectiveness) of a policy in order to
achieve more eﬃcient outcomes. Finally, a policy evaluator is said to be ineﬀectiveness averse
if he/she is intolerant to ineﬀective outcomes and is willing to give up any desirable attribute
(i.e. equity or eﬃciency) of a policy in order to achieve more eﬀective outcomes32.
Based on table 2.3, an inequity averse policy evaluator would prefer informed consent,
mandated choice, government monopsony, opt-in futures and reimbursement policy provided
that family veto is disallowed or the family has the same preferences as the individual. The ﬁrst
of these policies is equivalent to what is known as a ﬁrst person informed consent , which has
gained considerable attention in the US. According to this policy, organ procurement is solely
based on the documented intent of the donor and the organs of a registered deceased donor are
removed even if the family objects. Disallowing family veto is therefore a legal instrument and
the law plays a crucial role in shaping the permissibility by removing families from the decision-
making process. In contrast, disallowing family veto cannot be used as a legal instrument under
a monopsonistic market because the exchange is voluntary and the relevant party is no longer
the individual but his family. Therefore the only legal instrument the policy maker could
use in order to respect autonomy is to ensure that the family has the same preferences as
the individual and the only way to ensure overlapping preferences is through signalling them
by registries or donor cards. Therefore a precondition to an equitable monopsonistic market,
among others, is to manage a donor registry. This applies to reimbursement and opt-in futures
markets as well unless the contract is binding and enforceable in the latter.
It is shown that all policies attain Pareto optimality, either because any departure from
that policy puts one of the primary parties involved in the exchange (i.e. recipients, health
professionals) in a strictly less preferable situation, or necessitates the involvement of a sec-
ondary party (ie. the next-of-kin) in the exchange, whose interference may be undesirable
from an economic point of view. This indicates that a change in the allocation of organs from
one party (the brain-dead individual or the next-of-kin) to another (the patient) may not be
Pareto superior. In cases of conﬂicting interests one is highly likely to encounter in organ
32These types of aversion will always result in corner solutions (i.e either completely equitable satisfying Axiom
1.i-v, or completely eﬃcient satisfying Axiom 2.i-ii). A policy evaluator might also be willing to give up
some fairness and eﬃciency in order to choose a policy which is an interior solution (i.e equitable and
eﬃcient, but only partially). The superiority of an interior solution compared to a corner solution depends
on the relative weights the policy evaluator subjectively assigns to each sub-axioms.
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procurement, the characteristics of the optimal outcome and the costs of its attainment are
altered by law through placing the burden of reaching optimal arrangements on the donor and
his family rather than on the recipient. Therefore, the optimality of allocations may be diﬃcult
to apprehend without taking into account the impact of existing laws and the involvement of
the government (Mishan, 1967; Goodwin, 2006).
The Pareto criterion does not provide any discriminating indication since all policies lie on
the Pareto border. Therefore an ineﬃciency averse policy evaluator would list policies in a
preference ordering according to their distributional eﬃciency. Let , ∼, and % respectively
denote strictly preferable, equally preferable and equally or more preferable. Then based on
table 2.3 the preference ordering of an ineﬃciency averse policy evaluator is:
free market  presumed consent ∼ informed consent ∼ mandated choice ∼ required recovery
∼ monopsony ∼ reimbursement ∼ futures market  reciprocity
Finally an ineﬀectiveness averse policy evaluator would list the policies in preference or-
der according to their cost-eﬀectiveness. Based on table 2.3, the preference ordering of an
ineﬀectiveness averse policy evaluator is:
required recovery  free market  monopsony  opt-in futures market  reimbursement 
presumed consent  informed consent  mandated choice
The types of aversion and the corresponding policy choices are given in table 2.4. A policy
evaluator who has no concern for inequitable outcomes would prefer two distinctly opposite
policies: required recovery regime or a free market system. This choice depends on the extent to
which one perceives oneself on the scale of liberalization. In a society of communitarian-based
law, one could argue that requiring everyone to donate their organs would be constitutional
if people were suﬃciently concerned about life and the burden was shared by all. On the
other hand, in a relatively individualistic society attributes that we possess and appreciate
can become tragic liabilities if those natural assets are owned by someone else (Calabresi,
1991). In a libertarian society in which free enterprise and virtues of markets are highly
appreciated, requiring everyone to donate their organs would be unconstitutional and may
never ﬁnd grounds for legislation.
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Table 2.4.: Aversion and policy choice
Types of aversion
Inequity Ineﬃciency Ineﬀectiveness
(not ordered) (ordered) (ordered)
First-person Informed Ability Free market Required recovery
consent to pay Free market
Mandated choice Govt. monopsony Govt. monopsony
Policy Govt. monopsony Opt-in futures market Opt-in futures market
Choice Opt-in futures market Medical Reimbursement Reimbursement
Reimbursement Criteria Presumed consent Presumed consent
Informed consent Informed consent
Mandated choice Mandated choice
Required recovery
Priority Reciprocity
The preference-ordered policy choices that would satisfy the triplet goals of equity, eﬃciency
and eﬀectiveness are the government monopsony, opt-in futures market and the ﬁrst-person
informed consent policy if and only if one is willing to give up some eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness.
Otherwise, one cannot ﬁnd a policy that adheres to all three notions of aversion.
The analysis suggests that even though a monopsony may be inferior relative to a free market
system with respect to eﬃciency, a paid, government-funded and regulated monopsonistic
market with highly set safeguards to ensure an equitable distribution of deceased human
organs is the most preferable policy that conforms to the notions of fairness, eﬃciency and
eﬀectiveness described in this chapter. In the order of preference a government monopsony is
followed by an opt-in futures market and ﬁrst-person informed consent policy.
As opposed to a free market, a government monopsony avoids risks of discrimination and
violation of equal access for equal need by alienating all buying rights to a single non-proﬁt
organization and by ensuring an organ allocation based on medical criteria without any pref-
erence for the recipient's ﬁnancial status or insurance coverage33. By successfully managing a
donor registry, a contemporaneous monopsonistic market will maximize the probability that
the preferences of the family overlap with that of the deceased and will ensure patient auton-
omy. It is assumed that the ﬁxed price oﬀered by the monopsonist is likely to be below the
market clearing level but its eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness can be increased by setting the price
33A study by Leider and Roth (2010) shows that the majority of respondents supports the legality of markets
with institutional intermediaries such as the government or the insurance companies and ﬁnd them morally
acceptable compared to markets in which individuals pay for organs.
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as close as possible to the market clearing price. This may require robust and extensive re-
search on estimating the market price under given cultural, psychological and socio-economic
dynamics.
One might be concerned about the extent to which the chosen policy is internalized by
the society. The implementation of a monopsonistic market along the aforementioned lines
is relatively easy in western countries where institutions delegated to ensure an equitable
distribution of human organs are well-established. By enacting a legislation that legalizes
monopsony these institutions will be additionally responsible for an equitable and eﬃcient
procurement of deceased donors. However, the internalization of this process for those who
are subject to the rules of a monopsony may be diﬃcult and costly due to moral conﬂicts
and potential repugnance. Therefore, it might be reasonable to adopt a policy that is less
cost-eﬀective but one that heavily draws from an existing market that was once thought to be
morally outrageous: Insurance markets. Insurance programs resemble market-based reform
proposals today because both place value on the dead (Goodwin, 2006). A typical example
is viatical or life settlements34. The idea of the sale of a life insurance policy was repugnant
in the 19th century not only because it was a bet on someone's death but also it was a life
insurance policy held by entities that proﬁt from deaths (Roth, 2007). Proponents of life
insurance were compared to criminals because they were allegedly promoting a practice that
would result in murders (Goodwin, 2006). Despite these ethical reservations, viatical and
life settlements remain useful for the ﬁnancial management of elderly or terminally ill people.
Although repugnance may have endured, people internalized the idea of life insurance contracts
and what policy owners do with them. Therefore extending the scope of life or health insurance
policies by including an additional clause on future delivery of organs upon demise might be
more feasible and less repugnant than initiating unaccustomed procurement systems.
34Viatical settlement is the sale of a life insurance policy before it matures in order to pay extremely high
health insurance premiums. These settlements involve insured individuals with much shorter life expectancy
(generally two years or less) due to terminal illness. Life settlements are similar except that the life
expectancy of the policy owner is more than two years.
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A billboard in San Francisco, June 2006. Photo by Mark Coggins
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3. The Impact of Presumed Consent Laws
and Institutions on Deceased Organ
Donation
Those who seek to help others are twice disadvantaged in a manner that can easily
be avoided by simply doing no more than everyone else. Tom Koch
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3.1. Introduction
Over the last decades, the gap between the number of patients on the waiting list and the
number of organ donors has grown rapidly, causing an increasing shortage of transplantable
organs. The chronic organ shortage in developed countries has become a major policy issue
and recent proposals have focused on the eﬀectiveness of presumed consent laws in increasing
deceased donations. Particularly in the US where the gap between those who need an organ
transplant and the number of transplantable organs is growing faster than ever, propositions
to enact a presumed consent regime have been discussed at some length. Recently the British
Parliament discussed the proposition of a system of presumed consent which has received
support from the medical community.
Deceased organ procurement systems revolve around the defaults of presumed and informed
consent legislations. A growing debate has emerged on the pros and cons of both systems
among medical professionals, bioethicists, legal practitioners and philosophers. In presumed
consent or opt-out regimes, a brain-dead individual whose organs are suitable for transplan-
tation is considered to be a donor unless she premortem took an aﬃrmative action to revoke
it. Therefore, it is presumed that the deceased donor does not have any objection to have her
organs removed unless he or she has stated a preference to not donate.
In contrast under informed consent or opt-in system, individuals are required to take an
explicit aﬃrmative action to become donors. Countries in which the default rule is not to
donate implicitly assume that there is a social reluctance towards organ donation. Therefore,
individuals who are not registered in the system are assumed to not donate their organs
upon demise. However, the family of the deceased is allowed to express an opinion, generally
respected by the hospital even though there are otherwise clear indications on the part of the
donor . This practice is considered to place additional burden and stress of decision-making
on families. In fact, informing families about the wishes of the deceased rather than asking to
give consent has proved the families to rarely oppose donation (May et al., 2000). However
the practice is changing. Recently in the US a ﬁrst-person informed consent system has been
implemented by which organ procurement is solely based on the documented intent of the
donor and the organs of a registered deceased donor are removed even if the family objects1.
Most of the European countries have adopted presumed consent legislation and it is sug-
1As of April 2010, the ﬁrst-person consent system has been ratiﬁed in all states in the US except Kansas and
Wisconsin.
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gested that presumed consent can play an important role in increasing donation rates (Johnson
and Goldstein, 2003; Gimbel et al., 2003; Abadie and Gay, 2006; Neto et al., 2007). However,
disunity continues within the medical community and experts have expressed their skepticism
whether any change in legislation per se could increase donations (Matesanz, 1998; Grigoras
et al., 2010). Healy (2005) asserts that countries that enacted presumed consent regime also
implemented a number of other practices to increase deceased donation rates. Thus presumed
consent is an indicator of a country's commitment to donation rather than a direct cause
of high donation rates2. Under presumed consent, the wishes of the decedent's family are
not taken into account and the next-of-kin is not allowed to override the donor's wish to do-
nate. However in practice countries adopted presumed consent consider families' wishes and
the-next-of-kin is allowed to veto donation even if the decedent has previously revealed her
preference to donate organs3. The reason for considering families' decision in the process has
been to avoid public backlash, liability suits and to show respect for the grieving family (Healy,
2005; May et al., 2000). Thus presumed consent is not fully enforced and families are still
allowed to make the ﬁnal decision regarding organ donation. From this perspective, it is not
clear whether enforcing presumed consent legislation has a positive eﬀect on organ donation
rates.
On the other hand presumed consent laws express a social norm about the default course
of action. On the contrary of informed consent where donation is a special option (opt-in),
it is assumed to be the default option (opt-out) under presumed consent (Healy, 2005). A
higher number of deceased organs is expected to be procured because individuals who do not
legally express their wishes to not donate are considered as having no opposition to have their
organs removed. Based on this view enforcing presumed consent may have a positive eﬀect on
donation rates but it may not be of great magnitude because in practice families can override
the wish of the deceased individual to donate.
This chapter purports to advance the literature on the impact of presumed consent laws
2This strategy, known as the Spanish model of organ procurement , has been introduced in 1989 by the eﬀorts of
Dr. Rafael Matesanz and has been successfully implemented in Spain, followed by Italy and later by South
Australia. The Spanish model adopts the principle of decentralization of the donor coordination through
regional coordination and aims to cope with the obstacles faced by physicians and staﬀ (Chang et al., 2003).
These include under-trained doctors, unidentiﬁed donors and the reluctance and incompetence to approach
families to request donation. Therefore, Spanish model endorses continuous education and training of
transplant coordinators to improve management and communication skills.
3A remarkable exception to this case is Austria and recently Czech Republic where presumed consent legisla-
tion is strictly enforced, that is families are ruled out of the decision-making process. Therefore the organs
of the donor can be procured unless the donor opposed the removal of her organs.
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on deceased donation rates by examining the interactions between a presumed consent legal
regime and other customs and institutions. The chapter contributes to the existing empiri-
cal literature in two respects. First, it is argued that the impact of presumed consent laws
on deceased donations depends on various institutional settings which have not been explic-
itly modeled previously. Second, failure to control for the unobserved country heterogeneity
will lead to misleading inference regarding the impact of presumed consent legislation. This
unobserved country heterogeneity cannot be estimated by a FE model because laws and insti-
tutions show very little or no variance overtime or by a random eﬀects model in the presence
of correlated country eﬀects. In this study we use an alternative three-stage error component
estimator which controls for the unobserved country heterogeneity and still identify the impact
of presumed consent laws on deceased donation rates.
To address these issues, data on the total number of deceased donations, total per capita
health expenditure, the number of registered deaths caused by cerebro vascular diseases, motor
vehicle accidents and committed intentional homicides, civil rights and liberties and binary
information on consent legislation, legal systems, family consent, and donor registry systems
have been collected for 28 countries over the period 1993-2006.
3.2. Data Source and Descriptive Statistics
The data cover Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Swe-
den, the UK and the US. Data on total population is obtained from World Bank, Health,
Nutrition and Population statistics database4. Data on the number of total deceased dona-
tions are compiled from the TPM, International Registry of Donation and Transplantation5.
Registered number of deaths caused by cerebro vascular diseases, motor vehicle accidents and
homicides are compiled from the WHO Mortality database6. The number of deceased dona-
tions and the registered deaths are divided by the population and multiplied by million to
obtain the total deceased donation rates and the registered death rates pmp. Data on the
purchasing power parity adjusted per capita total health expenditure is obtained from the
4http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/
5TPM, International registry of donation and transplantation, http://www.tpm.org/
6http://www.who.int/healthinfo/morttables/en/index.html
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WHOSIS database7. Information on consent legislation is compiled from Abadie and Gay
(2006) and Healy (2005). Consent legislation variable takes the value of 1 for countries which
enacted presumed consent and 0 for countries which enacted informed consent legislation. The
data on civil rights and liberties is compiled from the Freedom House8. Data on legal systems
have been collected from the CIA, World Factbook9. The legal system variable takes the value
of 1 for common law countries and 0 for civil law countries. Information on donor registry
and family consent is obtained from the Global Observatory on Donation and Transplanta-
tion, Abadie and Gay (2006) and via personal communication with the national transplant
authorities10. The family consent variable takes the value of 1 if the next-of-kin consent is
always sought in deceased donations and 0 otherwise11. The combined registry variable takes
the value of 1 if the country maintains a combined registry in any year and 0 if the country
maintains at most a single registry in any year12.
Table 3.1 displays country-by-country deceased donation rates, legislative defaults and con-
sensual practices in the year 2006. With the exception of Greece, Portugal and Slovak Republic
(Sweden and Poland), all presumed consent countries in the sample which (do not) routinely
seek family consent also (do not) allow family to veto their next-of-kin's wishes. On the other
hand, all informed consent countries with the exception of Canada allow family veto irre-
spective of whether family consent is routinely sought. Only about 29 percent of the sample
countries managed a combined registry system in 2006.
The descriptive statistics are given in table 3.2. Column (1) shows means and standard
deviations for the entire sample. Columns (2) and (3) show means and standard deviations
for 18 presumed consent and 10 informed consent countries respectively. Column (4) shows
7http://www.who.int/whosis/en/index.html
8The civil liberties index comprises of freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights,
rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. In the sample, the total number of points awarded
to civil rights and liberties corresponds to a point between 4 and 1, 1 being the highest and 4 being the
lowest level of freedom. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/FIWAllScores.xls
9http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook
10Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation, http://data.transplant-
observatory.org/paginas/informes/DatosUsuario.aspx
11If a country always seeks family consent, this means that the consent of the family is asked every time
irrespective of the preferences of the donor (i.e. a deceased could have premortem allowed the removal of
her organs but the hospital still asks the family or a deceased could have premortem opposed the removal
of her organs but the hospital still asks the family).
12A combined registry indicates that the country allows both organ donors and organ retainers the right
to express their wishes regarding organ donation by registering. On the other hand, a single registry
indicates that the country allows either organ donors or organ retainers to express their wishes by registering,
depending on the default rule (i.e. presumed or informed consent).
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the diﬀerences between columns (2) and (3) along with the standard errors of the t-statistic
for the null hypothesis of equal means for presumed and informed countries. In the sample,
the mean deceased donation rate is slightly higher in presumed consent countries with a 14-
year average of 15.25 compared to an average of 14.15 deceased donation rate for informed
consent countries. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at conventional test levels, shown in column
(4). Presumed consent countries have statistically signiﬁcantly lower health spending, higher
cerebro-vascular diseases and motor vehicle death rates and a lower civil liberties compared
to informed consent countries.
3.3. Regression Analysis
Four of the 28 countries were discarded from the regression analysis. Switzerland is discarded
because the consent legislation varies by canton although it is an informed consent country
by federal law. Israel is discarded in order to reduce heterogeneity in social norms13. Greece
is discarded on the grounds that the cause of low transplant rates is a low number of medical
staﬀ and intensive care units and not a low deceased donation rate (Karatzas et al., 2007).
Luxembourg is discarded due to data inconsistencies on deceased donation rates. After re-
moving Switzerland, Israel, Greece and Luxembourg, the regressions were performed for the
remaining 24 countries over the period of 1993-2006.
In empirical studies most often the interest is on the impact of time-invariant or almost
time-invariant variables on the dependent variable. The researcher may want to estimate the
impact of institutions or laws which do not change in the short-run. In such cases, a FE error
component model does not allow the estimation of the parameters of these time-invariant
variables. In the case of slowly changing variables with little within variance a FE model
further results in ineﬃciency that lead to highly unreliable point estimates and misleading
inference. Under these circumstances the solution to estimating the impact of time-invariant
or almost time-invariant explanatory variables is to employ a pooled OLS or a RE estimation.
However, both RE model and pooled OLS will be biased if the unobserved eﬀects are correlated
with the regressors and the latter estimation will be less eﬃcient than a RE estimation even
if the unobserved country eﬀects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. In this
13The cause of extremely low deceased donations in Israel is the reservation on the deﬁnition of death and the
belief that the Jewish Law forbidding desecration of the human body outlaws donation (Steinbuch, 2008).
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chapter, the impact of presumed consent laws on deceased donations is estimated via the
FEVD proposed by Plumper and Troeger (2007)14. The estimation results are reported in
table 3.3.
Column (1) displays the entire sample estimation results with only the consent legislation
variable as the explanatory factor. Without taking into account of the potential remaining
factors, presumed consent countries exhibit 3.5 percent higher deceased donation rates on
average, compared to informed consent countries. In the absence of country speciﬁc eﬀects
and other explanatory factors, Abadie and Gay (2006) found that the impact of presumed
consent on deceased donation rates is much higher, around 15 percent on average once the
year ﬁxed eﬀects have been accounted for. The reason is that without country speciﬁc eﬀects
the consent legislation variable soaks up most of the explanatory power of the unobserved
heterogeneity and shows a higher-than-otherwise impact of presumed consent laws.
The likelihood of medically becoming a donor is greater for individuals who have been ex-
posed to situations in which irreversible brain injury resulting in brain death is more likely.
Given medical compatibility, victims of motor vehicle accidents, assault and cerebro vascular
diseases are suitable candidates for transplantation. In column (2) we incorporated the poten-
tial donor pool as a factor that might aﬀect deceased donation rates. The estimation results
detect a sizeable but lower impact of potential donor pool on deceased donation rates than
previously predicted15.
Column (3) shows that presumed consent countries exhibit 5.3 percent higher deceased
donation rates on average compared to informed consent countries after accounting for total
per capita health expenditure, death rates caused by cerebro vascular diseases, motor vehicle
accidents and homicides, civil rights and liberties and legal systems, whose coeﬃcients are
14It is a three stage estimator that allows estimating the impact of time-invariant variables and that is more
eﬃcient than the FE model in estimating parameters of almost time-invariant variables. In the ﬁrst stage the
country speciﬁc eﬀects are estimated via FE excluding time-invariant and almost time-invariant variables.
In the second stage the country speciﬁc eﬀects are decomposed into an unexplained and an explained part
by the regression on the time-invariant or almost time-invariant variables. In the third stage a (standard
error corrected) pooled OLS is performed by including all the time-variant and invariant variables in the
model and the unexplained part (residuals) from the second stage. The third stage allows for computing
the correct standard errors of the parameters of (almost) time-invariant variables.
15The control of supply measures for donation policy purposes creates a paradox in organ collection because the
promotion of deceased donation through continuous education and awareness programs contradicts policies
that aim to reduce the prevalence of motor vehicle accidents and hand-gun crimes by raising awareness
(Annas, 1988). Recently, Dickert-Conlin et al. (2009) found that organ donations due to motor vehicle
accidents increase by 10 percent following helmet law repeals and that a nationwide elimination of helmet
laws in the US would increase the annual supply of organ donors by less than 1 percent.
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statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels16.
The impact of presumed consent laws on deceased donation can be challenged by the fact
that signiﬁcant variations in deceased donation rates are accounted by the way consent laws
are practiced and not only by the legal framework. It is argued that the practice of presumed
consent regime depends on family referral and donor administration through registries. First,
with notable exceptions most of the countries have either a national registry of volunteers
or refusals. In presumed consent countries where the default rule is to donate, a registry of
refusal (non-donor) allows individuals to explicitly oppose donation. In contrast, in informed
consent countries where the default rule is not donate, a registry of volunteers (donor) allows
individuals to explicitly consent to donation. It might be argued that if family consent is
sought, donor administration should have no impact on deceased donation. However, donor
registry can serve as a signaling device both to the next-of-kin and the hospital (Byrne and
Thompson, 2001). It is known that the preference of the potential donor is the major pre-
dictor of family preference (Tabarrok et al., 2004). This signaling however depends on the
legislative default. Under presumed consent, a combined registry allows some individuals to
be registered as donors besides those who explicitly object donation. In turn the family who
previously would have likely denied consent because of the unknown preferences of the poten-
tial donor under a single registry will consent to donation knowing their deceased next-of kin
is a registered donor. However the consent rates for those who are not registered will decline
because if the individual did not go through the trouble of registering, family may infer that
the person was against donation.
On the other hand, under informed consent, a combined registry allows some individuals
whose preferences towards donation were previously unknown to be registered as non-donors
in addition to those who explicitly consent to donate. In turn, the family will deny consent
knowing their deceased next-of-kin is a registered non-donor. However, the consent rates for
those who are not registered may rise because if the individual did not register as non-donor,
the next-of-kin may infer that the patient would have wanted to donate. Therefore it remains
ambiguous whether establishing a combined registry will increase deceased donation rates.
16In the preliminary analysis, a binary variable representing religious belief that takes the value of 1 for
countries in which the majority of the population is catholic and 0 otherwise has been considered as a
potential factor that might aﬀect deceased donation rates. However, such a measurement will not represent
the eﬀect of religious beliefs on deceased donation because it does not take into account the practice of
religion but merely represents a group of the population who consider themselves as Catholics.
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In order to correctly identify the impact of presumed consent on deceased donations, we
included family consent and donor registry variables in columns (4) and (5) as well as all
the relevant interactions of presumed consent, family consent and donor registry variables in
column (6)17. Based on the estimation results displayed in the last column of table 3.3, the
impact of presumed consent law and other procurement attributes on deceased donation rates
are reported in table 3.4 in which the sample countries are divided into eight groups based on
the information on consent legislation, family consent and national registry. Each cell gives
the impact of the row group on the corresponding column group. The particular interest is
the impact of presumed consent legislation on deceased donation rates given its interaction
with the family consent and the national registry variables.
Countries in which presumed consent is enacted exhibit 19 percent higher deceased dona-
tion rates on average compared to informed consent countries given both types of countries do
not routinely seek family consent, irrespective of the donor administration system (cells cor-
responding to third row seventh column and fourth row eighth column). On the other hand
if family consent is routinely sought but at most a single registry is maintained, presumed
consent countries exhibit only 8 percent higher deceased donation rates on average (cell corre-
sponding to ﬁrst row ﬁfth column). In contrast, if both types of countries maintain combined
registries and always seek family consent, the impact of presumed consent on deceased dona-
tion rates is substantially higher around 75 percent on average (cell corresponding to second
row sixth column).
Within presumed consent countries, routinely seeking family consent exhibit 15 percent
lower donations on average under a single registry system (cell corresponding to ﬁrst row third
column) but 36 percent higher donation rates on average if a combined registry is maintained
(cell corresponding to second row fourth column). On the other hand, routinely seeking family
consent has a negative impact on deceased donation rates, around 7 percent, within informed
consent countries irrespective of the type of donor registry (cells corresponding to ﬁfth row
seventh column and sixth row eighth column).
17In the speciﬁcation analysis, a family veto dummy variable compiled from various sources has been considered
as a potential explanatory factor. However, it has not been considered in the regressions for two reasons.
First, the family veto variable is highly correlated with consent legislation and registry variables whose
inclusion in the regressions rendered signiﬁcant estimates but a lower than otherwise R-squared, conﬁrming
collinearity. Second, even if countries allow the right to veto donor's wishes families do not use this right
either because they do not want to oppose their loved one's wishes or do not actually aware whether such
a right has been granted.
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Maintaining a combined registry exhibit a negative impact on deceased donation rates,
around 26 percent, within informed consent countries (cells corresponding to eighth row sev-
enth column and sixth row ﬁfth column) whereas maintaining a combined registry exhibit 19
percent higher deceased donation rates on average within presumed consent countries which
routinely seek family consent (cell corresponding to second row ﬁrst column). However, main-
taining a combined registry exhibits a negative impact on deceased donation rates, around
26 percent on average within presumed consent countries which do not routinely seek family
consent (cell corresponding to fourth row third column). This result might indicate that main-
taining a combined registry in presumed consent countries functions as a positive signaling
device when families are always asked for consent. A possible explanation is that in an opt-out
system in which only those who explicitly oppose donation can register, most of the individ-
uals who do not oppose donation cannot signal or express their preferences to their families
especially if discussing issues of donating one's organs upon his or her death is a diﬃcult task
and considered a taboo. Upon the introduction of a donor registry in such opt-out systems,
by registering as donor some individuals will no longer have unknown preferences. This will
induce families to allow donation of the organs of their deceased next-of-kin. On the other
hand if families are not asked for consent they will be oﬀended by being excluded from the
procurement process and oppose donation even if the decedent was a registered donor, on
the grounds that they assert a right on the body of their next-of-kin however such a right
is not allowed to be exercised. However exceptions do exist. In Austria and Czech republic
where the former country long considered the body of the deceased a property of the state, the
deceased donation rates are substantially higher not only because the procurement process is
well organized and eﬃcient but also the public tends to reconcile with the strict enforcement
of presumed consent legislation, internalizes the practice of exclusion of the family from the
decision-making process and accepts organ donation as an ideology that is perceived as an
implicit communal contract (Mossialos et al., 2008).
3.4. Policy Implications
This chapter presented empirical evidence on the impact of presumed consent laws on deceased
donation rates by examining the interactions between a presumed consent legal regime and
other customs and institutions. Given the small sample size, the absence of suﬃcient variation
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3.4. Policy Implications
in consent legislation variable within countries over time and the points Healy (2005) raises
about presumed consent being a signal of a country's commitment to donation rather than
a direct cause of higher donation rates, the results presented should be treated with extreme
caution.
In order to identify both the diﬀerential country endowments of deceased donation rates and
the impact of consent legislation and other time-invariant legislative attributes on deceased
donation rates, a FEVD model that decomposes country ﬁxed eﬀects into an unexplained
part and a part that is explained by our time-invariant or almost time-invariant explanatory
variables is estimated. The evidence conﬁrms that countries in which presumed consent is
enacted produce substantially higher deceased donation rates. However, the magnitude of this
impact depends on the involvement of the family and the establishment of donor administration
systems that have not been addressed previously. Presumed consent laws may greatly increase
deceased donations if hospitals cease to seek family consent and maintain at most a non-
donor registry or always seek family consent irrespective of the documented preferences of the
deceased but also give both organ retainers and donors the right to state preference through
registration (i.e. combined registry). The evidence indicates that otherwise presumed consent
legislation does not have a sizeable impact on deceased donation rates.
These results may have serious implications in the course of switching from an informed to
a presumed consent legislation. As the Brazilian experience with the presumed consent regime
showed, potentially perverse eﬀects that might arise due to failure to build social support and
to establish better and timely organization of the procurement processes should not be ruled
out. Brazil switched to presumed consent regime in 1998 that allowed organ removal from
the deceased without seeking family consent and later attempted to reinforce the system by
the threat of prosecuting doctors who refused to extract the organs of the deceased. Not only
the presumed consent legislation has received a public backlash causing many to register as
non-donors but also suﬀered from severe lack of medical infrastructure, timely organization of
the procurement process and eﬃcient allocation of organs (Csillag, 1998; Jensen, 2000). The
legislation is inevitably abolished few years later. Similar concerns have been raised in Romania
which recently switched from an informed to a presumed consent legislation (Grigoras et al.,
2010). Therefore a presumed consent regime is not sustainable without a solid infrastructure
and social support and is unlikely to be eﬀective (Verheijde et al., 2009). It seems early to
conclude for advocates, for example in the UK that switching to presumed consent laws by
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observing the successes of Spain on one side and Austria on the other side would increase
deceased donations even though both countries enacted presumed consent law yet practices
seem to diﬀer to a large extent.
In a recent report the BMA expressed their support for a soft presumed consent system
with safeguards in the UK which continues to involve the family (English, 2007). The empirical
evidence presented concurs with the BMA's view of a system of soft presumed consent and
it might be eﬀective in controlling organ shortages provided that families are not ruled out of
the decision-making process in the transition period and a combined registry is established in
order to respect both opponents' and advocates' views towards donation. Concerning strictly
presumed consent countries where families are excluded from the procurement process, further
empirical evidence may be needed to examine their success in raising donations.
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As part of a NEAD chain, Dr. Stuart Geﬀner transplants a living donor kidney at Beth Israel
Hospital in Newark in March 2009. Photo by Matt Rainey (The Star-Ledger)
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4. Living Organ Procurement Policies
Shall organs go to the sickest, or to the ones with most promise of recovery; on a
ﬁrst come, ﬁrst serve basis; to the most valuable patient; to the one with the most
dependents; to women and children ﬁrst; to those who can pay; to whom? Joseph
Fletcher
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Living donor OPPs diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the deceased OPPs both in terms of the organs in
question as well as in terms of the denouement of the donor. Transplantation of living donor
organs are restricted to a single kidney, partial lung and partial liver transplants of which the
latter two are complicated procedures and expose donors to signiﬁcant health risks.
There are quite few advantages of using living donor organs for transplantation. First,
the survival rates for living donor organ recipients are markedly higher than deceased donor
organ recipients. Currently in the US for which data is readily available from the OPTN,
5-year survival rates of a kidney, partial liver and partial lung recipients from a living donor
is 90.1, 77.8 and 35.8 percent compared to 81.9, 72.0 and 47.3 percent from deceased donors
respectively. At a rough computation, a living donor organ recipient in the US is 16.4 percent
more likely to live 5 years than a deceased donor organ recipient.
Despite the advances in immunosuppressive therapy, most of the living donors are altruistic
and biologically related family members whose organs are less likely to be rejected by the
recipient1. In fact about 80 percent of living donors and recipients in the US are biologically
or emotionally related (Becker and Elias, 2007). Biologically related living organ donation is
one of the driving forces that leads to higher survival rates than under deceased donation.
A third advantage is that living donation allows for suﬃcient time to prepare the kidney
recipient and the donor for transplantation which reduces the likelihood of complications
during surgery (Steinbuch, 2008). During a living organ transplantation, the removed kidney
can be transplanted right away without any concern for cold ischemia time that would typically
occur in cadaveric transplantation2. This advantage of living donor organs greatly increases
the medical eﬀectiveness of transplantation. Living donation also allows for the possibility
of preemptive transplantation which is conﬁrmed to have some survival advantages (Kasiske
et al., 2002; Mange and Weir, 2003; Gill et al., 2004)3.
When a living donor donates one of his kidneys, failure of the remaining kidney would
require a transplant albeit there exists a proliﬁc body of clinical evidence documenting that
living kidney donors have an equal post-operative quality of life to those with both kidneys
1Deceased donors cannot be altruists but rather volunteers because altruism is deﬁned as the act of knowingly
harming him/herself for the beneﬁt of others. By this deﬁnition only living donors are true altruists.
However, in common parlance altruism refers to the act of furthering the welfare of others which is diﬀerent
than the former.
2Cold ischemia time is the period that begins when an organ is cooled after the removal and ends when it is
implanted into the recipient.
3A kidney transplant is called preemptive if the patient did not go through pre-transplant dialysis which is
associated with increasing risks of mortality and allograft failure.
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intact (Ku and Kim, 2010). Living donation still carries signiﬁcant health risks for the donor
which is not a problem under deceased organ procurement.
The major distinction between living OPPs and deceased OPPs is that the former set of
policies will always respect patient autonomy because the individual in question states her
preference or will and act accordingly while alive whereas policies involving the procurement
of the organs of the deceased may impinge upon the wishes of the formerly competent patient
because a surrogate has to decide on his/her behalf.
4.1. Policies based on monetary incentives
A decade ago, market incentives to living donors in return for supplying a non-vital organ
(kidney) or revising the allocation rather than procurement were out of the scope of the debate
because most economists thought of the former raising ethical issues and the latter raising
equity concerns. Under monetary incentives for living donors most of the scholars proposed
monopsonistic systems or compensation of non-medical risks for living donors although there
are exceptions4.
4.1.1. Government Monopsony
In a monopsony, all buying and selling rights are alienated to the government which oﬀers a
ﬁxed price for organs of living unrelated donors. The government then delegates this duty to
a non-proﬁt organization who is responsible for the equitable distribution of organs as well as
the matching of potential donors and recipients.
The commercialization of human organs is prohibited in all countries but one. A regulated
market in living donor kidneys has been established in Iran, known as the Iranian Model . In
1988, Iran adopted a paid, government-funded, regulated living unrelated kidney transplant
program. If an ESRD patient does not have a willing, living related donor and if a deceased
donor cannot be found within six months, then the patient is referred to DATPA which is
the only organization delegated to ﬁnd suitable living unrelated donors (Ghods and Savaj,
2006). Neither the transplant centers nor the transplant physicians play a role in ﬁnding
and matching donors (Hippen, 2008). Those who would like to sell their kidneys are also
4Bartz (2003) proposed that prisoners shall be given a reduced sentence which, according to his proposal,
ranges between 60 days to 8 years depending on the portion of the body donated, premortem or posthu-
mously.
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referred to DATPA and no ﬁnancial incentive is oﬀered to ﬁnd an immunologically compatible
donor. After the transplantation the government pays for all the expenses of the operation
and the donor receives approxiamately $1, 200 and a health insurance from the government.
The donor also receives a separate payment of $2, 300 − $4, 500 either from the recipient or
from a charitable organization (Hippen, 2008). With the Iranian model the kidney waiting list
has been completely eliminated by 1999. The Iranian model also has few safeguards in order
to protect donors. The system does not allow any broker or third party to involve into the
exchange. In order to prevent organ traﬃcking foreigners are not allowed to receive kidneys
from Iranian living unrelated donors or to donate kidneys to Iranian patients.
In western countries, proposals for a government monopsony in living donors has been
discussed by Rapoport et al. (2002), Harris and Erin (2002), Friedlaender (2003), Hippen
(2005), Becker and Elias (2007) and recently by Steinbuch (2008). Becker and Elias (2007)
provides a single market price estimate of what it would cost to use monetary incentives to
induce suﬃcient supply of living and deceased kidney donors to reduce the organ shortage.
They argue that monetary incentives could increase the supply of organs suﬃciently enough
by increasing the total cost of transplant by no more than 12 percent. They assume that the
reservation price of an organ consists of three additive components: monetary compensation
for the risk of death, time lost during recovery and risk of reduced quality of life. The estimated
single price for kidneys, living or cadaveric, ranges from $7, 689 to $27, 677 and ranges from
$18, 705 to $69, 291 for livers depending on the value of statistical life, risk of death, quality
of life and foregone earnings.
Harris and Erin (2002) argues that the NHS in the UK shall act as a monopsonist that
purchases human organs and tissues from living donors and distributes them on the basis
of urgency or some fair principle at no cost to the recipient. They also suggest that donors
who contribute to the scheme shall be given the right to priority access of a transplant if
they need it in the future5. A similar proposal has been made by Rapoport et al. (2002)
and Friedlaender (2003) in Israel. Both studies propose a tax-exempt ﬁxed payment to living
kidney donors with long-term follow up by the Israel Transplant who acts as a monopsonist.
The US counterpart of this scheme is proposed by Steinbuch (2008). He proposed that the
inalienable buying rights could be given to UNOS only, at a market price above a statutorily
set minimum, which Steinbuch envisages to be at least $20, 000 for kidney and that UNOS will
5Currently, UNOS gives living donors priority access for a transplant.
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allocate them according to need, as it is allocated today. This way the risks of exploitation of
the poor and issues related to the ability to pay of the rich are eliminated. Steinbuch (2008)
suggests that the payment shall spread over several years and donors shall be given lifetime
government-funded supplemental health insurance. To circumvent market abuses, he suggests
that a minimum waiting period and age requirement shall be imposed prior to kidney sale.
Monetary alternatives are perceived beyond the moral values and notions a society could
seize, although there are many reasons for the dismissal of these alternatives. The major
objection to a market for living donors is that allowing payment will compromise human dignity
and that commodiﬁcation of body parts is morally unacceptable and repugnant. Proponents
of the idea of dignity of the individuals and respect in persons believe that body is part of the
basic human dignity. According to de Castro (2003), selling an integral body part constitutes
commodiﬁcation because the value of organ and the human being to which it is integral
becomes calculable once a price is set for selling them. Therefore, the organ is no longer a
priceless body part6. From a normative sense it is argued that a policy is not necessarily
immoral just so it oﬀers monetary incentives for donation per se. An OPP could be based
on an altruistic motivation yet be morally repugnant or based on monetary incentives yet
be morally acceptable. The immorality of selling organs rests on the second formulation of
Kant's categorical imperative: act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always
at the same time as an end (Kant, 1785). Proponents of a market system argue that we
commodify our bodies by selling blood, tissues, sperm, plasma, donor eggs for pregnancy or
military career and these acts are not prohibited (Gill and Sade, 2002; Becker and Elias, 2007;
Steinbuch, 2008). They further argue that abortion, physician-assisted suicide, prostitution,
contraception, pornography, embryo experimentation, homosexuality and many other acts or
preferences that people may ﬁnd repugnant or consider them as acts or preferences demeaning
human dignity are permitted by the society. Cherry (2005) argues that rhetorical moral terms
such as sanctity, sacredness, dignity or even repugnance should therefore not bear any moral
6Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978) distinguishes between two kinds of determinations concerning a scarce good.
The ﬁrst order determination as they call, deals with how many transplantations shall be performed or
alternatively how many organs shall be recovered either from a living or a deceased person. The second order
determination deals with who receives that organ. Accordingly, all ﬁrst order determinations contradict the
pricelessness of a particular good unless imposed by absolute natural scarcity. Given the fact that human
organs represent a quasi-natural rather than absolute scarcity, human organ cannot be priceless according
to this notion.
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weight for the prohibition of organ sale. Gill and Sade (2002) argues that if selling kidneys
violates Kantian duty to oneself, then all the above-mentioned acts shall be prohibited as well
because they all treat humanity as means. From an ethical viewpoint repugnance is not a
decisive factor and being repugned by the commodiﬁcation cannot be an ostensible reason for
banning organ sale.
Van Dijk and Hilhorst (2007) states that ethicists and medical doctors have diﬃculty with
living donation because of the physical harm inﬂicted on living donors which violates one
of the fundamental principles in medical ethics: primum non nocere (ﬁrst, do no harm).
Although this may be a legitimate argument to ban living donation completely regardless
of the structure of the policy, it is generally not a convincing argument because the beneﬁt
to a recipient more than compensates the harm inﬂicted on the donor. Besides, medical
professionals always harm their patients through euthanasia, especially passive euthanasia
of brain-injured individuals, cancer treatment, or transplantation in order to help them7.
The existing contradictory practice shifts the principle from primum non nocere to primum
succerrere (ﬁrst, hasten to help)8. Therefore oppositions based on ﬁrst, do no harm can only
be convincing if the whole practice of living donation is banned, not just organ sale.
A second objection to market-based reforms is that they may result in harvesting of low
quality organs for two reasons9. First, it is argued that the health of the poor who is coerced to
sell their kidneys will be lower compared to a wealthy individual who cannot be exhorted to sell
his kidney by oﬀering monetary incentives. Second, in a market by which proﬁt is generated,
institutions that are delegated to procure human organs will engage in aggressive solicitation
from ﬁnancially desperate individuals. This will loosen donor eligibility requirements in order
7Cancer patients undergo chemotherapy which destroys both cancerous and healthy cells. Similarly pre-
transplant treatment of the recipient involves the injection of immunosuppresive drugs so that the trans-
planted organ is not rejected. These drugs render the immune system vulnerable to trivial but potentially
deadly diseases.
8The principle of primum succerrere implies that an unexperienced medical condition could be exchanged
with another in order to eradicate the existing medical condition. In the context of transplant medicine
this could hardly be considered a cure.
9The connection between the form of exchange and the quality of the commodity being exchanged has been
discussed at length in the market for blood. Titmuss (1971) claimed that a commercial, market-driven
system in blood donation is inferior to a voluntary system. The reason is that if blood becomes a commodity
which is exchanged in return for payment, those who wish to sell their blood will have an incentive to lie
about their health and will be more likely to transmit a disease. By contrast he argued that there is no
reason to lie about one's health if the system is based on unpaid volunteers. Therefore, Titmuss argued
that a voluntary system will supply high quality of blood. Titmuss however, failed to take into account the
contigent nature of the relation between the form of exchange and the quality of blood supply with depends
on the distribution of disease in the population (Healy, 2006).
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to harvest more organs to make more proﬁt. The extended criteria for donation may result in
lower quality organs and the existence of proﬁt-driven institutions may further threaten donor
allocation protocols but the market reform itself is not the source of low quality of organs
(Hylton, 1990); it is the market structure and other subject-irrelevant problems such as the
distribution of disease in the population. In a competitive market oﬀering payment to living
donors therefore may increase the proportion of diseased organs. However, if the market is
monopsonistic there is no reason to believe that the procured organs will be of lower quality
compared to those procured in an altruistic system.
A third concern postulated by the opponents of organ sale is that the free will of the
donor will be compromised by oﬀering ﬁnancial incentives and most of those who would sell
their organs to the rich would be the poor. This argument rests on the evidence from black
markets and would be partly convincing if organs were sold in an unregulated market just as
it currently is in underdeveloped countries. The allocation of organs solely by medical criteria
would prevent individuals to seek organs by themselves. Thus under a regulated market it
is not possible to buy an organ outside the system. Healy (2006) argues that a commodiﬁed
exchange is not a direct cause of donor exploitation but it is rather the social context that
puts them in a situation that leads to exploitation.
All market proponents so far have emphasized that their proposal is strictly conﬁned to the
procurement and not allocation. Whenever organs are acquired through changing motivation
by oﬀering money, there is no reason to believe why they should not be distributed according
to the ability to pay. Furthermore, for the fact that if sellers have the right to demand
whatever amount they deem appropriate for their kidneys, they also have the right to give
it to whomever they deem appropriate. Even in the current allocation system for organs in
the US which strictly prohibits explicit payment, living donors are allowed to direct their
donation to a speciﬁc but unknown individual through bypassing organ allocation protocols,
known as unrelated directed donation. Given that it is very diﬃcult to determine the underlying
motivation of the living donor to donate to a complete stranger, may it be altruistic, a hidden
monetary exchange, photogenicity or social worth of the recipient all of which are irrelevant
criteria to allocate an organ under UNOS policies, a directed living organ donation from a
complete stranger undermines the eﬀorts of UNOS to provide an eﬃcient and equitable organ
distribution and broaches a set of justice and fairness issues.
A commercial non-proﬁt website called MatchingDonors operates to match recipients and
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unrelated donors who would like to voluntarily donate. The caveat with MatchingDonors is
that they require recipients to pay for the opportunity to gain access to the site where such
donors browse to choose their recipients10. The UNOS board has opposed this concept on the
grounds that it exploits vulnerable populations and undermines public trust in the equitable
allocation of human organs for transplantation11. It is expected that directed donation from
complete strangers such as those advertised in MatchingDonors will ﬁnd further legitimate
grounds following the introduction of payment in living donors. Thus it is very likely that
recipients and donors will ﬁnd additional incentives to override organ allocation protocols,
albeit the distribution of organs under a monopsony proposal is still based on medical crite-
ria. Therefore, a monopsonistic market in living organ donors is susceptible to distributional
ineﬃciency.
If a free market is considered to be excessive and it is thus appropriate to oﬀer a single price
and to delegate a single buyer, then one must set a price at a level that would persuade a
suﬃcient number of individuals to sell their kidneys. But what if this price is prohibitively high
thus ﬁnancially infeasible because no one is willing to supply a kidney for a small payment or
prohibitively low such that it is unfair to sellers? Even if precautionary measures would prevent
rich to access these organs, the burden will fall disproportionately on the poor. Accordingly,
those who would sell their kidneys will be so desperate that their decision will no longer
be considered a free choice (Gill and Sade, 2002). Poverty highlighted by organ sale, will
force poor to sell their kidneys which will in turn aggravate inequality. It may be considered
as morally unacceptable to implement a policy that aggravates inequality for the sake of
eﬃciency. Such undesirable outcomes cannot be rectiﬁed by implementing half-way measures
unless a redistribution of wealth and change in the means of production is targeted (Gill and
Sade, 2002).
Perhaps the most striking yet succinct argument against the permissibility of human organ
market is that it would erode social values. Inducing people to sell their kidney might erode the
sense of care, generosity, altruism and might lead to social alienation (Rothman and Rothman,
2006).
10The fee to post a patient's proﬁle in the database of MatchingDonors (organ registry fee) ranges from
$49 (7-day trial) to $595 (lifetime membership). As of October 2010, there are 8642 registered potential
donors and 527 patients awaiting for a transplant. About 100 transplants have been performed through
MatchingDonors since its inception in 2004. http://www.matchingdonors.com
11Interim Report of the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, December 7, 2009.
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/CommitteeReports/interim_main_EthicsCommittee_1_5_2010_9_18.pdf
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4.1.2. Reimbursement of Living Donors
The key concern that distinguishes living donors from deceased is that they are exposed
to ﬁnancial risks and that these risks may generate disincentives or barriers to donation.
Therefore it has been increasingly stressed that living donors should be compensated for a
number of non-medical costs incurred throughout this process. According to the Gallup (2005)
survey, 52 percent of the Americans strongly agrees that living donors should be compensated
for the costs of travel, child care and forgone earnings and 73 percent stresses that living
donors should not be denied health or life insurance after donation. A number of compensation
schemes that have been proposed include compensation for the costs of travel, lodging, forgone
earnings, social security in the form of life insurance or long-term health insurance, even college
tuition.
Gaston et al. (2006) proposes an inalienable package beneﬁts for living donors to compensate
them for the risk of mortality and medical complications that might arise following the surgery.
The package includes a 1-year life insurance policy of $1, 000, 000, a health insurance policy
for long-term care and a reimbursement of travel expenses and forgone earnings. Further the
authors propose that living donors could also be compensated by a tax deduction of $10, 000
or a tax-exempt lump sum payment of $5, 000 to oﬀset the inconvenience, pain and anxiety of
the individual. The cost of their proposal is in the range of $23, 525 to $32, 800 with a median
saving of at least $66, 000 per living donor.
A number of countries have introduced or enacted legislation concerning the reimbursement
of living organ donors including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Japan, Luxembourg, Morocco, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Spain, the UK and
the US12.
Little is known regarding the eﬀectiveness of living donor reimbursement policies on donation
rates. Recenty, the impact of state legislation and federal policies on living kidney donation
rates in the US is investigated by Boulware et al. (2008) and Wellington and Sayre (2010).
The ﬁndings of the former study show that state and federal policies were positively associated
with living unrelated kidney donations but not associated with living related donations. On
the other hand, the latter study did not ﬁnd any evidence to support that these laws aﬀect
12See Boulware et al. (2008) for a detailed description of state legislation and federal initiatives for the re-
imbursement of living organ donors in the US. For a detailed description of international legislation on
reimbursement of living donors consult Pattinson (2003) and Klarenbach et al. (2006a).
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organ donations. Further empirical research is needed the examine the relationship between
legislation and living donation rates extensively13.
4.2. Non-monetary organ allocation
Non-monetary organ allocation mechanisms have been proposed in an attempt to not provide a
general solution to the shortage of transplantable organs but rather to optimize the living donor
organ allocation and to help people who already have a willing live donor (Roth, 2007). By
this nature non-monetary organ allocation policies are free from coercion and only discriminate
according to medical attributes which are not relevant criteria for policy evaluation. Due to
lack of allocation protocols in living donation (perhaps perforce), non-monetary policies will
not respect the medical need criteria.
4.2.1. Pairwise Kidney Exchange
In the face of widely acknowledged repugnance for explicit monetary incentives for donation, it
is argued that living altruistic donation should be reinforced by eﬃcient allocation of donors.
This allocation mechanism is developed by Roth et al. (2005b). The idea is that the kidney of
an altruistic individual who consents to donate to his/her loved one cannot be transplanted if
the organ is incompatible with the biological recipient. Consider the example in ﬁgure 4.1. A
kidney transplantation within pairs {1, 2, 3} is not possible because they are immunologically
or bloodwise incompatible14. However, the individual R1 is found to be compatible with D3,
D1 is found to be compatible with R2 and R3 is found to be compatible with D2. Donors
and recipients make a complete circle. This incompatibility resolving exchange mechanism has
been implemented by the New England PKE program based on Roth et al. (2004, 2005a,b,
2007). Currently, kidneys can be exchanged between up to thirteen incompatible patient-
donor pairs15. A variant of PKE is AUPKE in which one donor-recipient pair is incompatible
13See Chapter 5 for empirical evidence from the US on the impact of legislation related to reimbursement of
living donors on living donation.
14An individual of blood type O can only donate to a recipient with blood types O, A, B and AB and can
only receive an organ from an individual of blood type O. An individual of blood type A can only donate
to a recipient with blood types A and AB and can only receive from an individual of blood type A and O.
An individual of blood type B can only donate to a recipient with blood types B and AB and can only
receive from an individual of blood type B and O. Finally, an individual of blood type AB can only donate
to a recipient with blood type AB and can receive from an individual of any blood type.
15A historic six-way paired donation has been performed for the ﬁrst time at Johns Hopkins Medical Center
on 14 January 2009. The transplantations are successfully performed on 12 patients simultaneously at 3
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(e.g. B-donor > O-recipient) and the other donor-recipient pair is compatible but not identical
(e.g. O-donor > B-recipient). Swapping the recipients results in two compatible and identical
(B-donor > B-recipient and O-donor > O-recipient) living donor kidney transplants. Blood
type O recipients are the most unfortunate ones among all patients because they can only
receive from type O patients. Therefore, an altruistically unbalanced donation can help these
type O patients to ﬁnd compatible kidneys.
Figure 4.1.: Pairwise kidney exchange
PKE has its drawbacks. For instance, if D1 decides not donate after D3 has donated, then
R2 will not get a transplant. Then D2 will not donate and thus R3 will not be able to get a
transplant. Rees et al. (2009) therefore assert that transplants must be performed simultane-
ously to eliminate the possibility of donor reneging as opposed to Becker and Elias (2007) who
argued that the simultaneity of transplants is to avoid the risk of payment between the donor
and the recipient. The simultaneity of transplants further poses coordination problems among
the transplant teams. Becker and Elias (2007) claimed that the New England PKE program
is unlikely to provide a substantial increase in the number of transplants. This foresight, as
it might be correct, is not caused by the mechanism per se but rather by the low number
transplant centers in Baltimore, St. Louis and Oklahoma City. Over 100 medical personnel served the
exchange. Between 2-11 December 2009, a thirteen-way paired donation has been performed jointly with
Georgetown University Hospital and Washington Hospital Center. The transplantations are successfully
performed on 26 patients.
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of living donations at the outset. According to USRDS 2009 annual report, a total of 280
kidney transplants have been performed in the US between 2003 and 2007 via pairwise kidney
exchanges. Roth (2007) stresses that kidney exchange mechanisms, albeit restricted in their
ability to solve the organ shortage problem, could increase the number of transplants by a
thousand if organized at a national scale.
4.2.2. NEAD Chain
Other kidney exchange mechanisms have been developed by Abraham et al. (2007) and Rees
et al. (2009). The mechanism described in the latter study is called the NEAD chain, displayed
in fgure 4.2. The principle of this mechanism is that recipient R1 needs a kidney and donor
D1 is willing to donate but is found to be incompatible with R1. However, an altruistic donor
is found to be compatible with R1. The system then ﬁnds a compatible match, R2 for D1.
Then a compatible match is found for D2 who then pays it forward by donating to another
recipient, R3 etc... This way a never ending donation chain is established by only a single
altruistic donor. The mechanism has been implemented by the initiatives of the Alliance for
Paired Donation up to 10 patients in 2007-2008 (Rees et al., 2009).
Figure 4.2.: NEAD Chain
The NEAD chain is based on altruism and trust. Since the transplants are not performed
simultaneously for every chain, there is a risk of donor reneging. For example, after the
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altruistic donor donated to R1 and if for some reason D1 fails to donate to R2, couple 2 can still
enter into another paired chain. Therefore, donor reneging does not have serious consequences.
Further, such possibility is remote because once the altruistic donor has donated, the remaining
donors involved in this exchange carry emotionally or biologically induced incentives to donate
in order to save the lives of their loved ones. The experience with the NEAD Chain further
shows that no donor has reneged so far.
Section 301 of the NOTA states that It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation if the transfer aﬀects interstate commerce. Because the term valuable
consideration could include more than cash payments, section 301 is amended by adding the
following at the end of section 301 (a): the preceding sentence does not apply with respect to
human organ paired donation. Thus the amendment excludes PKEs and NEAD chain from
the scope of valuable consideration.
4.2.3. List Donation
List donation is very similar to PKE except that the kidney of a living donor who is incom-
patible with its biological recipient is transplanted to the ﬁrst compatible recipient on the
waiting list. In return the biologically incompatible recipient of the living donor is promised
to receive the next available compatible kidney of a deceased donor or receives a higher place
in the national waiting list. The distinguishing feature of list donation from other forms of
non-monetary living donor allocations is that it combines living and deceased donor alloca-
tions and introduces the concept of priority in a way akin to reciprocal systems. List donation
exchanges violate the principle of equal transplant access for equal need. Once the incompat-
ible living donor donated a kidney to the ﬁrst recipient on the waiting list, the next available
deceased kidney goes to the biological recipient instead of the second recipient on the waiting
list. This situation is problematic because allocation of the organs of the deceased is regulated
by UNOS and other networks in Europe such that it favors the one in most medical need while
living donor organ allocation is not regulated. By combining living and deceased allocations
list donation violates UNOS allocation protocols. Similar objections arise when giving priority
to the biologically incompatible recipient instead of allocating her the next available deceased
organ. Crowe et al. (2007) argues that a list donation exchange discriminates againts blood
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type O recipients. For instance, consider that a living donor with blood type B has a biological
but incompatible recipient of blood type O. The living donor thus donates one of her kidneys
to a recipient on the waiting list with blood type B in return for seeing her loved one receive
a deceased kidney of blood type O. Since patients with blood type O are the ones who wait
the longest, Crowe et al. (2007) suggest that blood type O recipients should not engage in list
donations but perhaps engage in exchanges such as AUPKE.
4.3. Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented an exhaustive review of ﬁve living donor OPPs. These are monopsony,
reimbursement, PKE, NEAD chain and list donation. These proposals and mechanisms are
not evaluated based on the axioms set fourth in chapter 2 because various notions of eﬃciency
of organ allocation mechanisms cannot be determined by neoclassical analysis and further
research might be needed.
It is generally acknowledged that the eﬀectiveness of PKE and NEAD chains are limited
given their current size. However a nation-wide implementation of these mechanism is believed
to greatly increase the number of transplants (Roth et al., 2007).
In contrast to deceased donor OPPs, monopsonistic markets or reimbursement for living
donors do not preclude the implementation of organ allocation mechanisms or vice versa be-
cause market-based reforms aim to regulate the procurement and organ allocation mechanisms
aim to manage an eﬃcient distribution of living donor kidneys. In this light, any monetary
incentive policy could be used to reinforce and ensure a higher participation rate in these
exchange mechanisms. As mentioned in section 4.2.2 a prerequisite to initiate a NEAD chain
is to ﬁnd an altruistic donor which may not be found so easily. By giving extrinsic motivation
a monopsony market or a small reimbursement could exhort more unrelated living donors to
participate in NEAD chains. Regardless of whether nation-wide exchanges or market-based
reforms are implemented, any modiﬁed strategy in living donation will result in higher number
of living transplants, particularly preemptive renal transplants.
Reimbursement of non-medical costs must be routinely oﬀered, not to seek out donations
but to compensate living altruistic donors for the disutility of weeks of convalescence they ex-
perience during the donation process and foregone earnings. On the other hand, monopsonistic
markets are not without cost. Potential problems include qualitatively and medically inferior
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outcomes, infringement of donor dignity, exploitation, impingement of free will and violation
of donor allocation protocols in a way that results in unfair outcomes. These problems, some
plausible some are not, highlight that it may be diﬃcult to establish a morally permissible
market for living donors, even when it is highly regulated.
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Kidney vendors in Lahore, Pakistan in 2004 demanding ﬁnancial help from the Pakistani govern-
ment to pay oﬀ debts. Photo by K.M. Chaudary (Associated Press)
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5. The Impact of Reimbursement
Legislation on Living Donation:
Evidence from the US
The great danger [of economists] is that having seen a slice of human life, they
imagine themselves to have seen the whole and they prescribe reforms with a passion
that beﬁts those who believe that an irrational world is ignoring their perfectly
rational models. Eric Cohen
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5.1. Introduction
The rising prevalence of diabetes and hypertension together with the advances in the transplant
technology led to an ever-growing demand for transplantable organs. As of November 2010,
there were about 93, 000 patients waiting for a kidney transplant in the US. However in
2009, about 15, 400 kidney transplants were performed of which only 5, 700 were from living
donors. Despite the eﬀorts, the yearly additional number of patients registered for a transplant
far outstrips the yearly number of removals from the waiting list resulting in an increasing
shortage of transplantable organs in the US.
It is known that individuals willing to become living donors are exposed to serious ﬁnancial
and medical risks and that these risks may generate disincentives or barriers to donation. In
the face of insurmountable shortage and widely acknowledged repugnance for explicit mone-
tary incentives for donation, an increasing number of proposals emphasizes the urgent need
to introduce reimbursement for living donors for non-medical costs incurred throughout the
process of donation (Delmonico et al., 2002; Gaston et al., 2006; Klarenbach et al., 2006b;
Matas, 2007; Abouna, 2008). Reimbursement schemes of this kind include compensation for
the costs of travel, lodging, forgone earnings, social security in the form of life insurance or
long-term health insurance.
A second line of proposals discussed tax deduction schemes to exhort individuals to serve as
an organ or bone marrow donor (Calandrillo, 2004; Milot, 2008). Tax deduction that may be
claimed for organ donation is subtracted from gross income at the time of ﬁling tax returns. As
a result this lowers the overall taxable income and the amount of tax paid. Tax deductions are
peculiarly regressive because they depend on the tax bracket (Calandrillo, 2004). A tax credit
might correct this inequity problem because it is independent of the tax bracket and it reduces
the tax owed rather than reducing taxable income. Milot (2008) stresses that tax deduction,
albeit it prima facie appears to be a sound legislative approach, turns an otherwise non-tax
event into a tax item that increases complexity of the tax system and provides diﬀerential
tax returns to those who become living organ donors because it depends on the tax bracket.
At a national level, a study by Boulware et al. (2006) reveals that of those 845 participants
surveyed, 91 percent were in favor of reimbursement of medical costs, 84 percent were in favor
of paid leave but only 35 percent were in favor of tax deduction/credit.
Most of the states that enacted legislation related to reimbursement of living donors only
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allow reimbursement of public employees for becoming an organ donor. The share of public
employees in the state population varies in the range of 1 to 4 percent, indicating that those
who could potentially beneﬁt from the legislation are a very small group (Boulware et al., 2008).
Within the last two decades several states in the US enacted legislation that allows individuals
to take paid leave of absence or tax deduction should they decide to become living donors.
In 1998, Colorado became the ﬁrst state that allowed paid leave of absence for prospective
donors followed by Wisconsin and Maryland in 20001. A number of states further enacted
legislation that allows a $10,000 tax deduction or tax credit to serve as an organ or bone
marrow donor which may be claimed for lost wages, travel, lodging and medical expenses.
This legislation addresses only employed persons with suﬃciently high levels of income to
beneﬁt from a $10,000 tax deduction or credit (Boulware et al., 2008). The legislation that
allows tax deduction was ﬁrst introduced in the states of Wisconsin and Georgia in 2004.
Figure 5.1.: The evolution of state legislation related to reimbursement of living donors
Figure 5.1 displays the number of states that enacted legislation related to reimbursement
of living donors in the US since 1998. There has been a tremendous growth in the number of
1A concise and updated version of the description of state legislation can be found in the appendix A.2.
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states that allowed paid leave of absence between 2000 and 2003 and tax deduction between
2004 and 2006. Currently, there are 26 states in the US that enacted legislation related to
compensation of living donors of which 12 states allow paid leave of absence only, 1 state allows
tax deduction only, 2 states allow tax credit only and 11 states allow both tax deduction and
paid leave of absence for organ donors. Figure 5.2 displays the geographical distribution and
the breakdown of state legislation in the year 2009.
Figure 5.2.: State legislation related to reimbursement of living donors
The ﬁrst study that investigated the impact of state legislation and federal policies on living
kidney donation rates in the US was carried out by Boulware et al. (2008). The ﬁndings of
this study show that the state legislation and federal policies are not associated with sustained
improvements in the larger number of living related donations and therefore overall living
donation rates. On the other hand, state and federal policies are positively associated with
living unrelated kidney donations. This indicates that legislation related to reimbursement of
living donors may selectively decrease barriers to living kidney donation from unrelated persons
and does not provide additional incentives for related donors. Wellington and Sayre (2010)
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examined the association between ﬁnancial incentives that either allow for tax deduction or
30 days of paid leave of absence and organ donations in the US. The results, in line with the
ﬁndings of Boulware et al. (2008), show that state legislation is not associated with overall
living donations.
Alongside the modest rewards that provide compensation for lost wages, lodging and travel
expenses for organ donors in order to decrease barriers to living donation, it has been advocated
that the current system of living donor organ procurement in the US could be developed to
its full potential by rectifying an eﬃcient allocation of organs from living donors. Currently in
the US, most of the kidney transplants from living donors are associated with kidneys donated
by relatives, spouses or partners, known as living related donation. However in some cases the
tissue or the blood type of the related donor may be incompatible with its designated recipient
resulting in failure to perform the transplant2. PKE programs have been implemented in a
number of transplant centers across the US over the last decade, starting with the Johns
Hopkins program in Maryland in 2001 and have been developed in an attempt to not provide
a general solution to the chronic shortage of transplantable organs but rather to optimize the
living donor organ allocation and to help those who already have a willing living donor. In order
to increase the number of living donor organ transplants, individuals are further allowed to
direct their donation to a speciﬁc but unknown individual, known as living unrelated donation.
This type of living donors are those who do not have any biological, romantic or legal ties with
the organ recipient.
Simmons et al. (1987) shows that the likelihood of donating a kidney, knowing the presence
of others who might donate, decreases almost linearly with the number of potential known
donors. Thus when a donor believes that there are others who can donate the urge or the
pressure to help the patient diminishes. This phenomenon is known as the substitution or
bystander eﬀect . We distinguish between two types of substitution eﬀects. First, living dona-
tions diﬀer signiﬁcantly from deceased donations not only in terms of the medical eﬀectiveness
of the procedure and the denouement of the donor but also in terms of the organs in question.
Currently in the US, the transplantation of living donor organs are restricted to single kidney,
partial lung and partial liver transplants. This special case allows ESRD patients to receive
kidneys either from deceased or living donors. Therefore all else equal a kidney obtained from
2The PKE mechanism, developed by Roth et al. (2005b) aims to resolve this incompatibility by swapping
related but incompatible donors such that the resulting donor-recipient pairs are medically compatible.
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a brain-dead patient could be a substitute for a kidney obtained from a living donor. Since
living donation is an act of genuine altruism, we investigate the extent to which living donors
avoid donation on the anticipation that there will be higher deceased donations in the fu-
ture. This phenomenon is called the deceased donor substitution eﬀect. A second phenomenon
equally important to the transplant community is the degree to which living related donations
are substituted by living unrelated donations. This phenomenon is called the living donor
substitution eﬀect.
In the light of this information, the aim of this chapter is to provide a preliminary empirical
evidence on the impact of legislation related to reimbursement of living donors as well as on
the eﬀectiveness of PKEs on living donation rates in the US. Speciﬁcally, the focus of interest
is on the impact of enacting state legislation that allows individuals to take paid leave of
absence, or to claim a tax deduction/credit of $10, 000 from income should they become living
donors, on living related, unrelated and total living donation rates. A secondary goal is to
provide empirical evidence on the extent to which states that initiated paired organ exchange
programs are successful in increasing living donations and to test the existence of deceased
and living donor substitution eﬀects in the US. To address these questions, state data on the
number of living related, unrelated and total living adult donation rates, combined deceased
kidney and liver transplant rates, real per capita GDP, the number of transplant centers, the
prevalence of ESRD and binary information on the legislation related to reimbursement of
living donors and PKEs have been collected for 50 states and the District of Columbia over
the period 1988-2009.
5.2. Empirical Analysis
To the best of our knowledge, empirical studies that aim to identify the factors that inﬂuence
living organ donation rates in general are limited because the data required to conduct such
analysis was not readily available. In particular, none to very little is known regarding the
eﬀectiveness of legislation and the impact of paired donation programs on living donation
rates. The reason is that both the legislation related to reimbursement of living donors and
the kidney exchange programs in the US have been introduced only recently.
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5.2.1. Data Source and Descriptive Statistics
The data cover 50 states and the District of Columbia for the period of 1988-2009 with the
exception of Alaska, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming which were discarded due to lack of data
on the number of living organ donors. State data on the number of living related, unrelated
and total living adult donors, the combined number of deceased kidney and liver transplants
and the number of transplant centers are retrieved from the OPTN3. State population over
the age of 18 is obtained from the US Census Bureau4. The number of living adult donors,
the combined number of deceased kidney and liver transplants and the number of transplant
centers are divided by the respective adult population and multiplied by million to obtain the
pmap rates. The prevalence of ESRD pmp is retrieved from the USRDS 2009 Annual Report5.
Real GDP per capita (in 2000 US dollars) is obtained from the US Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis6. The state legislation related to reimbursement of living donors
is collected from the National Kidney Foundation7, TransplantLiving8, National Conference
of State Legislatures9 and Boulware et al. (2008). The tax deduction legislation variable takes
the value of 1 if state i allows tax deduction or tax credit at any year t and 0 otherwise. The
paid leave legislation variable takes the value of 1 if state i allows paid leave of absence at
any year t and 0 otherwise. Finally, the binary variable on PKE which is collected from the
OPTN, takes the value of 1 if a paired exchange program has been running in state i at any
year t and 0 otherwise.
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 46 states and the District of Columbia.
Column (1) shows means and standard deviations for the entire sample. Columns (2) and
(3) show means and standard deviations for 13 states that enacted tax deduction laws and
34 states that did not enact tax deduction laws, respectively. Similarly, columns (4) and (5)
show means and standard deviations for 22 states that allowed paid leave of absence and 25
states that did not allow paid leave of absence, respectively. Columns (6) and (7) show the
diﬀerences between columns (2), (3) and columns (4), (5) along with the standard errors of
the t-statistics for the null hypothesis of equal means for states that enacted either legislations
3OPTN, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp?
4US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov
5http://www.usrds.org/2009/ref/E_Ref_09.pdf
6http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/
7http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/LivingDonors/pdf/ LDTaxDed_Leave.pdf
8http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/nancialaspects/legislation.aspx
9http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13383
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and states that did not enact any such legislation.
In the sample, states with tax deduction laws have higher average total and related living
donors pmap per year than states without tax deduction laws but have lower average unrelated
living donors. This diﬀerence, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional test
levels, shown in column (6). In addition, states that allow a tax deduction have statistically
higher number of transplant centers, higher prevalence of ESRD but lower GDP per capita and
lower combined deceased kidney and liver transplant rates. On the other hand, states with paid
leave of absence law have systematically lower living donation rates, related or unrelated, than
states without paid leave of absence legislation. These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in column (7). In addition, states in which paid leave legislation is enacted
have statistically signiﬁcantly lower GDP per capita, lower combined deceased kidney and
liver transplant rates and lower number of transplant centers.
Figure 5.3.: Living adult donation rates in the US, 1988-2009
Figure 5.3 displays the evolution of living related, unrelated and total adult donation rates
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pmap since 1988. There has been a constant fall in the average proportion of living related
adult donors throughout the last two decades, from 94 percent in 1988 to 70 percent in 2009.
This share also exhibits a similar variability across states. In the sample period, Vermont
has the lowest average share of living related adult donors out of total living adult donors
(71 percent) and Mississippi has the highest average share of related donors (94 percent).
Donations from living related adults still constitute an overwhelming proportion of the overall
number of living adult donors despite the recent marginal success in raising donations from
unrelated persons.
Figure 5.4 displays the geographical distribution of total living adult donation rates pmap
by state on a very low to very high scale. 2 states are classiﬁed as exhibiting very low
(range: 1.41-2.05), 13 states are classiﬁed as low (range: 7.87-14.68), 23 states are classiﬁed as
medium (range: 15.45-24.75), 7 states are classiﬁed as high (range: 30.29-40.08) and 2 states
are classiﬁed as having very high (range: 66.14-163.16) levels of donations10.
Figure 5.4.: Total living adult donation rates by state, 1988-2009
10A k-means clustering method is used to classify the level of donations.
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5.2.2. Econometric Methodology
In order to test for the living donor substitution eﬀect we postulate that there is a simultaneous
relationship between living related and living unrelated donation rates and we treat them as
endogenous variables. To see this, consider the following model:
y1it = µ1i + δ1t + α1iwit + Z
′
itγ1 +X
′
itβ1 + pi1ci,t+1 + ρ1y2it + ε1it (5.1)
y2it = µ2i + δ2t + α2iwit + Z
′
itγ2 +X
′
itβ2 + pi2ci,t+1 + ρ2y1it + ε2it (5.2)
y3it = µ3i + δ3t + α3iwit + Z
′
itγ3 +X
′
itβ3 + pi3ci,t+1 + ε3it (5.3)
where y1it, y2it and y3it respectively denote the living donation rates pmap for unrelated,
related and total adult donors, i denotes the state i = 1, . . . , N , t denotes time t = 1, . . . , T ,
j denotes the equation j = 1, 2, 3; µji, δjt and αji respectively are the state eﬀects, the year
eﬀects and the linear state trend eﬀects, γj 's are L × 1 vectors where L is the number of
exogenous almost time-invariant regressors, βj 's are K × 1 vectors where K is the number of
exogenous time-variant regressors, the variable c is the combined deceased kidney and liver
transplant rate and εjit is the stochastic disturbance term at jth equation. Zit consists of
binary variables on tax deduction, paid leave of absence legislations and PKEs, Xit consists
of real per capita GDP, the number of transplant centers pmap and the prevalence of ESRD
pmp. We are primarily interested in the vectors γ and secondarily interested in the parameters
pi and ρ.
The endogeneity of living donation is accounted by specifying the model as a system of
equations where contemporaneous values of living unrelated and living related adult donation
rates are on the right-hand side of equations (5.2) and (5.1) respectively. This speciﬁcation
invalidates the consistency of OLS and requires the use of an IV estimation. A statistically
signiﬁcant negative estimate of ρj indicates that there exists a living donor substitution eﬀect
between unrelated and related donations.
Deceased donor substitution implies that a potential living donor today gives up donating
on the anticipation that the number of deceased donations will increase in the future . This is
accounted by the one-period lead value of the combined deceased kidney and liver transplant
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rate11. A statistically signiﬁcant negative estimate of pij provides evidence of deceased donor
substitution eﬀect in the US.
The unobserved state eﬀects in the system above represent time-invariant or rigid factors
that might aﬀect living donations such as customs, beliefs, subjective judgments about trans-
plantation and donation, the level of altruism, trust in medicine and doctors in general and
trust in the US health care system in particular. In the panel data context, the state speciﬁc
eﬀects in equations (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3) can be estimated via FE and/or RE. Estimating
a RE model requires that the state speciﬁc unobserved eﬀects are uncorrelated with all the
explanatory variables as well as with the error terms of the model.
First, it may be reasonable to assume that beliefs, subjective judgments, altruism and trust
in the healthcare system may not only aﬀect the level of donations from living donors but
also donations from deceased individuals. Since the level donations from deceased donors
has been accounted as an explanatory factor, this renders the unobserved state eﬀects to be
correlated with the error terms through the level of donations from deceased donors. Further,
the unobserved eﬀects are likely to be correlated with the endogenous variable which will be in
turn correlated with the disturbances. This establishes the ground to perform a FE estimation.
Second, the visual inspection of the number of unrelated and related adult donors in the US
states shows that there has been a slight increase in the number of living unrelated donors and
a downward trend in the number of living related adult donors in most of the states, especially
after 2002. Failure to control for these trends might confound the impact of legislation on
living adult donors and tempt one to conclude that the legislation is positively associated with
unrelated donation and negatively associated with related donation. To decouple legislation
from these trends linear state trends have been incorporated in all three models.
Finally the exact time-variant factors that are thought to inﬂuence living unrelated donation
11A natural question arises so as to whether living donations today might aﬀect deceased donations at a
later period, a phenomenon called dirty altruism coined by Rigmar Osterkamp. If exists, it might lead
to an endogeneity problem. Although dirty altruism is plausible in principle, this substitution seems to
be weak for several reasons. First, substitution requires a willing, living and medically compatible donor.
Approximately 30 percent of all kidneys and livers in the US come from living donors and the remaining
70 percent are recovered from deceased donors. Substitution also depends on the medical urgency and
the instantaneous probability of ﬁnding a deceased donor. Second, when a kidney or liver patient needs a
transplant, she is asked to ﬁnd a living donor ﬁrst, not because people substitute per se but rather because
the time when a deceased donor becomes available is unknown. Third, a living donor is most of the time
subject to serious medical risks as opposed to deceased donors. It is acknowledged that dirty altruism
might exist but this eﬀect should be negligible. A recent study in the US by Beard et al. (2009) did not
ﬁnd convincing empirical support for the dirty altruism model.
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rates but have not been explicity accounted for in the model might also aﬀect living related
and thus total living donation rates. This will induce a contemporaneous correlation of error
terms across all three equations which requires the use of a SUR framework.
5.2.3. Results
To reveal the impact of reimbursement legislation on living donation rates, equations (5.1),
(5.2) and (5.3) are estimated as a system of equations via 3SLS with two-way FE error com-
ponent model while allowing for state-speciﬁc linear trends. By employing a 3SLS Two-way
FE, we accommodate for the unobserved state and year heterogeneity, endogeneity and cross-
equation error correlation. The estimation results are reported in table 5.2.
Irrespective of the type donation, neither tax deduction nor paid leave of absence aﬀect
living donation rates once the state and the year ﬁxed eﬀects, linear state trends, organ
allocation mechanism, wealth, medical capital, alternative source of organs and the demand
for living donation have been controlled for. There may be many reasons for the failure of tax
deduction legislation to induce related individuals to donate. First, as mentioned previously,
the beneﬁciaries of the reimbursement legislation are limited to public employees and are a very
small group, representing 1 to 4 percent of the total state population. Second, related donors
may be irresponsive to tax deduction schemes simply because of the biological or emotional tie
between the donor and the recipient. Third, as opposed to being rewarded by future beneﬁts
living donors might prefer being compensated today for their time and eﬀorts for donation
today. In this case tax deduction may become less appealing. On the other hand, the absence
of a statistically signiﬁcant and positive impact of paid leave of absence legislation is in line
with the long held view that compensating donors for the lost wages during the recovery period
following organ donation is not to seek out donations but to acknowledge the value of donor's
contribution and to appreciate their eﬀorts.
States that initiated paired exchange programs do not exhibit statistically signiﬁcantly
higher living unrelated, related or total adult donation rates once other potential determi-
nants have been controlled for. This result is aligned with the view that PKE programs have
been developed in an attempt to not provide a general solution to the chronic shortage of
transplantable organs but rather to optimize the living donor organ allocation and to help
those who already have a willing living donor (Roth, 2007). PKE is not an eﬀective method
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to reduce kidney shortages or to increase living donations but it is an eﬃcient system that
allocates formerly poor-matched or mismatched kidneys from related living donors.
Our results reveal the existence of a unilateral living donor substitution eﬀect. As shown in
column (2) donations from unrelated donors negatively aﬀect the number of related donors.
However as shown in column (1), the converse is not true. To test the potential existence of
deceased donor substitution eﬀect we incorporated one-period lead value of the combined de-
ceased kidney and liver transplant rate as an explanatory factor that represents the alternative
source of organs. The evidence points out to the existence of a deceased donor substitution
eﬀect in the US such that the larger number of living related donations today and thus total
donations today decrease on the anticipation of future increases in the number of kidney and
liver transplants.
5.3. Policy Implications
The empirical evidence presented herein points that the legislation that allows individuals to
take paid leave of absence or to receive a tax deduction has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
living adult donations, related or unrelated, even after controlling for other potential factors,
linear state trends, endogeneity and cross-equation error correlation. This is not necessarily
a compelling reason to abandon paid leave of absence legislation. The essence of allowing for
paid leave for living organ donors is to compensate them for the recovery period and for the
loss of income associated with the act of donation in order to help save a life.
Most of the states that enacted legislation related to reimbursement of living donors only
allow reimbursement of public employees for becoming an organ donor. Failure to allow
reimbursement for the unemployed, uninsured or low-income individuals who are a major
proportion of the population and who are more likely to experience ﬁnancial hardship as a
result of donation hinders the eﬀectiveness of the legislation. This study suggests that the
current legislation related to reimbursement of living donors should be amended in order to
cover a broader group of beneﬁciaries of the legislation to ensure that the barriers to living
donation are lowered and that the provisions of the amendment should be independent of
whether beneﬁciaries of the legislation are employed or not. However this might be a diﬃcult
task considering the indistinct line between oﬀering modest rewards and outright payments
prohibited by the NOTA of 1984.
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A second but equally important contribution of this chapter was to identify the impact of
PKE programs on living donations. We found that states that initiated PKEs do not exhibit
higher living donation rates. This suggests that such eﬃcient organ allocation mechanisms
may not be eﬀective in order to raise overall living donations.
Evidence of a deceased donor substitution eﬀect indicate that kidney donations for trans-
plantation may be intertemporally related. On the other hand the ﬁnding that a unilateral
living donor substitution eﬀect exists in the US points that if chronic organ shortages persist
and unrelated donations continue to grow, we might expect a shrinkage in the number of living
related donors. This shift in the composition of living donors might place additional burden on
UNOS and its aﬃliated OPOs to investigate the motivation behind living unrelated persons
to donate and to explain the ongoing eclipse in biological altruism.
The empirical study in this chapter imposes several problems and limitations. First, doubts
can be cast upon the instrument relevance especially for the unrelated living donation rates12.
For the fact that correcting the bias introduced by endogeneity requires at least one instrument
that is uncorrelated with the unobservable confounder variables, that is suﬃciently correlated
with related or unrelated living donation rates and that can neither have a direct inﬂuence
on living donation rates nor be correlated with error term of the equation, any set of good
instruments other than their lagged values may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd. Given the data, such strong
instruments are proved to be nonexistent. Therefore the results rely upon the instrumentation
of related and unrelated living donation rates by their lagged values and should be treated
with extreme caution as the endogeneity problem may be severe leading to little conﬁdence
in the estimation results. Second, there will be some bias due to failure of accounting for
the diﬀerences in the period of paid leave of absence in the legislation. In some states the
legislation allows for only 10 days of paid leave while in other states this period is up to
30 days. Second, this study failed to distinguish between states that allow tax deduction and
states that allow tax credit in the estimations due to lack of suﬃcient data. Given the inequity
concerns about tax deduction, tax credit schemes may not exhibit an adverse impact on living
donation. Further evidence might be needed as more data become available.
12There is empirical and theoretical evidence that IV estimation with weak instruments may perform bad and
even poorer than OLS (Stock et al., 2002).
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Chinese inmates on death row waiting to be executed. They are shot on the head if a heart is
needed or on the chest if a cornea is needed. After the execution the organs are procured to be
sold to international patients from Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. The remains
are cremated to destroy any trace of evidence. According to Amnesty International China has
executed at least 30,000 death sentences between 1990 and 2000. In 2007 China has put a ban
on organ sales.
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Organ transactions today are a blend of altruism and commerce; of science, magic
and sorcery; of voluntarism and coercion; of gift, barter and theft. Nancy Scheper-
Hughes
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6.1. Introduction
The international trade of human organs and its prevention has been the subject of a growing
debate in Europe and other western countries. Human organ procurement and transplantation
is a controversial and delicate issue which becomes even more ampliﬁed if these procedures
are commercialized. Due to increasing shortages some patients who are in desperate need for
an organ face extensive waiting times on the transplant list and seek kidneys on the black
market.
This chapter analyzes the legal and the economic aspects of traﬃcking in human beings
for the purposes of organ removal. Section 6.2 provides the background on the sale and the
purchase of human organs, describes how the black market operates and map the traﬃcking
routes around the globe. Section 6.3 reviews the international standards and legal instruments
to combat traﬃcking and discusses their applications with a comparative analysis of criminal
provisions for thirty-eight countries by focusing on the magnitude of sanctions and the scope
of criminal liability in national criminal codes. Despite organ traﬃcking being an international
crime legislations concerning such criminal activities are local with suboptimal sanctions and
inadequate provisions of enforcement. This problem not only requires the identiﬁcation of
an optimal magnitude and mix of penalty that should be imposed on oﬀenders engaging in
organ traﬃcking, but also necessitates criminal provisions for organ traﬃcking to expressly
distinguish between criminal agents and severe and otherwise punishable violations.
For this purpose, section 6.4 develops a simple model of law enforcement that illustrates a
way to determine the optimal mix of sanctions under two deterrence policies. Organ traﬃcking
is socially undesirable because payment for a kidney dilutes deterrence; thus it has to be
controlled. The analysis suggests that under conventional deterrence, traﬃcking should be
penalized by maximal ﬁnes together with a maximum ban of practice term for the surgeon;
however, imprisonment should not be used because it is a costly sanction. The analysis also
suggests that organ recipients who are insured against the cost of illegal transplants should
be subject to severer punishments than those who are not insured. Under target deterrence,
the enforcement authorities should always impose imprisonment together with a maximal ﬁne
to the surgeon despite it lowers welfare. The implications of the model and what should be
embodied in the speciﬁc legislation are discussed in Section 6.5.
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6.2. Traﬃcking in humans for the purposes of organ removal
Analyzing the criminal network and the socioeconomic proﬁles of those who engage in the
commercialization of human organs is crucial in order to understand the motives behind be-
coming a criminal and to identify the tools to combat organ traﬃcking. Organ traﬃcking is
a demand-driven problem; it runs from West to East, from rich to poor and from medically
desperate to ﬁnancially desperate individuals. Since the current organ procurement system
relies on altruism and there is a chronic shortage of transplantable organs, some wealthy in-
dividuals who are on the waiting list ﬁnd alternative, illegal means to obtain a kidney which
would perhaps be impossible otherwise.
Although the transplant laws and the penal procedures established against the commer-
cialization of organs date back to the late 1960s, the emergence of organ traﬃcking as a
transnational phenomenon only dates back to 1980s. Organ traﬃcking is known to be ex-
tremely well-organized and mobile, yet infrequently hierarchical, involving a network of travel
agents, insurance companies, religious organizations, charitable trusts, patient advocacy or-
ganizations, organ brokers, lab technicians, medical directors of transplant units, qualiﬁed
medical doctors and nursing staﬀ (Vermot-Mangold, 2003; UNGIFT, 2008). According to the
WHO, organ traﬃcking accounts for up to 10 percent of all transplants and 20 percent of all
kidney transplants performed worldwide (Nullis-Kapp, 2004; Abbud-Filho et al., 2008). Organ
traﬃcking activities are not exclusive to traﬃcking of organs from living donors although no
reliable evidence has been substantiated regarding cases of murder. It is believed that traﬃck-
ing occurs in morgues, laboratories, prison hospitals, even in disaster sites (Scheper-Hughes,
2000; Carreon, 2005; Goodwin, 2006). The operations usually take place in private facilities
known to be actively involved in illegal transplants. Sometimes the donor is smuggled into
the country by a broker who intermediates the delivery of kidneys. To this end, a signiﬁ-
cant aspect of traﬃcking in human beings for the purposes of removal of organs is corruption
(Caplan et al., 2009). As noted by Scheper-Hughes (2003b), strong links with the police and
customs oﬃcials have been established through bribes to law enforcement agents in return for
not reporting the violation (i.e. forgery of travel documents, passports, fake ID's) or to secure
entry. Corruption takes place at the private level as well, in the form of bribes to doctors to
prepare forged medical documents under the name of charitable donations (Sanal, 2004).
Organ traﬃcking runs between medically desperate and ﬁnancially desperate individuals.
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Wealthy patients, diagnosed with organ failure are willing to exhaust all their means to obtain
a healthy organ to survive whereas ﬁnancially desperate individuals are willing to sell their
kidneys to pay oﬀ debts. Studies report that donors typically live under poverty and unsanitary
conditions with extreme debt and selling a kidney has been misgauged as a way to escape
poverty (Goyal et al., 2002; Scheper-Hughes, 2000). A recent study conducted by Mendoza
(2010) in the Philippines shows that about 89 percent of the surveyed kidney vendors were
low income class or extremely poor and the vast majority of kidney vendors reported annual
incomes below the poverty line. According to a ﬁeld study conducted by Goyal et al. (2002)
in India, most of the donors stated that they would not have sold their kidney if they had
known its consequences. This includes chronic pain at the nephrectomy site, renal failure and
inability to perform manual labor which is the primary source of income for donors. This
problem is more pronounced in countries like India and Pakistan where kidney sellers cannot
get post-operative medical care because the government is ﬁnancially unable or unwilling to
provide them.
Figure 6.1 displays the international recipient and donor routes and hubs of traﬃcking.
Recipients from the Arab Peninsula travel to India and Egypt to receive a transplant and
patients in the Far Southeast Asia travel to China and India. It is believed that there exists a
surgeon network linking Turkey and Israel to South Africa where most of the recipients come
from Israel and donors come from Brazil. A striking fact of this network is that China, India
and Turkey hold central positions in the sale of organs which are known as the hubs of organ
traﬃcking1.
The global traﬃc in human organs is ruled by the dominance over the geographical areas in
which Turkey operates in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, China and India operate over
Far East and Southeast Asia. A distinguishing feature of Turkey and India is that Turkey is
a donor importer whereas India is a donor exporter country. Organ donors are smuggled
into Turkey from former Soviet countries and local donors almost do not exist. In India the
majority of the population have either been a kidney seller or are willing to sell one. A
characteristic shared by these countries is that the law enforcement is relatively weak. This
includes legislative loopholes in national criminal codes as well as high levels of corruption2.
In China, the government holds the monopoly power over the sale and the procurement of
1See EHC (2004) and Pearson (2004). The WHO identiﬁed these countries as hot spots in organ traﬃcking.
2According to Jha (2004), countries known to be active in illegal transplants have performed poorly on
corruption-perception index.
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human organs which has been made through the extraction of organs of executed prisoners. In
1984, the Chinese government issued a document entitled Rules Concerning the Utilization of
Corpses of Organs from the Corpses of Executed Prisoners. This law allowed the government
to extract the organs of executed prisoners although no government oﬃcial admitted the
practice and claimed that the prisoners have given consent. The execution of prisoners in
China is believed to coincide with the transplant operations although no evidence has been
available. In 2007, the Chinese government has admitted the sale of organs from executed
prisoners and imposed a temporary ban on organ sales. China has also been a transplant
center in Far East Asia for international patients. In Japan, the Shinto tradition prohibits the
use of cadaver donors and deems organs of cadavers to be unclean. Therefore Japanese organ
procurement almost completely consists of directed living donations. Patients who need heart,
pancreas, lung and liver turn to China where they are procured from executed prisoners and
sold to international patients from Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. A tradition
similar to Shinto exists among Orthodox Jewish in Israel. The deceased donation rates in Israel
are very low because Orthodox Jewish deﬁne death as the cessation of the heart and not the
brain activity which makes impossible to procure deceased organs (Steinbuch, 2008). Therefore
Israeli patients seek organs in Turkey, Romania and Moldova (Rothman, 1999). Furthermore,
insurance companies subsidized by the government are funding these illegal transplants up to
$80, 000 for which there is a wide-spread demand in Israel (Goodwin, 2006). This practice
further impedes enforcement against traﬃcking.
The soaring demand for kidney which is not matched by the current altruistic organ procure-
ment system exhorted individuals to become organ brokers who identiﬁed this lucrative organ
shortage. A broker and a potential donor agree over a kidney price as low as thousand dollars
whereas the same kidney is sold to a wealthy recipient for a price that is substantially higher.
Rothman et al. (1997) states that organ brokers who intermediate the transaction between
potential poor donors and wealthy recipients take large payments and physicians who are a
part of this transaction provide substandard medical care characterized by the incompetence
of medical staﬀ and the poor quality of organs. Opponents of the commercialization of organs
further argue that it exploits the poor, violates the bodily integrity of the donors, drag them
to deeper poverty and impedes justice and fairness by diﬀerentiating between wealthy patients
who are able to pay for an organ and patients who are on the waiting list.
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6.3. International Standards and Legal Instruments
Organ traﬃcking is closely related to traﬃcking in human beings by the Article 3 of the Proto-
col to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traﬃcking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the UN Convention against TOC. Examining organ traﬃcking as a form of TOC
is important towards determining how the laws are framed, how investigations and prosecu-
tions are conducted and how the international police collaborations are carried out. Deﬁning
organized crime is therefore important for public policy so as to determine the allocation of
ﬁnancial and personnel resources to combat organ traﬃcking.
The UN Convention deﬁnes transnational crime as an oﬀence that is committed in more
than one country; in one country but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction
and control takes place in another country; in one country but involves an organized criminal
group than engages in criminal activities in more than one country; or in one country but
has substantial eﬀects in another country. On the other hand, the Task Force on Organized
Crime of the US President's Commission deﬁnes organized crime as the supply of illegal goods
and services to countless number of citizen customers. This deﬁnition does not represent to-
day's organized criminal activity in which the main problem comes from the word organized
and not crime. This view alters the deﬁnition of organized crime and shifts the focus from
crime to the group by which the criminal activity is carried out by the use of ideology, hierar-
chy, continuity, violence or the threat of violence, bonding, illegal enterprises, involvement in
legitimate business and corruption (Finckenauer, 2005).
The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traﬃcking in Persons is considered to be
the ﬁrst binding legal instrument that has been globally ratiﬁed (Caplan et al., 2009). Article
3 of the UN protocol and Article 4 of the COE Anti-Traﬃcking Convention deﬁne traﬃcking
in persons by the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons,
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving
of payments or beneﬁts to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person,
for the purpose of exploitation. Traﬃcking of human beings including those for the purposes
of organ removal constitutes a crime when an action by certain means is carried out for the
purpose of exploitation.
Most international organizations such as the UN, the WHO and the COE prohibit and
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oppose the commercialization of human organs and the traﬃcking of human beings for the
purposes of organ removal. In resolution 59/156 of 2004, the UN General Assembly condemned
traﬃcking in human body parts and urged member states to adopt the necessary measures
to prevent, combat and punish traﬃcking in human organs. A report by the UN Secretary-
General pointed out that it became more diﬃcult to understand and analyze the problem and
its extent and to take necessary measures at national and international levels in the absence of
internationally agreed deﬁnitions and legal standards to provide a framework for cooperation
in combatting organ traﬃcking (Caplan et al., 2009).
Organ traﬃcking has been condemned by the WHO on the grounds that it contravenes basic
human values, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the WHO constitution. The
WHA condemned the commercialization of living donor organs and issued a set of guiding
principles through resolution WHA 44.25 on human organ transplantation in 1991 which was
adopted by 192 countries. While the Guiding Principles 5 and 6 respectively called for the
prohibition of commercialization of human body parts and commercial advertisements of the
need for and the availability of organs, the choice of methods to combat commercial dealings
including the type and the magnitude of sanctions is left at the discretion of the states (Caplan
et al., 2009).
The COE Parliamentary Assembly report stated that organ traﬃcking should not remain
the sole responsibility of donor exporter countries of Eastern Europe and recommended mea-
sures to minimize incidences of traﬃcking in Europe (Vermot-Mangold, 2003; Caplan et al.,
2009). This report was the basis of the COE Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1611
which was adopted in 2003. The COE recommended that states shall establish those who
are criminally responsible for organ trade in their national criminal codes including brokers,
hospital and nursing staﬀ, lab technicians and medical staﬀ who encourage and provide infor-
mation on transplant tourism. The COE Parliamentary Assembly report expressly stated that
donors should not be criminally responsible because most of them are compelled by economic
hardship and deceived to sell their organs. The parliamentary assembly also recommended
that all member states sign and ratify the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and
its Additional Protocol concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin,
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traﬃcking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children supplementing the UN Convention against TOC and the Protocol on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography supplementing the Convention on the
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Rights of the Child.
The protocol supplementing the COE Anti-Traﬃcking convention recommended that po-
tential donors shall be prevented through raising awareness and education. Donor exporter
countries in Europe were called to restrict organ donation by prisoners, and to implement
national strategies to reduce poverty and corruption. The protocol also called donor importer
countries to expressly distinguish medical staﬀ involved in the commercialization of human
organs in their criminal codes and to deny reimbursements for illegal transplants performed
abroad as well as for the follow-up care of recipients.
6.3.1. The Scope of Criminal Liability
Article 19 of the COE Anti-Traﬃcking Protocol states that countries must adopt provisions
that criminalize persons who receive transplants knowingly that the organ is obtained from a
traﬃcking victim. None of the other international protocols includes this provision. On the
other hand, if the potential recipient is unaware that the organ to be transplanted is obtained
from a victim of traﬃcking, she cannot be held criminally liable according to Article 19 of the
COE protocol. The criminal liability of persons who make use of the services of the victim of
traﬃcking for the purposes of organ removal diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the criminal liability of
persons who make use of the services of victims of traﬃcking for other purposes such as labor
or sexual exploitation (Caplan et al., 2009). The reason is that in the former the potential
organ recipient who makes use of the services of the exploited donor is in a desperate situation
in which she has to choose between remaining on the waiting list to receive an organ that
is donated voluntarily and procured through legal means but one that may never come and
resorting to other ways to receive an organ that is paid and procured by means of coercion and
exploitation in the black market. Almost all patients who obtain organs in the black market
are compelled to do so because the alternative is either death or lifetime debilitation. Therefore
the criminal liability of potential recipients should be assessed delicately and diﬀerently than
persons who make use of the services of other traﬃcking victims. Caplan et al. (2009) note
that several states objected this provision and that no agreement among the EU member states
could be reached because of the complexity of the issue.
The criminal liability of living organ donors is an equally sensitive issue because they are
deceived or coerced to sell their kidneys due to poor economic prospects and debts. This group
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of persons are mostly thought to be the victim of traﬃcking and treated as such unless they
become intermediaries or brokers after selling their kidney. UNGIFT (2008) and Caplan et al.
(2009) state that countries should refrain from holding these individuals criminally liable
because they are likely to suﬀer from the dire consequences of kidney removal. This view
is implemented in the Article 26 of the COE Anti-Traﬃcking protocol by a non-punishment
provision that suggests that countries must adjust their criminal provisions so as to not impose
penalties on organ donors as long as they do not become brokers.
The UN as well as the COE protocols call for vigorous pursuit of intermediaries, brokers,
medical staﬀ and hospitals involved in organ trading. Under Article 5 of the UN protocol, the
criminal liability of intermediaries and brokers is straightforward because they mostly recruit,
transport and transfer other accessories by illicit means. The criminal liability of medical
staﬀ and hospitals on the other hand is contingent upon several conditions. Physicians are
criminally liable if they engage in the traﬃcking of persons deﬁned as in Article 3 of the UN
protocol and Article 4 of the COE Anti-Traﬃcking Convention; aid and abet traﬃckers and
deceive organ donors about the risks of operation; explicitly refer their patients to receive
organs obtained from donors known to engage in commercial dealings; fail to inform authori-
ties, where required by law, about cases of traﬃcking and commercial dealings; and perform
transplants knowingly that the organ is obtained from a paid donor. Physicians cannot be
held criminally liable if they merely inform the patient about transplant tourism without any
further involvement, and confront with or provide follow-up care on recipients known to have
received transplants, in their own or other countries through paying for the organ (Caplan
et al., 2009).
Hospitals and medical clinics can also be held criminally liable if they harbour and allow
physicians to transplant organs obtained through illegal means in their premises, facilitate
commercial dealings or oﬀer payment to persons to become donors.
Article 23 of the COE Anti-Traﬃcking Convention requires that states adopt measures to
ensure that the criminal oﬀences established in the convention are punishable by eﬀective,
proportionate and deterrent sanctions including deprivation of liberty which can give rise to
extradition (Caplan et al., 2009). Article 24 of the COE Anti-Traﬃcking Convention regards
the following oﬀences as aggravating when determining the penalty: the oﬀence deliberately
or by gross negligence endangered the life of the victim; the oﬀence was committed against a
child; the oﬀence was committed by a public oﬃcial in the performance of her duties; and the
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oﬀence was committed within the framework of a criminal organization. The convention notes
that states shall take into account previous convictions and ﬁnal sentences passed by other
states while determining the range and the magnitude of sanctions. The convention further
stipulates that any establishment used as a harbour to carry out illegal transplants shall be
subject to temporary or permanent closure and the medical staﬀ intentionally participating in
any activities related to traﬃcking in humans for the purpose of organ removal shall be denied
the right to exercise their duties.
6.3.2. Comparative Analysis
This section attempts to analyze criminal provisions against traﬃcking in humans for the
purposes of organ removal in selected countries with a focus on the scope of criminal liability
and highlight potential loopholes and inconsistencies in accordance with the international
standards set forth by the UN, the WHO and the COE. We ﬁrst examine the types of sanctions
imposed by the states in our sample and then focus on the provisions in detail by taking into
consideration whether the law distinguishes between donors, (insured) recipients, medical staﬀ,
chronic oﬀending; impose closure of establishment; impose sanctions based on the consequences
of traﬃcking to the victim and the legal age of the victim; specify sanctions based on the
liability rule; deny the right to exercise duty and whether the law punishes oﬀences committed
abroad.
The criminal provisions against the traﬃcking of human organs for 38 countries are com-
piled in table 6.1. To facilitate comparison, all ﬁnes are converted to US dollar and Euro. As
of 2008, countries that impose a pecuniary sanction only are China, Denmark, Norway, Fin-
land, Austria and Panama. Denmark, Norway and Finland do not specify the magnitude of
sanctions, however the latter two countries may impose stiﬀer sanctions stipulated elsewhere
in the law. China is the only exception in the whole sample by imposing a ﬁne of eight to ten
times the value of the trade.
Countries that impose an imprisonment term only are Brazil, Italy, Czech Republic and
Romania. The length of imprisonment term in these states ranges from 2 to 20 years. The
remaining countries in the sample impose both a ﬁne and an imprisonment term. Across the
sample, there is a great variability in terms of the length of imprisonment ranging from one
month to twenty years as well as in pecuniary sanctions ranging from a couple of dollars to
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millions of dollars. Countries with the lowest amount of pecuniary sanctions are India and
Turkey which stipulate a ﬁne less than a couple hundred US dollars. Countries with the lowest
imprisonment term in the sample are Australia, Canada, Estonia, Hong Kong, Iraq, Lebanon,
the Netherlands and New Zealand all of which stipulate an imprisonment term for traﬃcking
that is at most 1 year.
Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics for 36 countries in order to give a snapshot of
the distribution of monetary and non-monetary sanctions. Columns (1) and (2) respectively
show means and standard deviations for 11 COE member states that ratiﬁed the COE Anti-
Traﬃcking Convention and 10 COE member states that did not ratify the convention. Simi-
larly, columns (3) and (4) respectively show means and standard deviations for 8 COE non-
member states that ratiﬁed the UN protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traﬃcking in
Persons and 9 COE non-member states that did not ratify the protocol. Columns 5 and 6
show means and standard deviations for the entire sample. The ﬁrst number at the bottom
row of table 6.2 shows the sample size for the ﬁnes and the second number shows the sample
size for the imprisonment term.
Both the average ﬁne and the average imprisonment term imposed for organ traﬃcking are
substantially higher in states that did not ratiﬁy the COE convention or the UN protocol than
states that did ratify3. The reason for the former is that the high ﬁnes imposed by Switzerland
(one of the COE members that did not ratify the convention) substantially increase the mean
within the COE member states. The reason for the latter is that Japan, which did not
ratify the UN protocol, is known to be the most strict country in terms of the laws governing
donation and transplantation with highly disproportional ﬁnes for traﬃcking4. As shown in
column (6) the average ﬁne imposed for traﬃcking dramatically falls after removing Japan
from the sample. As shown by the standard deviations, average monetary sanctions imposed
for organ traﬃcking are dispersed across a wide range of values indicating an ambiguity so as
to what should be its optimal level. Concerning the imprisonment term states in the sample
have more or less an equal length of average imprisonment term with relatively small variance.
Identifying those who ought to be subject to penal procedure and the magnitude of penalties
for the criminally responsible is a controversial issue. Some analysts suggest that donors
should not be criminally charged of organ traﬃcking because most of them are in economic
3This does not indicate that the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand testing the
statistical signiﬁcance of these diﬀerences is misleading because the sample size is too small.
4See the Appendix A.3.
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hardship or they are deceived to sell their organs. Similarly, the criminal liability of (potential)
organ recipients should be established carefully. In accordance with this view, the German
law explicitly stipulates that the court has discretionary power to remove or to reduce the
punishment for donors and recipients5. In contrast, the legislations of Finland, Morocco, the
Netherlands and New Zealand either criminalize the recipient or both the recipient and the
donor without any mentioning of health professionals. None of the countries in the sample
address the issue of insured recipients or the reimbursement of illegal transplants.
Concerning medical staﬀ, most of the countries do not explicitly distinguish between med-
ical staﬀ and other accessories and impose a uniform penalty. The exception to this case is
Switzerland which explicitly sets a higher penalty for health professionals. Switzerland is also
the only country in the sample that distinguishes between actions that result from negligence
and otherwise punishable actions.
Some legislations speciﬁcally impose a ﬁne and/or an imprisonment term for medical staﬀ
(e.g. Brazil, Romania) and emphasize that the medical staﬀ is only criminally liable if they
knowingly implant an organ obtained through illegal means. Only in Czech Republic, Iceland,
Ireland, Panama and recently in China, the law stipulates a ban of medical practice for health
professionals involved in traﬃcking. Furthermore, the latter two countries speciﬁcally mention
that the licences of medical establishments involved in the removal of organs from victims of
traﬃcking may be temporarily of permanently revoked and the establishments may be shut
down.
A close examination of criminal provisions reveals that the concept of repeat or chronic
oﬀending has not been embodied in the law; however there is a clear distinction between those
who commit this illegal act once (i.e. donor, recipients) and those whose oﬀense is of chronic
nature (i.e. medical staﬀ, mediators). The exceptions to this case are Belgium, Germany, Hong
Kong and Kuwait. Even though traﬃcking is accepted universally as a demand driven problem,
the legal distinction between repeat and one-time oﬀending is one of the most important points
in deterring worldwide traﬃcking.
None of the countries in the sample distinguish based on the legal age of the victim; how-
ever the legislation in Brazil speciﬁcally stipulates that in cases of organ removal resulting in
disability for work, incurable disease, loss of function, permanent deformity or death of the
victim, the sanctions are gradually increased.
5A bill with a similar provision is introduced in the Israeli parliament.
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Some national legislations sanction violations outside the country or refer to international
criminal organizations. Countries that punish the purchase or the sale of organs or illegal
transplantations abroad are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy and
Switzerland (EHC, 2004). The legislation in Bulgaria further imposes stiﬀer penalties for those
involved in the international exchange of human organs. This provision expressly acknowledges
the involvement of criminal organizations in trading human body parts because international
traﬃcking implies, among others, an organized crime network and the possibility of corruption.
National legislative diﬀerences indicate that neither the legal framework nor the magnitude
of sanctions might be optimal. As Rothman et al. (1997) point out:
Despite the unanimity that commercialization is unethical, the international procla-
mations fail to provide a rationale for their position and contain no provisions for
enforcement, no consideration of how these policies should be implemented or what
penalties ought to be imposed for violations.
The COE states that laws in many countries are not clear about who is criminally responsible
for organ traﬃcking. Sanctions are not enforced and prosecutions have tended to focus on
brokers rather than on medical staﬀ and recipients do not fall under the criminal law because
most of them leave the jurisdictional domain after committing the crime (Pearson, 2004).
Such inconsistencies necessitates cooperative international law making, policing and call for
further analysis of the identiﬁcation of an optimal penalty that should be imposed on oﬀenders
engaging in organ traﬃcking.
6.4. A Simple Model of Law Enforcement
In this section, a model of optimal law enforcement in organ traﬃcking is outlined. Albeit
simple, the model has two important implications. Under conventional deterrence, traﬃcking
should be ﬁned to the fullest extent for all oﬀenders, together with a maximum ban of medical
practice term for the surgeon, and severer punishments for recipients who are insured against
the cost of transplant; however imprisonment should not be used except otherwise indicated
because it is a costly sanction. Under target deterrence, the enforcement authorities should
always impose imprisonment together with a maximal ﬁne to the surgeon despite it lowers
social welfare. This model not only presents simple and normative results in the enforcement
of law but also provides guidelines concerning criminal provisions the law is ought to stipulate.
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There has been a fair growth in the literature of the economic analysis of criminal law
enforcement since the seminal paper of Becker (1968). Becker's analysis was based on the
utility maximization of a rational criminal who faces the decision to commit crime given he is
subject to a probability of detection and a ﬁne if caught and aimed to identify the certainty
and the severity of punishment that deter crime. Most of the studies following Becker focused
on the maximization of social welfare as the objective of public policy. The primary concern
in the maximization of social welfare is that the social planner bears the cost of detecting
as well as the cost of imposing sanctions. Therefore the social planner tries to identify the
optimal probability of detection and the optimal ﬁne that maximizes social welfare. The main
result of Becker's analysis is that the optimal ﬁne is the maximal which is equal to the wealth
of the criminal. This ﬁnding is based on the assumption that ﬁnes are costless transfers and
that the wealth of the individual is observable. This type of analysis has been criticized for
that (1) the type of crime is not internalized by the analysis; that is there are crimes (i.e.
rape, serial murder) for which ﬁnes are useless in deterring and that imposing a non-monetary
sanction may be optimal despite it lowers welfare6, (2) the wealth of the agents is usually
unobservable and requires the state to bear the cost of wealth auditing to identify the level of
wealth7, (3) there are asymmetries between the government and the enforcer8, (4) criminals
usually engage in deterrence diluting activities (i.e. corruption)9, (5) individuals may not be
risk neutral10, (6) organized crimes may diﬀer from individual crimes (i.e. target deterrence
may be needed)11, (7) the criminal domain may be beyond the control of a single government
or a group of enforcers (i.e. transnational crimes) and (8) the analysis is essentially static
and that a dynamic framework would produce a completely diﬀerent result12.
6.4.1. Conventional Deterrence
The following cases are assumed given the enforcement, speciﬁc to organ traﬃcking: The
liability is strict; the enforcement is act based; detection is a policy instrument; the wealth of
6See Shavell (2004) for a comprehensive analysis of the theory of law enforcement.
7See Polinsky (2006).
8See Jellal and Garoupa (1999).
9See Polinsky and Shavell (2001) and Garoupa and Klerman (2004).
10See Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
11See Gambetta and Reuter (1995), Grossman (1995), Fiorentini (1995), Posner (1998), Garoupa (2000),
Kugler et al. (2005), Chang et al. (2005), Mansour et al. (2006) and Ballester et al. (2006).
12See Feichtinger (1983), Davis (1988), Leung (1995), Feichtinger (1999), Feichtinger and Tragler (2002), Fent
et al. (2002) and Garoupa and Jellal (2004).
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the individual is known; the sanctions are both monetary and non-monetary; the agents are
risk neutral in sanctions and the act is irreversible.
The liability is strict in the sense that the oﬀender will be convicted even though he was
negligent under actus reus and fault is not required. Strict liability imposes an additional
burden on the oﬀender and relatively easy to establish for the enforcement authority13.
Legal intervention is act-based. Under act-based enforcement the sanction is imposed with
respect to the act irrespective of whether the act imposed harm. Under harm-based enforce-
ment the imposition of harm precedes legal intervention. The sanction should be higher the
greater the probability or the magnitude of harm (Shavell, 2004).
The enforcement authorities use the probability of detection as a policy instrument. The
enforcer ﬁrst determines the optimal probability of detection and then devotes public resources
necessary to achieve the chosen probability of detection. Therefore public expenditures devoted
to detect and to apprehend oﬀenders is also a policy variable.
Standard law enforcement theory states that the optimal ﬁnes for an illicit activity should
be maximal, that is should equal the agents' wealth, assuming that the agents are risk neutral
in ﬁnes14.
Both monetary and non-monetary sanctions are considered as means of deterrence. Non-
monetary sanctions under organ traﬃcking may come about in two ways. First, as is the case
in the US and most of the European countries, oﬀenders may face imprisonment in addition
to monetary sanctions. Another non-monetary sanction is the ban of medical practice which
prevents health professionals from practicing medicine.
The ﬁnal aspect of the analysis is that the removal of kidney and transplant cannot be
undone once it is performed.
The agents in kidney sale from living donor are the surgeon who will perform the operation,
the middleman, the donor and the recipient. It is assumed that the existence of middleman is
necessary to match the recipient with the donor and that the surgeon and the middleman are
not the same person15.
13Under the negligence rule as opposed to strict liability, the enforcement authority has to prove that the
traﬃcker was at fault and that he was negligent. If a negligence rule is assumed to prevail, doctors who
were involved in traﬃcking would not be held liable as long as they were proved to be not negligent. This
contradicts the legal ground to ban traﬃcking.
14It is assumed that imposing ﬁne is costless. Further, if the wealth of the individual is unknown, then the
optimal ﬁne may not be maximal so either overdeterrence or underdeterrence occurs assuming that some
agents are wealthier than others (Polinsky, 2006).
15This condition is imposed to make the case realistic and more interesting. Note that most of the donors sell
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When the middleman matches a recipient and a donor, he buys the kidney from the donor
and sells it to the recipient for a price, p. The diﬀerence between the purchasing and the sales
price is the gain that middleman obtains from kidney sale which is the middleman's share
from sales proceedings, denoted by γ (0 < γ < 1). Let q be the probability of being detected
by the enforcer with 0 < q < 1. If detected, the middleman is subject to a ﬁne for selling
organs, fm, which is bounded by his wealth, wm (0 < fm ≤ wm). Therefore if the middleman
goes into kidney trade, he will pay a ﬁne, fm if detected, in which case the kidney payment
will be undone. If he is not detected, he will gain γp16. The individual will choose to become
a middleman if his expected payoﬀ is greater than zero.
Πm = (1− q) γp− qfm > 0 (6.1)
For donor's choice to sell a kidney, let δ be the donor's share from sales proceedings, h be
the expected harm of the operation and fd be the ﬁne imposed on a donor who is caught
selling his kidney. If the individual chooses to become a donor and sell one of his kidneys,
he will not be detected with some probability and receive a portion of the purchasing price.
The middleman and the donor share the total purchasing price of the kidney (γ + δ = 1). At
the same time, the donor agrees to undergo nephrectomy (surgical removal of kidney) and he
is subject to harm17. If the donor is detected while selling his kidney, it is assumed that the
enforcement authorities do not impose a sanction because she is victimized (fd = 0). In that
case the payment is undone; however the harm is not reversible. The individual will choose
to become a donor if his expected payoﬀ is greater than zero:
Πd = (1− q) (δp− h)− qh = (1− q) (1− γ) p− h > 0 (6.2)
Similarly, the recipient beneﬁts gr after the transplantation but also pays the cost of trans-
plantation, cx , including the surgeon fee and the clinic fees. If detected, he will be required
to pay the ﬁne, fr ,which is bounded by the wealth of the recipient, wr (0 < fr ≤ wr) and
their kidneys through a middleman although there are cases in which the kidney is sold directly to a clinic.
16If the individual chooses to become an organ broker, he allocates all his working time to illicit activity and
does not earn legal wage.
17Illegal organ transplantations are performed under much less hygienic conditions which involve risk of infec-
tion. A recent study by Goyal et al. (2002) in India showed that 86 percent of the participants indicated a
decline in their health status and in the ability to perform physical labor after nephrectomy.
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the kidney payment is undone; however, the gain and the harm are not reversible18. Note
that when the recipient is not insured against the costs of criminal activity, the sum of kidney
price and the cost of transplant will be bounded by his/her wealth. On the other hand if the
recipient does not engage in traﬃcking, he will remain on dialysis which costs cd. Therefore,
the recipient will choose to involve in this illegal activity if his expected payoﬀ exceeds that of
undergoing dialysis.
Πr = (1− q) (gr − p− cx − h)− q (fr − gr + h) > −cd (6.3)
If the surgeon decides to perform the operation, he will not be detected with probability
(1− q) in which case he will be paid by the amount cx for performing the operation. If
detected, he will pay a ﬁne, fs , which is bounded by his wealth, wswith 0 < fs ≤ ws and
the payment for transplant will be undone. On the other hand, the surgeon's gain for not
performing the operation equals his wage19. The surgeon will only perform this operation if
Πs = (1− q) (cx + Λ)− qfs > Λ (6.4)
Next, consider the willingness of the middleman and the recipient to enter into a sales
agreement. The middleman, the donor and the recipient agree over the kidney price, p whereas
surgeon and the recipient agree over the transplant fee, cx. For an agreement between the
middleman and the recipient to be feasible, (6.1) and (6.3) imply that
qfm
(1− q) γ < p <
gr − h+ cd
1− q − cx −
qfr
1− q (6.5)
It follows from (6.5) that an agreement between the middleman and the recipient occurs if
and only if
fm + γfr <
γ (gr − h+ cd)− γ (1− q) cx
q
(6.6)
Similarly, for an agreement between the recipient and the donor to be feasible, (6.2) and
18If the kidney payment is not undone, then the recipient's ability to pay a ﬁne for engaging in kidney sale
would decline by p and the middleman's and the donor's ability to pay a ﬁne for engaging in kidney sale
would increase by γp and (1− γ) p respectively.
19The surgeon continues to perform his daily activities and engaging in organ traﬃcking does not exclude him
from receiving his wage. This condition is imposed so that the surgeon can cover his illicit activity and
gain access to medical equipment.
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(6.3) imply that
h
(1− q) (1− γ) < p <
gr − h+ cd
1− q − cx −
qfr
1− q (6.7)
It follows from (6.7) that an agreement between the recipient and the donor occurs if:
qfr < gr − h+ cd − (1− q) cx − h
1− γ (6.8)
and using (6.6),
qfm <
(
γ
1− γ
)
h (6.9)
The interpretation of (6.9) is that the middleman will engage in kidney sale if and only if
the expected ﬁne is less than the expected harm borne by the donor, multiplied by the ratio
of their shares from kidney sale. Hence, the commercialization of kidney can be deterred if
the expected ﬁne is suﬃciently high or if the donor's share from the sale is suﬃciently high.
However, the latter case is not relevant because donors do not have a bargaining power in this
trade (Pearson, 2004).
Finally, consider the willingness of the surgeon and the recipient to enter into a transplant
agreement. For a transplant to be feasible (6.3) and (6.4) imply that
q (fs + Λ)
1− q < cx <
gr − h+ cd
1− q − p−
qfr
1− q (6.10)
It follows from (6.10) that a transplant occurs if and only if:
q (fs + fr) < gr − h+ cd − (1− q) p− qΛ (6.11)
and
qfs < (1− q) (cx − p) + h
1− γ − qΛ (6.12)
From (6.11), the enforcement authority has at least three tools at its disposal to control
organ traﬃcking. Organ traﬃcking can be deterred if the expected sum of ﬁnes for engaging
in traﬃcking is suﬃciently high or if the surgeon's wage is suﬃciently high or if the cost of
dialysis is suﬃciently low.
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The individual gains, denoted by g, are gm = γp > qfm/ (1− q); gd = δp > h/ (1− q);
gr > h− cd + (1− q) (p+ cx) + qfr; gs = cx > q (fs + Λ) / (1− q).
The total gain would be the sum of individual gains which implies:
gr >
q (fm + fs + Λ) + h (2− q)
1− q − cd − q (p+ cx) + qfr (6.13)
The critical value of gain or deterrence, denoted by gˆr, is deﬁned as the level of gain below
which the recipient will not involve in organ traﬃcking and above which he will. Thus from
(6.13)
gˆr =
q (fm + fs + Λ) + h (2− q)
1− q − cd − q (p+ cx) + qfr (6.14)
Note that even though the kidney payment and the cost of transplantation are mere transfers
they aﬀect the deterrence level because nephrectomy and transplantation are not reversible
acts. On the other hand one would obtain a deterrence level unaﬀected by p and cx if these
operations were reversible, which is unrealistic.
From (6.14), the dilution of deterrence is twofold; one is related to the price of kidney and
the other is related to the costs associated with dialysis. Observe that organ traﬃcking dilutes
deterrence by lowering gˆr. The reason is that if p is zero, then those who are willing to sell their
kidney will have no incentive to do so those who seek kidney will have no incentive to resort
to black market, anticipating that no one will supply the kidney at a zero price. Therefore
the deterrence diluting eﬀect of kidney payment makes organ traﬃcking a socially undesirable
phenomenon20.
Second, observe that dialysis also dilutes deterrence because marginal increases in the cost
of dialysis make it favorable for the recipient to choose the lesser-cost option in the black
market. Another implication given by the deterrence level in (6.14) is that an increase of ﬁnes
20This result is conditional upon the mechanism by which the legal organ procurement system functions.
Currently organs are legally procured under systems based on altruism although exceptions do exist. If the
procurement system is based on market mechanism, that is individuals do not donate but rather sell their
organs, then commercialization may or may not be socially undesirable. Further, the question of social
undesirability of organ traﬃcking is not concerned with whether there is payment or not. The reason is
that payment is why organ trading is illegal in the ﬁrst place; thus if there were no payment at all, 6.14
would certainly be higher. The social undesirability of organ traﬃcking rather stems from the fact that the
enforcement authority has no direct control over the price and ﬂuctuations in the price or the operation
fees in black markets. This means that given there is a black market and a price above zero, any upward
movement in the price weakens deterrence and the enforcer's eﬀorts to reduce incidences of traﬃcking.
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for the surgeon and the middleman increases the deterrence level.
Conventionally it is assumed that the social welfare is the gain that the agents create minus
the harm they cause minus enforcement costs. It is further assumed that the enforcement
authorities do not know the gain a particular recipient obtains but the distribution of the
gains. To examine the social welfare implications of organ traﬃcking, let H be some measure
of social harm caused by traﬃcking, c (q) be the enforcement cost to detect oﬀenders (c′ (q) > 0)
and z (gr) be the density of gains among recipients, z (gr) is positive on [0,∞)21. Thus, social
welfare can be expressed as:
W =
ˆ ∞
gˆr
(gr −H) z (gr) dgr − c (q) (6.15)
The objective of enforcement authorities is to choose the ﬁnes and the probability of detec-
tion that maximize the social welfare in (6.15). The optimal levels of sanctions are denoted
by an asterisk.
Proposition 1
If the agents are assumed to be bounded by wealth, then:
i. The optimal ﬁnes for the middleman and the surgeon are maximal,f∗m = wm; f∗s = ws.
ii. Without health insurance, the optimal ﬁne for the recipient is maximal, f∗r ≥ p+cx = wr.
iii. With health insurance, the optimal ﬁne for the recipient should be accompanied by an
imprisonment term.
Proof
part (i): Whenever fm < wm and fs < ws, ﬁnes can be raised to the agents' respective wealth
levels and q can be lowered accordingly so that the deterrence level is unaltered but the state
saved some enforcement costs because q is lower, thus social welfare is higher if fm and fs
are maximal. Therefore the optimal ﬁnes for these agents that are not maximal cannot be
optimal.
part (ii): If the ﬁnes, fm, fs and fr can be raised to f
′
m, f
′
s and f
′
r respectively and the
probability of detection, q, can be lowered to q
′
without aﬀecting behavior, this implies
21For our purposes it is not essential to elaborate and quantify what H exactly signiﬁes. The social harm of
traﬃcking is generally interpreted as an impediment to fairness and justice.
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∂gˆr
∂fm
+
∂gˆr
∂fs
+
∂gˆr
∂fr
=
∂gˆr
∂q
⇒ 3q − q
2
1− q =
Φ1 + (1− q)2 Φ2
(1− q)2 (6.16)
where Φ1 = fm + fs + Λ + h > 0 and Φ2 = fr − p− cx. (6.16) will always hold if:
f∗r ≥ p+ cx (6.17)
From (6.17), the optimal ﬁne for the recipient should be greater than or equal to the total
cost of traﬃcking (p+ cx), which is assumed to be bounded by the recipient's wealth under
no insurance22. However, since the ﬁne cannot exceed the agent's wealth, the optimal ﬁne for
the recipient equals his/her wealth. This normative result is standard when individuals are
risk neutral in ﬁnes and wealth is observable and would not be altered if p+ cx < wr because
the ﬁne for the recipient can be raised to maximum without incurring costs. The inequality in
(6.17) is also a benchmark for the enforcer given the total of cost traﬃcking can be identiﬁed
by the enforcement authority. Given the optimal ﬁnes, f∗m = wm; f∗s = wsand f∗r = wr, the
optimal probability is then determined by maximizing
´∞
Φ0
(gr −H) z (gr) dgr − c (q) over q
where Φ0 =
q(wm+ws+Λ)+h(2−q)
1−q − cd − q (p+ cx) + qwr.
part (iii): Some recipients are insured against the costs incurred due to illegal transplantation
including the cost of tissue typing and laboratory tests. This problem has been pointed out
by Vermot-Mangold (2003). If recipients are insured, the total cost of traﬃcking may exceed
his/her wealth. In this case, p + cx = wr + ε where ε > 0. From part (ii), we know that
f∗r = wr which implicitly assumed that ε = 0. Under health insurance, the optimal ﬁne for
the recipient is greater than the sum of kidney price and the cost of transplant which is in
turn greater than the recipient's wealth23.
f∗r > p+ cx = wr + ε (6.18)
The optimal ﬁne is greater than the recipient's wealth however he/she will not be able to
22(6.16) may still hold under certain conditions even if f∗r ≤ p+ cx. Since the recipient is bounded by wealth,
both cases lead to f∗r = wr.
23Here, the health insurance that partially covers the costs of transplantation refers to a moral hazard problem
which, unlike the conventional deﬁnition of moral hazard, indicates a tendency of insurance protection to
alter the potential recipient's behavior to engage in illegal transplantation. The incentive conducive to
insurance and that engages the individual to seek organs in illegal ways may also be interpreted as an
indirect motive to prevent loss for as waiting for an organ through legitimate means may impose a loss
on the individual. See Shavell (1979) on how moral hazard aﬀects the behavior under typical insurance
protections.
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pay f∗r but only wr. This result suggests that the optimal deterrence cannot be reached by
solely relying on ﬁnes and that those who are insured against the costs of criminal activity
should be subject to more severe punishment than those who are not insured, possibly by an
imprisonment term since the pecuniary penalty is exhausted. 
Now suppose that there exists a medical board that supervises and licenses medical doctors
in the country. It is now possible to introduce ban of medical practice for surgeons who
engage in traﬃcking. According to Caplan et al. (2009) the ban of medical practice would
be an eﬀective tool to combat organ traﬃcking. It is assumed that the imposition of ban of
medical practice is costless.
Proposition 2
If the state is able to impose a ban of medical practice given it is costless, then:
i. Monetary sanctions should always be accompanied by a ban of medical practice
ii. The optimal ban of medical practice term is maximal, t∗b = T
Proof
part (i): The ban prevents surgeons from practicing medicine thus earning wage as long as
the ban is in eﬀect. The disutility caused by the ban is the foregone wage which can be
expressed by the net present value. Let T be the maximum ban of medical practice term that
can be imposed on the surgeon and tb be the duration of ban of medical practice, 0 < tb ≤ T .
The disutility of ban of medical practice of duration tb is Λµ = Λ
´ tb
0 (1 + r)
−t dt where r is
the discount rate (0 < r < 1) and t denotes time. If the state uses ban of medical practice
together with ﬁnes, the surgeon will perform the operation if cx > q (fs + Λµ) / (1− q). Upon
the introduction of ban of medical practice, the deterrence level is:
gˆ
′
r =
q (fm + fs + Λµ) + h (2− q)
1− q − cd − q (p+ cx) + qfr (6.19)
The deterrence in (6.19) is higher than the case where such ban is absent. In this framework,
the ban of medical practice introduces a higher foregone wage for the surgeon, thus it is optimal
to use whenever possible because it only aﬀects legitimate earnings and it is assumed to be
costless to impose.
part(ii). Suppose that the optimal ban of medical practice term is t
′
b and that t
′
b < T . Then
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the ban of medical practice term can be raised to maximum possible term that can be imposed
without decreasing social welfare since it is a costless non-monetary sanction. This maximum
term could be lifetime or some term less than lifetime due to moral reasons24. Therefore a
ban term that is not maximal cannot be optimal. 
If the state imposes ban of practice even at a zero marginal cost, the surgeon may or may
not be deterred because ban of practice does not incapacitate him25. Upon the introduction
of ban of medical practice, the social welfare is given by (6.15) where now the deterrence level
is replaced by (6.19). Once the ban term and ﬁnes are determined optimally, the objective of
enforcement authorities is to choose the probability of detection that maximizes social welfare.
6.4.2. Target Deterrence
In organ traﬃcking as opposed to other criminal organizations, each agent except the broker
has a strictly complementary role such that the removal of any of those agents is suﬃcient
to dissolve the network. The broker only intermediates the exchange of organ between donor
and the recipient and he is not a vital member of this organization, therefore none of the
agents other than the surgeon could be the key player. First, surgeon's skills to perform a
transplant cannot be substituted by another agent; however the tasks performed by a broker
can be substituted by a surgeon. Second, surgeon is the only member whose oﬀending is of
chronic nature whereas the recipient and the donor are assumed to commit the underlying
oﬀense once. Therefore the surgeon is entitled to be the key player. If there is a particular
agent whose detection and apprehension is suﬃcient for the dissolution of the crime network
the enforcement authorities may detect and sanction only the key player so that no other
agents can establish the necessary conditions to commit crime26. The rationale behind this is
that the enforcement authority intends on deterring all but does not actually want to impose
a sanction on non-key players. This is referred to as the decriminalization of the agents who
24Not only a lifetime ban of medical practice may be a disproportional punishment on the grounds of justice
and fairness but it may also be socially costly because it permanently cuts back on the health workforce.
25An additional impact of introducing ban of medical practice, which is beyond the scope of this analysis,
is that under circumstances in which the surgeon is not deterred by the ban and continues to perfom
illegal transplants, he/she will be performing an illegal medical practice without the licence, over and above
performing illegal transplants. In this case, the surgeon should be brought to punishment for both organ
traﬃcking and illegal medical practice.
26Commercialization will not take place if agents anticipate that there is no surgeon willing to do the operation.
It is acknowledged that not all surgeons can be deterred but if some surgeons could be adequately deterred
there is less incentive to sell and buy kidneys.
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are not key players.
Proposition 3
If the enforcement authorities sanction only the key player, the recipient cannot be deterred by
monetary sanctions alone imposed on the surgeon.
Proof
The deterrence level is given by (6.14) where now fm = fr = 0.
gˆ
′′
r =
q (fs + Λ) + h (2− q)
1− q − cd − q (p+ cx) (6.20)
The deterrence in (6.20) is lower by (qf∗m/ (1− q)) + qf∗r where f∗s = ws. The only way
for the enforcement authorities to deter the recipient (i.e. to keep the deterrence constant)
is to increase the ﬁne imposed on the surgeon. The optimal ﬁne for the surgeon was equal
to his wealth and cannot be raised further. Since the ﬁne is used to the fullest extent, the
optimal sanction can be achieved through imposing a non-monetary sanction in addition to
ﬁne, possibly imprisonment. Let ts be the imprisonment term imposed on the surgeon. It is
assumed that the disutility to the surgeon of an imprisonment term of length t is t. Then, the
deterrence level is:
gˆ
′′′
r =
q (fs + ts + Λ) + h (2− q)
1− q − cd − q (p+ cx) (6.21)
where f∗s = ws and the optimal imprisonment term, t∗s ≡ f∗m + (1− q) f∗r .
Upon the introduction of imprisonment the social welfare will be lower than in (6.15) because
the public has to bear the cost of imprisonment which was costless for imposing ﬁnes27. In
practice the enforcement authorities may not identify the recipient or the surgeon to impose the
sanction simply because he may have left the purview of the authority. This problem occurs
because the laws are usually not clear about who is subject to punishment and there are cross-
country inconsistencies in criminal laws pertaining to organ traﬃcking which oﬀenders take
27Notice that the enforcement authority could impose a ban of medical practice instead of an imprisonment
term in which case social welfare will not be lower than 6.15 because imposing ban of medical practice
is assumed to be costless. However, as mentioned in Proposition 2, a ban of medical practice will not
incapacitate the surgeon whereas the imprisonment term will. Therefore it may be optimal to impose an
imprisonment term instead of ban of practice whenever the authority pursues a target deterrence policy.
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advantage of.
6.5. Concluding Remarks
This chapter analyzed the legal and the economic aspects of organ traﬃcking. The soaring
demand for transplants and the prohibition of the sale of transplantable human organs made
organ trading a seventy-ﬁve-million-dollar industry in twenty years28. Most of the international
organizations condemned this practice by issuing a set of resolutions. We ﬁrst examined
the legal instruments and the international standards set by the UN, the WHO and the
COE. Although some of these international standards are allegedly binding, they did not
counteract the growth of black markets because they have no enforcement powers or funding
to help especially the underdeveloped countries trace illegal organ sales (Goodwin, 2006).
The inspection of the legislations of a sample of countries reveals that despite the widespread
ratiﬁcation of international conventions and protocols, a standard framework is missing in
terms of the magnitude of sanctions as well as in terms of the scope of criminal liability for
organ traﬃcking.
In section 6.4 a simple model of law enforcement is developed to address the embodiment
of speciﬁc legislation and the implementation of an optimal deterrence policy. The results
of the model, albeit normative, suggest that criminal provisions concerning organ traﬃcking
should expressly stipulate a higher penalty for health professionals, consisting of a mix of
maximal pecuniary sanctions and a maximum ban of medical practice term to reinforce the
deterring eﬀects of the law because they oﬀend repeatedly and their mediation is essential,
unlike brokers'.
An increase in the legal wage of transplant surgeons would increase the maximum pecuniary
penalty since the maximum ﬁne that can be imposed on the surgeon is assumed to be bounded
by his wealth. Therefore the wage of the surgeon may be used as a policy instrument to deter
him from performing illegal transplants. This is especially a useful tool because past experience
shows that traﬃcking is diﬃcult to detect and prove, and raising the probability of detection
or the rate of investigation is costly. Increasing the wage of transplant surgeons would also
reinforce the deterring eﬀect of ban of medical practice through increasing the net present
28This value is based on Havocscope, an online database of black market activities. See
http://www.havocscope.com/blackmarket/human-trade/organ-traﬃcking/
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value of forgone wage. When the enforcement authority engages in a target deterrence policy
this mix of sanctions should further include an imprisonment term for the health professional
because targeting the key player requires higher penalties in order to deter potential recipients.
Insurance against illegal transplants typically seen in Israel is a serious deterrence diluting
issue which requires severer penalties than situations under which insurance does not exist.
Under a conventional deterrence policy insured recipients should be subject to maximal pecu-
niary sanctions and an imprisonment term.
The model presented relies on several simplifying assumptions and spatial aspects have
been left out. Cooperation is an important tool to combat traﬃcking that aims to increase the
probability of detection through pooling of resources, expanding the jurisdictional domain and
exchanging information on ongoing investigations. It is a crucial strategy to deal with organ
trade syndicates that operate in more that one country whose apprehension may be diﬃcult
if states adhere to conduct investigations at a national level.
It is known that organ traﬃcking remains active and intense in countries with relatively
weak jurisdictions if there are relatively strong jurisdictions in the domain of criminal activity
(Feichtinger, 1999). Enforcing the law and setting dissuasive sanctions may eliminate traﬃck-
ing in a particular jurisdiction. However failure to take into consideration the enforcement
in other and particularly vulnerable states will not eradicate traﬃcking incidences but will
merely shift criminal activity elsewhere. This spill-over eﬀect, as Scheper-Hughes notes, stim-
ulates traﬃcking in a neighboring country and leads to the emergence of traﬃcking hubs such
as Turkey, India, South Africa and China where illegal transplants are booming and medical
regulations are inadequate to supervise health professionals. This suggests that brokers, recip-
ients and physicians not only observe sanctions but they also estimate, perhaps inaccurately,
the probability of detection and locate themselves where the expected sanctions are minimal
and the scope of criminal liability is highly limited. The legal asymmetries across jurisdictions
should be eradicated in order to cope with organ traﬃcking by committing to impose a uni-
form expected sanction and a uniform legal framework that takes into account the aggravating
circumstances in determining the magnitude of sanctions and the scope of criminal liability.
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Transplant is not a cure. It is exchanging one medical condition for another.
Norm Barber
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Hundreds of thousands of lives depend upon the resolution of the organ shortage conundrum.
With increasing burden of disease and advances in the biotechnology, the demand for trans-
plantable human organs will continue to rise. The supply of organs will not be able to catch
up with the demand unless revolutionary solutions in the ﬁelds of xenotransplantation and
stem cell research to clone fully compatible internal organs become feasible. Currently the
legal, ethical and medical barriers impede the implementation of these alternatives and they
are unlikely to be ready for routine use within the next twenty years. In their absence, three
main possibilities lie ahead to shape the future of organ donation and procurement.
7.1. A Praise for Market Reform
The ﬁrst scenario is that the exchange in transplantable human organs will be taken over by
pure market reforms in which individuals will be legally entitled to sell their organs or the
organs of the deceased. Whether such reforms are centralized, competitive, contemporaneous
or intertemporal, most people would be concerned in many ways about the systematic vulner-
ability and the risks of exploitation of the donors. When people's needs are greatest, they will
voluntarily enter into a contract that exploits them. It is not the contract that is the source
of exploitation but the willingness of the buyer to take advantage of another's vulnerability
(Healy, 2006). Perhaps the exploitation of the donors may not be so easily dismissable; how-
ever market-based reforms do not automatically qualify for being exploitative. Therefore a
market-based reform that is centralized, highly supervised and monitored may not be a bad
choice after all. Healy (2006) suggests that there are two ways to prevent donor exploitation.
The ﬁrst is to enforce prohibition on the commercialization of organs so that people will not
have the opportunity to enter into exploitative contracts. The second is to redistribute the
bargaining power in such a way that any exchange that does happen will not be exploitative.
With respect to Healy's second suggestion, the axiomatic analysis in chapter 2 reveals two
equitable paths that market reforms in cadaveric organs may take. The ﬁrst path leads to
a contemporaneous government monopsony. The mediation of a private non-proﬁt institu-
tion will minimize systematic exploitation of the donors and ensure an equitable, eﬃcient
and eﬀective procurement and distribution of organs. Although the detailed mechanics of a
contemporaneous monopsony is beyond what this research could oﬀer, few conditions for an
equitable procurement along the lines deﬁned in chapter 2 are the sine quibus non of this
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policy. First, a donor registry should be maintained so that the risks of failure associated with
the interference of the next-of-kin are minimized and the donor autonomy is ensured. Second,
a monopsonist should allocate the organs of the deceased solely based on medical criteria to
further ensure that buyers do not take advantage of the vulnerability of the donors. Third,
the oﬀered price by the government should be as close as possible to the market clearing
price to ensure that donors are not ﬁnancially exploited and that the system works somewhat
eﬃciently, if not as eﬃciently as a free market.
The second path leads to a future delivery market that is more accustomed, morally less
repugnant but also less eﬀective than the ﬁrst. The life insurance markets of the 19th cen-
tury show that monetary incentives for procurement can be incorporated into the world of
death (Healy, 2006). Future contracts that stipulate payments to the contractor induce time
inconsistent behavior and restrict the actual number of donors at the time of delivery. Future
contracts are also likely to impinge upon the autonomy of the contractor if families are allowed
to veto the contractor's decision. Although extending the scope of life or health insurance poli-
cies by including a simple clause on future delivery of organs may seem to do the trick, the
scale of national coverage of such insurance policies remains to be solved. Therefore, the sine
quibus non of future delivery markets are that the government should be the only authority to
procure and to distribute transplantable human organs and that the health insurance cover-
age should be suﬃciently broad and preferably universal before implementing a future delivery
market. With respect to the contract terms the time inconsistent behavior induced by making
payments to the contractor can be solved in two ways. First the decision of the individual can
be made irreversible by law if the payments are going to be made to the contractor. Second,
the payment can be made to the next-of-kin after donation instead of the contractor while
alive. In both cases, the next-of-kin should not be allowed to veto the contractor's decision.
In the case of living donors opponents of market reforms point to potential problems of
qualitatively and medically inferior outcomes, infringement of donor dignity, exploitation,
impingement of free will and violation of donor allocation protocols in a way that results
in unfair outcomes. These potential problems, some plausible some are not, highlight that
although market reforms in living donors are preferable as there is no family to complicate
the decision making, it may be diﬃcult if not impossible, to establish a morally permissible
market for living donors. An important question is how a shift from gift-giving to markets
in the procurement of one type of donors (i.e. deceased or living) will aﬀect the procurement
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in the other. The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 points that related living adult donations
thus total living adult donations may be intertemporally substituted by deceased donations.
This ﬁnding suggests that if a market reform is implemented only for cadaveric organs this
may boost deceased procurement rates but may also decrease living donation rates. This will
possibly result in a decrease in the medical eﬀectiveness of organ transplants in the long-run
because using living donor organs have survival advantages compared to deceased organs. But
most importantly it will wipe out altruism in the procurement of living donors. It is not the
market in cadaveric organs that is the source of this erosion but the intertemporal substitution
eﬀect between deceased and living donors. Therefore a shift from gift-giving to market-based
reforms may have to be implemented simultaneously for deceased and living donors or should
not be implemented at all. Scholars overlook this point when they propose market reforms.
7.2. A Praise for Altruism
The second scenario is that the altruistic donation will become indispensable in the exchange
of transplantable human organs and any monetary incentive will be perceived as repugnant,
coercive and exploitative. In the case of deceased donors, it is argued that a ﬁrst-person in-
formed consent policy is the only equitable option according to the criteria set forth in chapter
2. This policy entails that the procurement is based solely on the documented intent of the
donor and the families are not allowed to revert this decision. The downsize of this policy is
that its eﬀectiveness is unknown. But the evidence suggests that an informed consent pol-
icy that relies on family consent will not be eﬀective relative to a presumed consent policy.
According to Goodwin (2006) a presumed consent legislation that requires waiver of consti-
tutional rights in order to save others may be a burdened choice. But it may be the only
eﬀective policy that does not rely on monetary incentives. In Chapter 3 we constructed an
international dataset on the legislative defaults, health expenditures, death rates caused by
cerebro vascular diseases, motor vehicle accidents and homicides, legal systems, family con-
sent, civil rights and liberties and donor registry systems for 24 countries over the period of
1993-2006. The empirical analysis reveals that there are two ways in which a presumed con-
sent default rule itself could be responsible for higher deceased donation rates relative to an
informed consent regime once the remaining potential factors are controlled for. The ﬁrst is to
enact a presumed consent regime that does not always seek family consent and that maintains
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at most a non-donor registry. The second is to always seek family consent irrespective of the
documented preferences of the deceased and to maintain a combined registry which records
both consent and objections. Oﬀ these conditions a presumed consent regime is unlikely to be
eﬀective. This suggests that switching to a presumed consent regime may help reduce the size
of organ shortages provided that the above conditions are met, a timely procurement process
is managed and a solid infrastructure and social support is built prior to legislative action.
In the case of living donors the second scenario relies on organ allocation mechanisms.
Their current performance in terms of the number of transplants they can produce is limited
given their size. Our analysis in chapter 5 conﬁrms that PKEs are unlikely to be eﬀective in
increasing living donation rates. However, a nation-wide implementation of these mechanisms
may substantially increase the number of transplants from living donors.
As long as the demand for transplants is left uncontrolled, an exchange in transplantable
human organs that is purely altruistic will not eliminate the risks of exploitation but only shifts
them to black markets. This brings us back to Healy's ﬁrst suggestion. Whether banning the
commercialization of organs deters people from entering into exploitative contracts depends on
the legislative criminal provisions and how these provisions are enforced. For this purpose in
Chapter 6 we examined the legal instruments and the international standards set by the UN,
the WHO and the COE; analyzed the criminal provisions for a sample of thirty-eight countries
and developed a simple model of law enforcement to address the scope of criminal sanctions and
the optimal deterrence for organ traﬃcking. The analysis suggests that a uniﬁed international
framework in terms of the magnitude of sanctions as well as in terms of the scope of criminal
liability for organ traﬃcking should be implemented and that the enforcement authorities
should treat unequal oﬀenders diﬀerently. This translates into punishing health professionals
by higher penalties consisting of a mix of maximal pecuniary sanctions and a maximum ban of
medical practice term. The analysis does not speciﬁcally address the optimal scope of criminal
liability; however there may be moral or otherwise reasons not to punish or severely punish
certain oﬀences. In a state in which it is desirable to deter but inapproriate or infeasible to
punish recipients, an imprisonment term should be imposed to health professionals in addition
to pecuniary sanctions.
Organ traﬃcking became a tremendous industry in twenty years with billions of dollars
changing hands among doctors, recipients and brokers although it is impossible to give a
reliable estimate of the size of this industry. Transplant tourism has serious redistributive and
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judicial consequences for the society. The wealthy but medically desperate patients of the
West turn to healthy but ﬁnancially desperate individuals of the East and to the prisoners
in death-row while those who cannot aﬀord to pay or dare to resort to black markets wait
for years for a kidney that they may never receive. Those who receive the gift of life at the
expense of paying for and taking someone else's health argue that everybody is better oﬀ
after all. However, donors not only risk their health in return for as little as few hundreds of
dollars but they become poorer in the long-run for not being able to work and unhealthier
because the government is unable or unwilling to take medical care of them. Recipients also
face serious post-operative complications and even death due to lack of health safety measures
and unmonitored quality of organs. The enforcement experience proves that deterring acts
of desperation through the penal system is diﬃcult and renders undesired consequences. The
transnational nature of organ traﬃcking and the lack of capacity to punish oﬀences committed
beyond the jurisdictional domain render diﬃcult to punish violators. Further the sensitive
issues complicate to reach a consensus on the scope of criminal liability. In a purely altruistic
system these problems will not go away. Therefore a benevolent social planner should weigh
the total burden of a purely altruistic system that unnecessarily exacerbates black markets
againts the total burden of a market reform that naturally inhibits black markets.
7.3. Reconciliation
The third scenario is a reconciliation of the ﬁrst and the second scenarios, characterized by
the introduction of compensation in a way that is more ethically and politically acceptable.
The idea is to provide some monetary compensation while retaining the giftlike features of
the exchange (Healy, 2006). Avoiding the language of the market allows both the transplant
community and the public to regard reimbursement or compensation as a slight modiﬁcation
of the current system without resorting to drastic changes (Mahoney, 2009).
It is argued that the reimbursement of hospital and burial expenses and the reimbursement
of non-medical costs of living donors must be routinely oﬀered to compensate the families of
the deceased for the pain and suﬀering they have experienced during the donation process and
to compensate living altruistic donors for the disutility of weeks of convalescence and foregone
earnings. If everyone else is paid at each stage of this process from the extraction of the
organs to the processing of body parts in secondary markets, so should be those who provide
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the organs.
Proponents of payment believe that the supply would rise if families of the deceased or
living donors are oﬀered a small payment in return to agree to donate the organs. Critics
raise the theoretical objection that as much as there will be many individuals exhorted by
payment there are also many individuals who would not agree to donate if the payment is
not suﬃciently large. In this case, there may be hardly any individuals who would agree to
donate for a small amount of payment, a phenomenon known as the discontinuity in the supply
(Healy, 2006). As a result the procurement rates may remain unchanged unless the payment
is suﬃciently generous rendering the reimbursement or the compensation scheme no longer
ethically and politically acceptable.
Analyzing the consequences of compensating the families of the deceased is currently diﬃcult
to address empirically. On the other hand, few reimbursement or compensation schemes for
living donors have been introduced whose eﬀectiveness could be examined. For this purpose,
in Chapter 5 we constructed a dataset on reimbursement legislation, the number of living re-
lated, living unrelated and total living adult donation rates, the combined deceased kidney and
liver transplant rates, real per capita GDP, the number of transplant centers, the prevalence
of ESRD and PKEs for 50 states in the US for the period 1988-2009. The empirical analysis
shows that the tax deduction and the paid leave of absence legislations have no impact on
living donation rates. If the aim is to lower the barriers to living donation by oﬀering modest
monetary incentives that are ethically and politically acceptable, it is suggested that the cur-
rent legislation should be amended. First, the tax deduction law should be repealed. Second,
the legislation should cover not only public employees but also the unemployed, uninsured and
low-income individuals who are a major proportion of the population and who are more likely
to experience ﬁnancial hardship as a result of donation.
7.4. Limitations and Future Research
Organ donation and transplantation lies at the intersection of law, economics and medicine.
Recent advances in social research conjecture and necessitate to pursue an interdisciplinary
approach to fully assess and help resolve the controversial issues arisen in this or other multi-
dimensional subject areas.
As much as there is a proliﬁc literature on the neoclassical analysis of the liberalization
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in the exchange of deceased human organs, exploring other future non-market procurement
alternatives through economic and legal tools might be very useful in order to assess the
eﬃciency, feasibility and the eﬀectiveness of these alternatives. Further research might explore
the foundations of reciprocal systems, both theoretically and through experiments, before
prejudicially ruling them out or considering them on a wider scale. Since these procurement
systems rely upon memberships, the minimum and the maximum eﬃcient network scales have
to determined respectively for opt-in and opt-out reciprocal systems. This translates into
ﬁnding the optimal membership size in mutual insurance pools.
In order to conduct further empirical analyses it seems imperative to construct detailed
national, local, qualitative and quantitative data sets on existing practices. Currently, the US
collects the most comprehensive data set on transplantation medicine including data on legal
framework. Equal data collection eﬀorts by other countries would enable detailed cross-country
comparisons. Speciﬁcally, the dynamics of the relationship between living and deceased dona-
tion is currently not well known and the use of larger and international panel data sets could
help identify their interaction.
In the exchange of living organs, the exchange algorithms developed by Roth et al. (2004,
2005a,b) and Roth et al. (2007) should be ﬁne-tuned, updated and their use should become
widespread in order to increase their eﬃciency, scope and accessibility. At the extreme, with
the advances in the medical technology new exchange mechanisms could be developed. These
mechanisms may involve not only the living (i.e. kidneys and livers) but also other solid and
life-saving organs in the future. The extent to which these mechanisms are ethically, medically
and politically acceptable depends on how eager, radical and aggressive we would like to be
so as to reduce organ shortages.
The main limitation of this research is that it almost exclusively focused on governmental
or policy problems related to the supply of human organs and did not address demand-related
problems or remedies. Despite the intensive economic research on ﬁnding solutions to increase
the supply of human organs, on the demand side there is a great untapped potential that
could help decrease the prevalence of organ failure. For instance, glomerulonephritis - a kidney
disease in which the part of the kidneys that ﬁlter waste and ﬂuid is damaged - whose primary
cause in underdeveloped regions is the lack of hygiene and sanitation. Malnutrition and obesity
are also the primary causes of heart diseases. Similarly, diabetes is the main factor for most
of the kidney and liver failures whose cure could substantially reduce the number of patients
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with kidney and liver failure. Therefore, research on increasing the supply through market
mechanisms, improving the management of donors or raising awareness about organ donation
should be combined with medical research aimed at reducing the demand for organs.
7.5. Closing Arguments
The proliﬁc literature on organ procurement discloses that some desirable properties of mar-
kets simply may not coexist in the highly controversial context of organ donation and trans-
plantation. Most of the undesirable consequences of monetary incentives would be rectiﬁed
by proper precautionary measures such as centralization of the procurement system, enforce-
ment of stringent medical requirements, thorough post-operative follow-up of donors, ingenious
pricing mechanisms etc... However, there are fundamental problems with the institution of
monetary payments that are not so easily rectiﬁable. First, while market reform may reduce
the family refusal rates, it can neither boost the raw supply of cadaver organs (ie. the supply
is naturally restricted by the number of brain-dead cases) nor remove any of the logistical
problems or some of the organizational problems associated with the procurement of deceased
donors discussed in Chapter 1. Second, currently the commercialization of human organs is
prohibited by law everywhere except Iran. This prohibition also comprises experimentation
with monetary incentives unless an exemption is legislated. In fact the only mean to test the
eﬀectiveness of a market whose impact on society and the potential repercussions are mere
foresight, is to set up an experiment or a pilot region. But the positive outcome of such ex-
perimentation may not eliminate the adverse or even the catastrophic results that could be
experienced in reality. From that moment on it might be impossible to revert to the cur-
rent altruistic system. In Richard Titmuss' words, once a commodity, always a commodity.
Therefore the altruistic system may have to be developed to its full potential before resort-
ing to market solutions whose fate is unknown without experimentation (Horton and Horton,
1993). This suggests that the procurement possibilities under a nonmonetary system should
be exhausted before resorting to alternative ways to seek out donations. This point of view
might be comforting for those who defend the idea of gift giving. But it shall not be forgot-
ten that by imposing a price level below what it would naturally prevail and expecting every
person to voluntarily donate whenever conditions allow but paying dialysis centers, transplant
surgeons, hospitals, OPOs, procurement teams and companies that process human body parts
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while giving the necessary care only to those who can aﬀord it, we, as a society, reside in a
paradox.
David Kaserman was an economist, a proliﬁc author and a passionate advocate of full
liberalization in the exchange of transplantable human organs. He was also suﬀering from
kidney failure and fought for almost 20 years before passing away in 2008 after a brief period
of illness and hospitalization. Perhaps Kaserman would not have been so passionate about
the implementation of a free market if he had not been suﬀering from kidney failure. Or
perhaps he would not have thought about this issue at all. Nor would someone who frowns
upon liberalization dissented markets if he had experienced heart failure that would lead to
a slow and painful death. As John Rawls said "no one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like" (Rawls, 1971). The moral permissibility
of markets cannot be truly determined unless we vote behind the veil of ignorance where we
do not know whether we are the healthy or the ill. Once the veil is lifted and we all know our
place in the society, it is easy to ﬂirt with or to frown upon markets.
The implausibility of the arguments against monetary incentives does not necessarily imply
feasibility. The past twenty years of debate on the implementation of an OPP that is eﬃcient
and comformable to human rights, dignity and morality has retrospectively realized that the
major obstacle against the implementation of a better system is not the outrageousness of
or repugnance againts these proposals per se. However, market designs of Alvin Roth and his
colleagues reveal an important fact: repugnance might constrain market transactions1. Three
decades have been devoted to change the paradigm of gift giving by oﬀering monetary incen-
tives for prospective donors and the political infeasibility and repugnance for such incentives
will continue to be insurmountable at least in the foreseeable future.
The failure to act upon the deﬁciencies of the current system indicates that political actors
deem the current state to be so far tolerable even preferable over equally acceptable alterna-
tives. Given the morally imperative discourse and the current political and legal infeasibility of
oﬀering explicit monetary payments, the status quo should unfortunately be taken for granted
to the extent that the size of the waiting lists and the unnecessary suﬀering and the death of
the many is no longer bearable.
1See Roth (2007) and Leider and Roth (2010).
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Legislation in Selected Countries
Australia: Australian Capital Territory, Transplantation and Anatomy Act No. 44 of 1978.
New South Wales, Human Tissue Act No. 164 of 1983. Northern Territory, Human Tissue
Transplant Act 1995. Queensland, Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979. South Australia,
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983. Tasmania, Human Tissue Act 1985 amended by Act
No. 51 of 1987 and later by Act No. 3 of 2008. Victoria, Human Tissue Act No. 9860 of 1982.
Western Australia, Human Tissue and Transplant Act No. 116 of 1982.
Austria: Federal Law of 1 June 1982 amending the Hospitals Law. Bundesgestzblatt für
die Republik Österreich, 18 June 1982, No.113, 1161-1162, IDHL (1986), 37(1), 32-33
Belgium: Law of 13 June 1986 on the removal and transplantation of organs. Moniteur
Belge, 14 February 1987, No. 32, 2129-2132. IDHL (1987), 38(3), 523-525
Brazil: Law No. 9434 of 4 February 1997 on the removal of organs, tissues, and parts of
the human body for the purposes of transplantation and treatment. Diario Oﬁcial, 5 February
1997, No.25, 2191-2193. IDHL (2007), 58(2)
Bulgaria: Law of 30 July 2003 on the transplantation of organs, tissues, and cells. IDHL
(2007), 58(1)
Canada: The Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act of April 1990. Uniform Law Conference
of Canada
Czech Republic: Transplant Act No. 285 of 30 May 2002 on donation, removal, and
transplantation of organs and tissues and amending certain acts. IDHL (2002), 53(2)
Denmark: Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 on the examination of cadavers, autopsies and
transplantation, etc. Lovtidende for Kongeriget Danmark, 14 June 1990, No. 63, 1331-1334.
IDHL (1991), 42(1), 30-32
Estonia: Law of 30 January 2002. Riigi Teataja 1 No. 21, 118, IDHL (2001), 52(4)
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Finland: Law No. 101 of 2 February 2001 on the use of human organs and tissues for
medical purposes. Finland Författningssamling, 8 February 2001, Nos. 101-105, pp. 249-256,
IDHL, (2001) 52(2)
France: Law No. 94-654 of 29 July 1994 on the donation and use of elements and products
of the human body, medically assisted procreation, and prenatal diagnosis. Journal oﬃciel
de la République Française, Lois et Décrets, 20 July 1994, No. 175, pp. 11060-11068. IDHL
(1994), 45(4), 473-482
Georgia: Law of February 2000 on taking of human organs, parts of organs, tissues and
their usage.
Germany: Act of 5 November 1997 on the donation, removal, and transplantation of
organs (the Transplantation Act). Bundesgesetzblatt, Part I, 11 November 1997, No. 74, pp.
2631-2639.
Greece: Law No. 1383 of 2 August 1983 on the removal and transplantation of human
tissues and organs. Ephemeres tes Kyberneseos tes Hellenikes Demokratias, No:106, 5 August
1983, Part 1, 1917-1920.
Hong Kong: Human Organ Transplant Bill of 27 March 1992. CAP 465 Human Organ
Transplant Ordinance, L.N. 291 of 2006
Iceland: Biobanks Act No. 110 of 25 May 2000. IDHL (2002), 52(2)
India: Act No. 42 of 1994 to provide for the regulation of removal, storage and transplan-
tation of human organs for therapeutic purposes and for the prevention of commercial dealings
in human organs and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Date of assent by
the President: 8 July 1994. (The Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994) IDHL (1995),
46(1), 34-38
Iraq: Decree No.698 of 27 August 1986 of the Revolutionary Command Council promul-
gating Law No.85 of 1986 on the Transplantation of Human Organs. Alwawai Aliragiya (The
Oﬃcial Gazette of the Republic of Iraq), 15 September 1968, No.3115, 559
Israel: Law of Anatomy and Pathology of 26 August 1953. Sefer Ha-Chukkim, 4 September
1953, No.134, 162
Italy: Law No. 644 of 2 December 1975 regulating the removal of parts of cadavers for
purposes of therapeutic transplantation and prescribing rules governing the removal of the
pituitary gland from cadavers with a view to producing extracts for therapeutic purposes.
Gazzetta Uﬃciale della Repubblica Italiana, Part I, 19 December 1975, No. 334, pp. 8869-
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Italy. Law No. 91 of 1 April 1999 on the removal and transplantation of organs and tissues.
Gazzetta Uﬃciale della Repubblica Italiana, 15 April 1999, No. 87
Japan: Law No. 104 of 16 July 1997 on organ transplantation. Kappo, 16 July 1997, No.
2181, 3-5.
Kuwait: Decree-Law No.55 of 20 December 1987 on organ transplantation.
Lebanon: Decree No.109 of 16 September 1983 on the removal of human tissues and organs
for therapeutic and scientiﬁc purposes.
Luxemburg: Law of 25 November 1982 regulating the removal of substances of human
origin. Mémorial: Journal Oﬃciel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Part A, 3 December
1982, No:98, 2020-2022. IDHL (1983), 34(2), 263
Morocco: Dahir No. 1-99-208 of 25 August 1999 promulgating Law No. 16-98 on the
donation, removal, and transplantation of human organs and tissues. Bulletin Oﬃciel du
Royaume du Maroc, 16 September 1999, No:4726, 728-732. IDHL (2000), 51(1)
Netherlands: Law of 24 May 1996 on laying down rules governing the availability of organs.
Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1996, 11, IDHL, 47(4), 469-475
New Zealand: Human Tissue Act No.28 of 18 April 2008. New Zealand Gazette (Te
Kahiti o Aotearoa).
Norway: Law No. 31 of 8 June 2001, amending Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 on
transplantation , hospital autopsies and the donation of cadavers etc. Norsk Lovtidend , Part
I, 4 July 2001, No:7, 818-819.
Panama: Law No. 52 of 12 December 1998 regulating the removal, preservation, storage,
transportation, intended use, and ﬁnal disposal of organs or anatomical parts, and also the
procedures for their transplantation into human beings. Gaceta Oﬁcial, 13 December 1995,
No. 22929, 143-190.
Pakistan: Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Ordinance No. XLIII of 2007.
Poland: Law of 26 October 1995 on the removal and transplantation of cells, tissues,
and organs. Dziennik Ustaw of: Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 6 December 1995, No. 138, pp.
2008-3012, Text No. 682
Romania: Law of 8 January 1998 on the removal and transplantation of human tissues or
organs. Monitorul al României, 13 January 1998, No. 8. IDHL (2002), 53(4)
Singapore: The Human Organ Transplant Act no. 15 of 1987. IDHL (2003), 54(2)
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Slovak Republic: Law of 24 August 1994 of the national council of the Slovak Republic
on the protection of the health of persons. Zbierka Zabonov Slovenskej Republiky, 7 October
1994, No. 76, 1302-1310. IDHL (1995), 46(2), 151-157
Slovenia: Law of 26 January 2000 on the removal and transplantation of human body
parts. Uradni List Republike Slovenije, 11 February 2000, No. 12, 1569-1572, IDHL (2002),
53(4)
South Africa: National Health Act No.61 of 2003 on the control of use of blood, blood
products, tissue and gametes in human organs. Government Gazette, No: 26595, 23 July
2004, 60-70
Spain: Law No. 30 of 27 October 1979 on the removal and transplantation of organs.
Boletín Oﬁcial del Estado, Gaceta de Madrid, 6 November 1979, No. 266, Serial No. 26445,
pp. 25742-25743. IDHL (1980), 31(2), 379-382
Sweden: Law no. 190 of 15 May 1975, repealed by Law no. 831 of 8 June 1995 amended
in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. Svensk författningssamling.
Switzerland: Federal Law No. 810.21 of 8 October 2004 on the transplantation of organs,
tissues and cells. Recueil Oﬃciel du Droit Fédérales, No.19, 8 May 2007, 1935-1960
Turkey: Law No. 2238 of 29 May 1979 on the removal, storage, transfer and grafting of
organs and tissues. T.C Resmi Gazete, 3 June 1979, No. 16655 1-4, IDHL (1980), 31(4),
866-869
UK: The Human Tissue Act of 2004. IDHL (2006), 57(3)
US: The UAGA of 1968, revised in 1987, 2006 and amended in 2008.
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A.1. Deceased donation and legislative defaults
Australia: Informed consent country by Law of 1982. The exact date varies by state/territory
(See above). There is a donor registry since 2000 in which objections are also recorded. Donor
card exists both for consent and objections. Legally, if the deceased has signed a donor card
for consent, the removal of organs is allowed regardless of the wishes of the family and the
hospital may, in all States and Territories, ignore the family. According to the Australian
Code of Practice of 1989 for Transplantation of Cadaveric Organs and Tissues, a patient is
considered dead if the circulation of the blood in the body or all the functions of the brain are
irreversibly ceased. The code of practice also deﬁnes the criteria for the clinical assessment of
brain death.
Austria: Presumed consent country by Federal Law No. 273 of 1 June 1982, Section 62A.
There is a non-donor registry since 1995. According to the law, the family does not have
the right to be informed or to veto donation and the removal of organs is prohibited if the
deceased donor or the next-of-kin premortem expressed an opposition against such removal.
Donor card does not exist.
Belgium: Presumed consent country by Law of 13 June 1986 on the removal and trans-
plantation of organs. There is a combined registry since 1987. Donor card does not exist.
Legally, organs and tissues of a deceased person may be removed unless an objection by the
donor or by a close relative has been expressed. However, if the objection is made by the close
relative, it may not override the expressed wishes of the donor.
Bulgaria: Presumed consent country by Law of 30 July 2003 on the transplantation of
organs, tissues, and cells.
Brazil: Informed consent country by Law No. 9434 of 4 February 1997. Brazil was already
an informed consent country but switched to presumed consent for a short period and then
switched again to informed consent.
Canada: Informed consent country by Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act of 1990.
The exact date varies by province: Alberta, Human Tissue Act 30 March 1967. British
Columbia, Human Tissue Gift Act 1974. Manitoba, Human Tissue Gift Act 17 July 1987.
New Brunswick, Human Tissue Gift Act 18 June 1986. Newfoundland, Act No. 78 of 1996.
Nova Scotia, Human Tissue Gift Act 18 March 1964. Ontario, Human Tissue Gift Act 1982.
Prince Edward Island, Human Tissue Donation Act 1992. Quebec, Civil Law of 1993. Families
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cannot overrule the wishes of the donor because donor card is a legal document. There is no
national donor registry in place so far. The Canadian government has approved $35 million
in funding for a national organ donor registry in 2009.
Czech Republic: Presumed consent country by Law of 1984. Donor registry since 2000,
non-donor registry since 2002.
Denmark: Informed consent country by Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990, amended by Law
No. 259 of 12 April 2000 and later by Law No. 432 of 2001. Prior to 1990, Denmark was a
presumed consent country by Law no. 246 of 9 June 1967. There is a combined registry since
1990. According to the Law No. 402 of 1990, family consent was not required if the donor
has expressed a will to donate. The law deﬁnes that a person's death is ascertained by the
irreversible cessation of respiration and heart activity or by the irreversible cessation of all
brain function.
The Law No. 432 of 2001 states that the registered donors shall decide premortem whether
they allow the family to challenge the donor's decision and the next-of-kin cannot oppose
donation unless such a preference is expressed in writing by the donor. Donor card exists
both for consent and objections. According to the Guideline No. 101 of 8 December 2006 on
consent for transplant from deceased persons, if no written or oral statement is expressed by
the deceased, transplantation can take place only if the deceased's next of kin gives consent to
surgery. Transplantation cannot be performed if the deceased has not indicated any preference
and the immediate next-of-kin cannot be found.
Estonia: Informed consent country by the Transplantation of Organs and Tissues Act of
30 January 2002. The determination of death is based according to total and irreversible
cessation of brain function, or total and irreversible cessation of circulation. According to the
Act of 2002, no other person can prohibit the removal and an organ or tissue may be removed
from a deceased person if he or she had expressed premortem a wish to donate organs or
tissues for transplantation after his or her death. If no information is available whether a
deceased person had expressed premortem an opinion on the post-mortem removal of organs
and tissues for transplantation purposes, the doctor who provided treatment to the deceased
donor is required to ascertain, through the next-of-kin, the opinion of the donor during his or
her lifetime.
Finland: Presumed consent country by Law No.355 of 26 April 1985 and Ordinance No.724
of 23 August 1985, repealed by Law No. 101 of 2 February 2001. Section 9 of the Law No. 101
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on the medical use of human organs and tissues states that organs and tissues of a deceased
person may be removed unless there is reason to assume that the person would have objected
while still alive, or that a near relative or other close person objects. No registry in place.
France: Presumed consent country by Caillavet Law No. 76-1181 of 1976, modiﬁed by Law
No. 94-654 of 1994 and later by Law No.2004-800 of 2004. There is a non-donor registry since
1990.
Georgia: Presumed consent country by the Law of February 2000. Article 8 of the law
stipulates that the removal of the organs of the deceased is allowed if it does not contradict
the religious beliefs of the deceased or if the family gives consent. Family veto is allowed
and family consent is always sought in Georgia. If the deceased has not given consent during
lifetime and the closest next-of-kin cannot be found procurement is not allowed.
Germany: Informed consent country by Donation, Removal and Transplantation of Organs
Act of 1997. The organs can be removed for transplantation only if the deceased donor has
consented to the removal. In the absence of any written statement by the donor during his or
her lifetime, the removal of organs is allowed if the next-of-kin is informed about the removal
and asked to give consent given the presumed will of the deceased donor. There is no registry
in place. Donor card exists both for consent and objections. The law deﬁnes death as the
irreversible loss of all function of the cerebrum, the cerebellum, and the brain stem.
Greece: Presumed consent country by Law No. 2737 of 1999. It was already a presumed
consent country by Law No. 821 of 1978 modiﬁed by Law No. 1383 of 2 August 1983. Section
4 of Art. 4 of Law No. 2737 of 1999 states that if the deceased donor did not express any
preference, the removal of an organ or tissue is allowed if the next-of-kin does not oppose
donation. This practice of seeking family consent was not embodied in the previous Law of
1983. The law neither deﬁnes brain death nor the standards of deﬁnition or the necessary
diagnostic tests on brain death.
Hong Kong: Informed consent country although there is no legislation regulating deceased
organ donation in Hong Kong. Expressed consent is sought from relatives prior to organ
donation.
Iceland: Informed consent country by the Biobanks Act no.110 of 25 May 2000.
India: Informed consent country by the Transplantation of Human Organs Act No.42 of
8 July 1994. According to the law, organs of a deceased donor can be removed and used for
therapeutic purposes if the donor during his or her lifetime consented to donation in writing
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and in the presence of two or more witnesses. If neither consent nor objection was made by
the deceased donor, the person who is lawfully in possession of the dead body may authorize
the removal of organs unless there is no reason to believe that any next-of-kin of the donor has
objected to such removal. The law neither deﬁnes brain death nor the standards of deﬁnition
or the necessary diagnostic tests on brain death, however, it deﬁnes (vaguely) a deceased
person as a person who does not exhibit evidence of life by reason of brain-stem death or
cardiopulmonary cessation.
Iraq: Informed consent country by Decree No.698 of 27 August 1986. The consent must
be given in writing.
Ireland: Informed consent country. There is no registry in place. Ireland does not have
laws governing organ donation and procurement but follows UK guidelines.
Italy: Presumed consent country by Law No. 458 of 1967, modiﬁed by Law No. 644 of
1975 and later by Law No. 91 of 1 April 1999. There is a donor registry since 2000 and a
non-donor registry since 2002.
Israel: Presumed consent country by the law of Anatomy and Pathology of 1953. There is
a non-donor registry since 1989.
Japan: Informed consent country by Law No. 104 of 16 July 1997 on organ transplantation.
Family consent is always sought in Japan. According to the law, the organs of a potential
donor can be removed if; (1) the deceased person has premortem expressed consent, in writing,
to donate his or her organs for the purposes of transplantation and (2) the family, given the
preference of the donor, has not objected to such removal. The law deﬁnes brain death as the
irreversible cessation of the functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem and leaves
the determination of brain death on the basis of generally recognized medical knowledge.
Donor card exists both for consent and objections.
Luxemburg: Presumed consent country by Law of 25 November 1982. Article 6 of the Law
states that the organs of a deceased person may be removed if the decedent did not express
written pre-mortem objection to such removal. No registry in place.
Morocco: Presumed consent country by Dahir No. 1-99-208 of 25 August 1999. Family
veto is allowed in Morocco.
Netherlands: Informed consent country by the Organ Donation Act of 24 May 1996. There
is combined registry. Section 9(2) of the act states that consent or objection may be given or
recorded by completing and submitting a donor registration form. A person may choose to
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leave a decision regarding the removal of his organs after his death to his surviving relatives
or to another named individual. Section 11(1) further states that if a person is not known to
have made a statement of will regarding removal of their organs, consent for removal may be
given following his death by a cohabiting spouse or other life partner.
New Zealand: Informed consent country by the Human Tissue Act of 2008 No. 28. It was
already an informed consent country by the Human Tissue Act of 1964. Non-donor registry
since 1999.
Norway: Presumed consent country by Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 on transplantation,
hospital autopsies, and the donation of cadavers amended by Law No. 31 of 8 June 2001. No
registry in place.
Pakistan: Informed consent country by the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues
Ordinance No. XLIII of 2007. According to the ordinance, the organs may be removed for
transplantation if the deceased person, during his or her lifetime, consented to donate any
of his organs or tissues in writing. The ordinance does not prescribe any rules so as to the
procedure to follow if the donor neither consents nor opposes donation. Section 6 subsection
2 of the ordinance states that a person is deemed to be medically and legally dead when there
is an absence of natural respiratory and cardiac functions and attempt at resuscitation that
is unsuccessful in restoring those functions; or an irreversible and permanent cessation of all
brain-stem functions and future attempt of resuscitation or continued supportive maintenance
would not be successful in restoring such natural functions.
Panama: Presumed consent country by Law No. 10 of 11 July 1983 regulating the trans-
plantation of organs and anatomical parts, repealed by Law No. 52 of 12 December 1995.
Organs of a deceased person can be removed for transplantation if; the donor, during his
lifetime, had not objected to have his organs removed, or the family of the deceased had not
expressed an objection to such removal within six hours of the determination of brain death.
The presumed will of the deceased prevails over the contrary opinion of the next-of-kin.
Poland: Presumed consent country by Law of 26 October 1995 on the removal and trans-
plantation of cells, tissues, and organs amending the Law of 30 August 1991 on health care
institutions. Section 4(1) of the Law states that the removal of cells, tissues, and organs from a
deceased person may be carried out if that person expressed no pre-mortem objection. There
is a non-donor registry since 1996.
Romania: Informed consent country by Law No. 2 of 8 January 1998 on the removal and
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transplantation of human tissues or organs. There is a combined registry in place since 1996.
The transplants of human tissues and body parts can be done only with the written consent
of the patient. In February 2008, the Romanian Parliament adopted a legislation regarding
the modiﬁcation of the Law no. 95 of 2006 concerning the Healthcare System reform. The
proposed amendment replaced informed consent system by presumed consent.
Singapore: Presumed consent country by the Human Organ Transplant Act No.15 of 10
June 1987, revised in 1988 and 2004 and amended in 2009.
Slovak Republic: Presumed consent country by Law No. 277 of 24 August 1994. There
is a combined registry since 2004.
Slovenia: Presumed consent country by Law of 26 January 2000. There is a donor-registry
since 2004.
South Africa: Informed consent country by the National Health Act No.61 of 2003.
Spain: Presumed consent country by Law No.30 of 30 October 1979. No national registry
in place although there are regional registries.
Sweden: Sweden was a presumed consent country prior to 1987. Between 1987 and 1996
it was an informed consent country. By Law of 1996, Sweden again switched to presumed
consent system. There is a combined registry since 1996.
Switzerland: Informed consent country by Federal Order of 1996. However, the legislation
varies by canton. The following majority of cantons have presumed consent legislation: Ap-
penzell (1974, 1992), Argovie (1987), Bale-Campagne (1988), Bale-Ville (1981), Berne (1984),
Geneva (1996), Grisons (1984), Lucerne (1981), Neuchatel (1995), Nidwald (1981), St-Gall
(1979), Turgovia (1985), Valais (1996), Vaud (1985), Zurich (1991). The Federal Law No.
810.21 of 2004 on the transplantation of organs, tissues and cells came into force in 2007.
Family consent is routinely sought in Switzerland. Section 2. Art. 8 states that, the organs,
tissues or cells can be procured if the deceased person has expressed a consent to donate. In
the absence of any document conﬁrming consent or refusal, the next-of-kin is asked if such a
consent is known. If the next-of-kin are not aware of such a declaration, the organs cannot
be removed unless the family gives consent. The decision of the family should respect the
presumed will of the deceased whose will prevails that of the family. If the deceased does not
have next-of-kin or the next-of-kin cannot be reached, the removal of organs is not allowed.
Donor card exists for expressing consent. No registry in place.
Turkey: Presumed consent country by Law No.2238 of 29 May 1979 on the removal, storage
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and transplantation of organs and tissues. If a person had not expressed a consent in writing,
the organs and tissues can be removed for therapeutic and research purposes, if the next-of-
kin gives consent. Transplantation is not allowed if the deceased has premortem objected to
the removal of his or her organs and tissues. The Law neither deﬁnes brain death nor the
standards of deﬁnition or the necessary diagnostic tests on brain death. Donor card exist. No
registry in place. On 3 July 2003, an amendment of the Law of 1979 on the removal, storage
and transplantation of organs and tissues has been introduced in the parliament. The bill
stipulates that during his or her lifetime, if a person consents, in writing, the removal of his
or her organs after his or her death, he or she will be given a special national identiﬁcation
card by which the next-of-kin will not be allowed to overrule the donor's wishes after his or
her death.
UK: Informed consent country by the Human Tissue Act of 1961, revised by the Human
Organ Transplants Act of 1989 and the Human Tissue Act of 2004. There is a donor registry
since 1994.
US: Informed consent country by the UAGA of 1968. 34 States have enacted the UAGA
of 2006. The revised act explicitly states that the family cannot amend or revoke donation,
expressed by the donor. This was not embodied in the UAGA of 1987. There is no national
registry in place although several states maintain donor registries.
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A.2. Reimbursement of living donors
Australia: The legislations of Austrialian Capital Territory, South Australia, New South
Wales, Tazmania, Northern Territory and Western Australia state that the reimbursement of
any expenses necessarily incurred by a person in relation to the removal of tissue shall be per-
mitted. The legislations of Victoria and Queensland do not explicitly state the reimbursement
of expenses incurred by the donor.
Belgium: Section 4(2) of the Law of 13 June 1982 on the removal and transplantation of
organs states that the compensation of living donor covers both the cost and the loss of income
that are directly connected with the transfer of organs.
Canada: Canada does not have a national compensation or reimbursement policy for living
donors. However few provinces established reimbursement programs for living donors. In July
2006, The British Columbia initiated the ﬁrst Living Organ Donor Expense Reimbursement
Program (LODERP). LODERP reimburses travel expenses up to $1500, accommodation up
to seven nights hotel accommodation at a maximum of $125/night, parking up to ten days
at a maximum of $12/day and $25/day for meals post surgery for up to seven days. Loss of
Income Subsidy is only provided when all other sources of funding have been exhausted and
for a maximum of 50 percent of the living organ donor's weekly net income to a maximum
of $350/week. In April 2008, Ontario and Manitoba initiated similar programs to reimburse
expenses of living organ donors.
Finland: Section 18 of Law No. 101 of 2 February 2001 on the use of human organs and
tissues for medical purposes states that the donor of an organ or tissue who suﬀers lack of
income for a whole day because of removal of an organ or tissue to meet a vital transplantation
need or for essential related tests and examinations, and does not get paid or receive corre-
sponding compensation for this period, is entitled to a daily allowance as provided concerning
daily allowance in the Sickness Insurance Act no. 364 of 1963.
France: According to Decree no.2000-409 of 11 May 2000 on the reimbursement of expenses
incurred during the removal of elements or the collection of products of the human body for
therapeutic purposes, the health care establishment that carries out the removal of the kidney
shall compensate the living donor for the cost of transportation, cost of accomodation and loss
of earnings.
Germany: Section 17(1) of Donation, Removal and Transplantation of Organs Act of 1997
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states that the payment or acceptance of an appropriate compensation for the measures neces-
sary to achieve the objective of the treatment regime especially for the removal, preservation,
the further processing including measures to prevent infection, the storage and transport of the
organs shall be permitted. However, the act does not deﬁne the content of such compensation
for living donors.
Israel: Section 22 of the Law of 24 March 2008 states that the MoH is the deciding authority,
subject to the approval of the Parliament Committee, on a ﬁxed sum of compensation of the
living donor for loss of income, leave of absence, life insurance and psychological treatment.
Japan: Section 11(6) of Law No. 104 of 16 July 1997 on organ transplantation states
that reimbursement for the costs of communication and correspondence, expenditure incurred
during removal, the storage or transportation of organs intended for transplantation, or trans-
plantation itself, or the ordinary costs inevitably involved in the donation or acceptance of
organ donation intended for transplantation or in acting as an intermediary with a view to
donation or the acceptance of the donation of such organs shall be allowed.
Luxemburg: Articles 16 and 17 of the Law of 25 November 1982 state that the transfer of
any substance should be free without prejudice to the reimbursement of lost income and all
expenses incurred by the donor.
Morocco: Article 5 of the Law of 25 August 1999 on the donation, removal and transplan-
tation of human organs and tissues states that the human organ donation cannot, in any case
or any way, subject of remuneration except for the costs related interventions required by the
removal and transplantation or organs and hospital expenses incurred therein.
Netherlands: Section 2 of the Organ Donation Act of 24 May 1996 states that costs,
including expenses and loss of income, incurred by the donor as a direct result of organ
removal shall be reimbursed.
Poland: Section 18(2) of the Law of 26 October 1995 on the removal and transplantation
of cells, tissues, and organs states that the reimbursement of expenditure actually incurred
in connection with the removal, storage, transportation, processing, and transplantation of
cells, tissues, and organs from a living donor or a deceased person shall not constitute mone-
tary compensation or a beneﬁt, breaching section 18(1) of the act concerning prohibitions in
commercial dealings.
Spain: Article 2 of the Law No. 30 of 30 October 1979 states that under no circumstances
will exist any ﬁnancial compensation to the donor or recipient. However such compensation
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is not onerous for the living donor or the family of the deceased.
UK: The Human Tissue Act of 2004 states that the costs incurred by living organ donors
shall be reimbursed by the NHS and the reimbursement does not constitute a reward for
organ donation, breaching section 32 of the Act. The reimbursement scheme consists of tax-
exempt personal expenses (e.g. travel costs) and loss of earnings. For employed living donors,
the reimbursement of loss of earnings following donation are paid of net income and are not
taxable. For self-employed living donors, the reimbursement is paid on gross income and are
taxable. Non-employed or retired living donors are reimbursed only for personal expenses and
are not liable for tax.
US: At the Congressional level, two bills have been (re)introduced at the 111th Congress
to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a nonrefundable personal credit
to individuals who donate certain life-saving organs (H.R.218) and to amend the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 and title 5, US Code, to allow leave for individuals who provide living
organ donations (H.R.2776). At the state level, the following states have enacted legislation
to compensate living donors either in the form of a tax deduction or a paid leave of absence
or both.
Arkansas: HB.1393 enacted on March 9, 2005. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax deduc-
tion which may be claimed for only travel expenses, lodging expenses, lost wages and medical
expenses. HB.1289 enacted on March 20, 2003. The legislation allows for a maximum 7 days
of paid leave of absence to state employees for bone marrow donation and a maximum of 30
days paid leave of absence for organ donation.
California: AB.1825 enacted on September 25, 2002. The legislation allows for a maximum
of 5 days of leave of absence for bone marrow donation and a maximum of 30 days paid leave
for organ donation.
Colorado: Colorado Statutes 24-50-104 enacted on May 18, 1998. The legislation allows
state employees for up to 2 days of paid leave for organ, tissue or bone marrow donation.
Delaware: SB.45 enacted on July 9, 2001. The legislation allows state employees and
teachers 30 days of paid leave for organ donation and 7 days of leave for bone marrow donation.
Georgia: HB.1410 enacted on April 29, 2004. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax deduc-
tion. HB.1049 enacted on April 24, 2002. The legislation allows for 7 days of paid leave of
absence to state employees for bone marrow donation and a maximum of 30 days of paid leave
for organ donation.
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Idaho: SB.1373 enacted on July 1, 2006. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax credit, 30
days paid leave of absence for state employees to donate an organ and 5 working days leave
of absence for bone marrow donation.
Illinois: HB.0411 enacted on August 2, 2002. The legislation allows for 30 days paid leave
of absence for organ or bone marrow donation.
Indiana: HB.1030 enacted March 28, 2002. The legislation allows a state employee 30 days
paid leave of absence to serve as an organ donor and 5 days leave for bone marrow donation.
Iowa: HF.801 enacted on May 12, 2005. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax deduction.
HB.381 enacted on August 28, 2003. The legislation allows state employees a maximum of 30
workdays of paid leave of absence and a maximum of 5 workdays of leave for bone marrow
donation.
Louisiana: SB.26 enacted on June 29, 2005. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax deduction.
Maryland: SB.17 enacted on May 11, 2000. The legislation allows all employees 30 days
paid leave of absence to serve as an organ donor and 7 days paid leave to serve as a bone
marrow donor.
Massachusetts: Chapter 149 (Section 33E) of the General Laws of Massachusetts amended
on September 29, 2005. The legislation allows a state employee to take a maximum of 30 days
of paid leave to serve as an organ donor.
Minnesota: HF.785 enacted on July 14, 2005. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax deduc-
tion. Minnesota Statute 181.945 enacted in 1990 allows paid leave of absence up to 40 work
hours to serve as a bone marrow donor.
Mississippi: HB.1512 enacted on March 23, 2006. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax
deduction. SB.2639 enacted on July 1, 2004. The legislation allows state employees for up to
30 days of paid leave of absence to serve as an organ or a bone marrow donor.
Missouri: HB.679 enacted on July 6, 2001. The legislation allows state employees 5 work-
days paid leave to serve as a bone marrow donor and 30 workdays paid leave to serve as an
organ donor.
New Mexico: HB.105 enacted on April 5, 2005. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax
deduction.
New York: AB.372 enacted on August 16, 2006. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax
deduction. AB.4138 enacted on August 29, 2001. The legislation allows state employees 30
days paid leave of absence to serve as an organ donor and 7 days paid leave to serve as a bone
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marrow donor.
North Dakota: HB.1474 enacted on March 14, 2005. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax
deduction. SB.2298 enacted on April 20, 2005. The legislation allows employees a maximum
of 20 workdays paid leave of absence to serve as an organ donor or a bone marrow donor.
Ohio: HB.119 enacted on June 30, 2007. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax deduction.
HB.326 enacted on Jul 10, 2001. The legislation allows state employees 240 hours of paid leave
to serve as an organ donor and 56 hours of paid leave to serve as a bone marrow donor.
Oklahoma: SB.806 enacted on May 25, 2007. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax deduc-
tion. SB.1628 enacted on May 8, 2002. The legislation allows state employees 30 workdays
paid leave of absence to serve as an organ donor and 5 workdays to serve as a bone marrow
donor.
South Carolina: SB.830 enacted August 6, 2002. The legislation allows state employees
30 workdays of paid leave to serve as an organ donor.
Texas: HB.89 enacted on May 29, 2003. The legislation allows for 30 days paid leave to
donate an organ and ﬁve days for bone marrow donation.
Utah: SB.164 enacted on March 21, 2005. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax credit.
SB.125 enacted on April 8, 2002. The legislation allows employees 30 days of paid leave for
organ donation and 7 days of leave for bone marrow donation.
Virginia: HB.1642 enacted on March 26, 2001. The legislation allows state employees up
to 30 days of paid leave to serve as a bone marrow or organ donor.
West Virginia: SB.240 enacted on May 11, 2005. The legislation allows state employees
120 hours of paid leave to serve as an organ donor and 56 hours of paid leave to serve as a
bone marrow donor.
Wisconsin: AB.477 enacted on January 30, 2004. The legislation allows a $10,000 tax
deduction. AB.545 enacted on May 9, 2000. The legislation allows state employees 30 days of
paid leave for organ donation and 7 days of leave for bone marrow donation.
Similar legislations that allow $10,000 tax deduction are being considered in California,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucy, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and
Washington.
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Australia: The criminal provisions in Australia vary by state/territory.
Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales & Tasmania: According to Trans-
plantation and Anatomy Act No. 44 of 1978, a person who enters into a contract or arrange-
ment under which a person agrees, for valuable consideration whether given or to be given
to himself or to another person, to sell or supply tissue from his body or from the body of
another person, before or after death, is subject to a maximum ﬁne of 500 Australian dollars.
The exact provision in New South Wales (Human Tissue Act No. 164 of 1983) sets a ﬁne of
400 Australian dollars and/or an imprisonment term of 6 months. The exact provision in Tas-
mania (Human Tissue Act 1985) sets a ﬁne of 500 Australian dollars and/or an imprisonment
of 3 months.
Northern Territory: According to Human Tissue Transplant Act of 1995, a person who
enters, agrees to enter, oﬀers to enter, holds himself out as being willing to enter or inquires
whether a person is willing to enter into a contract or arrangement under which a person agrees,
for valuable consideration whether given or to be given to himself or to another person, to sell
or supply tissue from his body or from the body of another person, before or after death, is
subject to a ﬁne of 500 Australian dollars or an imprisonment term of 3 months.
Queensland: According to the Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979, a person who;
buys, agrees to buy, oﬀers to buy, holds himself out as being willing to buy or inquires whether a
person is willing to sell to the person or another person; tissue, tissue being organ, blood or part
of a human body or a substance extracted from, or from a part of the human body; or the right
to take tissue from the body of another person is punishable by 1,000 Australian dollars and/or
6 months imprisonment; sells, agrees to sell, oﬀers to sell, holds himself out as being willing
to sell or inquires whether a person is willing to buy from the person or another person; tissue
or the right to take tissue from the body of another person is punishable by 500 Australian
dollars; publishes or disseminates by newspaper, other periodical, book, broadcasting, tv or
other means, exhibit to public view an advertisement related to buying tissue or the right to
take tissue from the bodies of persons unless the minister approval are subject to a ﬁne of 500
Australian dollars and/or an imprisonment of 3 months.
South Australia & Western Australia: According to Transplantation and Anatomy
Act 1983, a person who; enters into a contract or arrangement under which a person agrees,
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for valuable consideration whether given or to be given to himself or to another person, to
sell or supply tissue from his body or from the body of another person, before or after death,
is subject to a ﬁne not exceeding 5,000 Australian dollars. The exact provision in Western
Australia (Human Tissue and Transplant Act No. 116 of 1982) sets a ﬁne of 1,000 Australian
dollars; publishes or disseminates by newspaper, other periodical, book, broadcasting, TV or
other means, exhibit to public view an advertisement related to selling or buying in Australia of
tissue or of the right to remove tissue from the bodies of persons unless the minister approval
is subject to a ﬁne of 5,000 Australian dollars. The exact provision in Western Australia
(Human Tissue and Transplant Act No. 116 of 1982) sets a ﬁne of 500 Australian dollars
and/or imprisonment of 3 months.
Victoria: According to Human Tissue Act No. 9860 of 1982 Section 38, a person who; sells
or agrees to sell, tissue (including his own tissue) or the right to take tissue from his body is
subject to a ﬁne of 500 Australian dollars; buys, agrees to buy, oﬀers to buy, holds himself out
as being willing to buy, or inquires whether a person is willing to sell to the person or another
person tissue or the right to take tissue from the body of another person is subject to a ﬁne
of 1,000 Australian dollars and/or an imprisonment term of 6 months.
Austria: Section 62A paragraph 4 and section 62C of the Federal Law No. 273 of 1
June 1982 state that body parts or organs of deceased persons may not subject to monetary
transactions. A person who contravenes section 62A is subject to a ﬁne of 30,000 Schilling
(approx. 2180 Euros). The provision is not applicable if the sale or the purchase of organs or
tissues occurred abroad.
Belgium: Articles 17 of the Law of 13 June 1986 states that parties involved in the removal
of organs for proﬁt are punishable by a prison sentence of three to 12 months or a ﬁne of 1000
to 10,000 Euros or both. Article 18 further states that in case of recurrence of such acts within
ﬁve years from the date of the ﬁnal court order, the sentence shall be doubled.
Brazil: Article 14 Section 1 of the Law No. 9434 of 4 February 1997 on the removal of
organs, tissues, and parts of the human body for the purposes of transplantation and treatment
states that removing tissues or parts of the body of a person in return for payment or promise
of reward is punishable by a ﬁne and an imprisonment term of 3 to 8 years. If the person
is a living whose organs, tissues or parts of the body are removed and the oﬀence results in
disability for work, incurable disease, loss of function, permanent deformity or abortion, then
the penalty is an imprisonment term of 4 to 12 years. If the crime results in the death of the
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living person, then the penalty is an imprisonment term of 8 to 20 years.
Bulgaria: According to Article 349a of the Penal Code, a person who violates the rules
concerning the removal and transplantation of organs in exchange of monetary gain is subject
to an imprisonment term of 3 to 5 years. Article 40a of the Law of 30 July 2003 on the
transplantation of organs, tissues, and cells states that advertising organs, tissues and cells to
search for material beneﬁt or providing material beneﬁt for supplying organs, tissues and cells
under article 6 is subject to a ﬁne of between 20,000 and 40,000 Leva. Article 41 of the Law
of 2003 further states whoever operates on an international exchange of organs, tissues and
cells in breach of the provisions of this Act is punishable by a ﬁne of 100,000 to 500,000 Leva
unless subject to a severer punishment.
Canada: Sections 15-16 of the Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act of 1990 state that
a person who buys or sells or otherwise deal in, directly or indirectly, any tissue, body or
body part for the purpose of a transplant or for a therapeutic purpose, medical education
or scientiﬁc research is subject to a ﬁne not exceeding 100,000 Canadian dollars and/or an
imprisonment term not exceeding 1 year.
China: Until 2006, China did not have any rules and regulations governing the sale of
human organs. On 27 March 2006, The Chinese Ministry of Health issued a temporary regu-
lation banning the sale of human organs. The regulation states that; any physician found to
be involved in human organ trading will have their license revoked; clinics will be suspended
from doing transplants for at least three years; ﬁnes will be imposed at between eight to ten
times the value of the trade; hospitals are banned from performing transplants to foreigners
under medical tourism and medical staﬀ will not be allowed to perform transplants abroad.
However, the regulation does not stipulate expressly the prohibition of removal of organs from
executed prisoners.
Czech Republic: Section 29 of the Transplant Act No.285 of 30 May 2002 stipulates an
imprisonment term of up to 2, 4 or 8 years. The provisions stipulate a prohibition of medical
practice and are applicable if the sale or the purchase of organs or tissues occurred abroad.
Denmark: Section 20 paragraph 3 of the Law No. 402 of 13 June 1990 on the inquest, au-
topsy and transplantation states that anyone who makes or receives payment or other economic
beneﬁt of the removal or transfer of tissues and other biological material to the treatment is
punishable by a ﬁne. The provisions are not applicable if the sale or the purchase of organs
or tissues occurred abroad.
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Estonia: Section 3 of the Transplantation of Organs and Tissues Act of 30 January 2002
states that oﬀering reward or seeking ﬁnancial gain for the donation of organs or tissues is
prohibited, and is punishable pursuant to this Act and the Penal Code (RT I 2001, 61, 364;
2002, 86, 504; 105, 612) by a ﬁne and an imprisonment term not exceeding 1 year. The
provisions are not applicable if the sale or the purchase of organs or tissues occurred abroad.
Finland: Section 25 of Law No. 547 of 11 May 2007 amending Law No. 101 of 2 February
2001 on the use of human organs and tissues for medical purposes does not expressly stipulate
the magnitude of pecuniary sanctions but states that anyone who intentionally pay for the
removal of organs, tissues or cells is punishable by a ﬁne, unless more severe penalty for the
oﬀense is provided elsewhere in the Finnish law.
France: The Law No.2004-800 of 2004 states that any person obtaining one of another's
organs for a payment of any form is punishable by a ﬁne of 100,000 euros and an imprisonment
term of 7 years. The same penal provision applies to cases in which the organ is obtained
abroad.
Georgia: Article 52 of the Law of 2000 on taking of human organs, parts of organs, tissues
and their usage prohibits organ trading but does not specify criminal sanctions.
Germany: Article 18 of the Donation, Removal and Transplantation of Organs Act of
1997 states that a person who trades in organs or removes, transplants organs or has an organ
transplanted to him/herself is punishable by a ﬁne and an imprisonment term not exceeding
5 years. Repeat oﬀending is punishable by an imprisonment term from 1, up to 5 years.
Pursuant Section 49, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code, in the case of organ donors whose organs
have been the object of prohibited trade, and in the case of organ recipients, the court shall
be entitled to remove the punishment or may reduce the punishment at its discretion. The
provisions are applicable if the sale or the purchase of organs or tissues occurred abroad.
Greece: Article 20 of the Law No. 2737 of 1999 states that a person who; receives or agrees
to receive a monetary gain for giving his organs for a transplant is punishable by a ﬁne of at
least 2,000,000 Drachma ; receives or oﬀers to receive human tissues or organs for a monetary
gain is punishable by at least 1 year imprisonment. When the organ or tissue is acquired for
sale, the penalty is an imprisonment term of at least 3 years and a ﬁne of 10,000,000 Drachma.
Hong Kong: Section 4 of Human Organ Transplant Bill of 1992 states that a person
who; makes or receives any payment to supply or oﬀer to supply an organ from a dead or
living person to be transplanted to another person on Hong Kong or elsewhere; seeks to ﬁnd
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a person willing to supply or oﬀers to supply an organ for payment; initiates, negotiates any
arrangement involving any payment for the supply of or oﬀer to supply an organ; causes to
be published or distributed or knowingly publishes or distributes an advertisement inviting
persons to supply or to receive an organ for payment is, upon a ﬁrst conviction, a ﬁne of 10,000
Hong Kong dollars and upon a subsequent conviction, a ﬁne of 25,000 Hong Kong dollars and
an imprisonment term of 1 year.
Iceland: Iceland does not have speciﬁc provisions prohibiting the sale and purchase of
organs. However, Article 15 of the Act No.110 on Biobanks of 2000 states that biological
samples (includes organs and tissue) shall be acquired for clearly deﬁned and lawful purposes,
and not used for other purposes whose violation is punishable by pecuniary penalties or an
imprisonment term not exceeding 3 years. Article 14 further states that the Ministy may
revoke the licence of those who do not comply with the Act.
India: Article 19 of Transplantation of Human Organs Act No.42 of 1994 states that
whoever; makes or receives any payment for the supply of, or for an oﬀer to supply, any
human organ; seeks to ﬁnd a person willing to supply for payment any human organ; oﬀers to
supply any human organ for payment; initiates or negotiates any arrangement involving the
making of any payment for the supply of, or for an oﬀer to supply, any human organ; publishes
or distributes or causes to be published or distributed any advertisement, inviting persons to
supply for payment of any human organ is punishable by an imprisonment term between 2 to
7 years and by a ﬁne between 10,000 and 20,000 Rupees.
Iraq: According to Section 3 of the Decree No.698 of 1986 of the Revolutionary Command
Council promulgating Law No.85 of 1986 on the Transplantation of Human Organs, persons
involving in the sale and purchase of organs in any form are punishable by an imprisonment
term not exceeding one year and/or a ﬁne not exceeding 1000 Dinars. The same punishment
scheme applies to physicians who proceed with a transplant knowingly that organs have been
subject to commercialization.
Ireland: Ireland does not have legal provisions prohibiting the sale and purchase of organs.
However, the medical council may prohibit medical practice.
Israel: Law of 24 March 2008 on Organ Transplantation prohibits receiving or giving
remuneration for an organ removed during life or after death. However, section 29 of the law
does not prohibit payment of funeral expenses.
Italy: Article 411 of the Criminal Code stipulates an imprisonment term of 2 to 7 years.
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Articles 482, 483 of the Criminal Code stipulate an imprisonment term of 6 to 12 years if
the removal of organs is from a living donor. The provisions are applicable if the sale or the
purchase of organs or tissues occurred abroad.
Japan: Article 20 of the Law No. 104 of 16 July 1997 on organ transplantation in ac-
cordance with article 11 prohibiting organ traﬃcking states that a person who; accepts or
requests a ﬁnancial beneﬁt as monetary compensation in exchange for giving or having given
organs, or for serving or having served as an intermediary for organ donation for the purposes
of transplantation or for accepting such a donation or concludes an agreement to this end;
provides or proposes a ﬁnancial beneﬁt as monetary compensation in exchange for agreeing
or having agreed to donate organs, or for agreeing or having agreed to act as an intermediary
for organ donation for the purposes of transplantation or for accepting such a donation, or
concludes an agreement to this end; removes such organs or uses them for the purposes of
transplantation knowingly that the organs are associated with an act that contravenes the
provisions is subject to a ﬁne of 500 million Yen and/or an imprisonment term.
Kuwait: Articles 7 and 10 of the Decree-Law No.55 of 20 December 1987 on organ trans-
plantation state that persons who sell or buy organs in any fashion or obtains any material
beneﬁt in relation, including physicians who proceed with a transplant knowingly that organs
have been subject to commercialization are punishable by a ﬁne not exceeding 3000 Dinars
and/or an imprisonment term not exceeding three years. The penalty is doubled if repeat
oﬀending occurs within two years following the ﬁnal judgment of the ﬁrst oﬀence.
Lebanon: Section 7 of the Decree No.109 of 16 September 1983 on the removal of human
tissues and organs for therapeutic and scientiﬁc purposes states that any form of compensation
provided in relation to the donation of tissues and organs (of living donors) is punishable by
a ﬁne between 1000 and 10000 Lebanese Pounds and/or an imprisonment term between 1 to
12 months.
Luxemburg: Article 18 of the Law of 25 November 1982 states that unless subject to more
severe penalties enacted by any other laws, whoever makes or accepts a payment shall be
punished by imprisonment from eight days to three years or a ﬁne of 2,501 to 200,000 francs
or both.
Morocco: Article 30 of the Law of 25 August 1999 on the donation, removal and trans-
plantation of human organs and tissues states that however proposes, through any means,
remuneration except for the costs related interventions required by the removal and trans-
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plantation or organs and hospital expenses shall be subject to an imprisonment term of 2 to
5 years and a ﬁne of 50,000 to 100,000 dirhams.
Netherlands: Section 32 of Organ Donation Act of 24 May 1996 states that a party who
openly oﬀers payment or who puts himself forward as a donor in return of such payment
is subject to an imprisonment term of 1 year or a fourth-category ﬁne (11,250 euros). The
provisions are not applicable if the sale or the purchase of organs or tissues occurred abroad.
New Zealand: Section 56 of the Human Tissue Act No.28 of 2008 states that a person
who intentionally or knowingly requires or accepts, or oﬀers or provides ﬁnancial or other
consideration for human tissue is subject to a ﬁne not exceeding 50,000 New Zealand dollars
or an imprisonment term not exceeding 1 year.
Norway: Section 14 of Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 on transplantation, hospital autopsies,
and the donation of cadavers amended by Law No. 31 of 8 June 2001 states that anyone
who makes a decision regarding the removal of any organs except subject to the condition
prescribed by the act is punishable by ﬁne, unless the case is punishable under stricter penal
prohibitions. The provisions are not applicable if the sale or the purchase of organs or tissues
occurred abroad.
Pakistan: Section 11 of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Ordinance
No. XLIII of 2007 states that whoever; makes or receives any payment for the supply of,
or for an oﬀer to supply, any human organ; seeks to ﬁnd a person willing to supply for
payment of any human organ; oﬀers to supply any human organ for payment; initiates or
negotiates any arrangement involving the making of any payment for the supply of, or for
an oﬀer to supply any human organ; takes part in the management or control of a body
of persons, whether a society, ﬁrm, or company, whose activities consist of or include the
initiation or negotiation of any arrangement; publishes or distributes or causes to be published
or distributed any advertisement, inviting persons to supply for payment of any human organ;
oﬀering to supply any human organ for payment; or indicating that the advertiser is willing to
initiate or negotiate any arrangement is subject to a ﬁne of up to one million Rupees (approx.
$ 12,492) and an imprisonment term up to 10 years. Before 2007, there was no prohibition of
trading in human organs.
Panama: The Law no.52 of 12 December 1995, regulating the transplantation of organs
and anatomical parts does not explicitly stipulate a penalty against the commercialization of
human organs and tissues. However, articles 8-9 prohibit remuneration or compensation for
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organs or anatomical parts intended for transplantation or other therapeutic purposes and the
exportation organs, anatomical parts, or organic ﬂuids for proﬁt-making purposes. Article 108
in accordance with articles 8-9 of the Law states that anyone violating the provisions of the
Act are punishable by a ﬁne of up to 5,000 Balboas, suspension or cancellation of license and
temporary or permanent shut-down of the establishment.
Poland: Sections 19 and 20 of the Law of 26 October 1995 on the removal and trans-
plantation of cells, tissues, and organs state that any person who; advertises for the sale or
purchase, or for a mediatory service aimed at the sale or purchase, of cells, tissues, or organs
for the purposes of transplantation is subject to a ﬁne of 5,000 Zloty (approx. 1,120 euros);
for proﬁt-making purposes, buys or sells cells, tissues, or organs from other persons, acts as
an intermediary for their purchase or sale, or takes part in the transplantation of cells, tis-
sues, or organs from living or deceased persons, obtained in violation of the law is subject to
an imprisonment term of 3 to 10 years. The provisions are not applicable if the sale or the
purchase of organs or tissues occurred abroad.
Romania: Article 17 of the Law of 8 January 1998 on the removal and transplantation
of human tissues or organs states that organizing, removing and transplantation of human
organs and tissues with the aim of making proﬁt through the sale and purchase of organs or
tissues is subject to an imprisonment term between 3 to 7 years.
Singapore: Section 14 of the Human Transplant Act No.15 of 10 June 1987 states that a
person who; enters into a contract or arrangement for valuable consideration, whether given
or to be given to himself or to another person, to the sale or supply of any organ or blood
from his body or from the body of another person, whether before or after his death or the
death of the other person is subject to a ﬁne not exceeding 10,000 Singapore dollars and/or an
imprisonment term not exceeding 12 months; issues or causes to be issued any advertisement
relating to the buying or selling in Singapore of any organ or blood or of the right to take any
organ or blood from the body of a person is subject to a ﬁne not exceeding 10,000 Singapore
dollars and/or an imprisonment term not exceeding 12 months. On 19 January 2009, The
Human Organ Transplant (Amendment) Act is introduced in parliament which stipulates a
higher ﬁne of 100,000 Singapore dollars and a higher imprisonment term of up to 10 years.
South Africa: Human Tissue Act no.65 of 20 May 1983 did not have an explicit prohibition
against trading of human organs, however Section 34 of the Act stated that any person who
acquires, uses or supplies a body of a deceased person or any tissue, blood, gamete of a living
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or deceased person in any other manner or for any other purpose than that permitted by the
act is subject to a ﬁne not exceeding 2000 Rand and/or an imprisonment term not exceeding
1 year. Penal provisions against trading of human organs and tissues have been updated by
section 60, subsections 4-5 of the National Health Act no.61 of 2003 which state that a person
who; receives any form of ﬁnancial or other reward for donating tissue, a gamete, blood or
a blood product, except for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred by him or her to
provide such donation; sells or trades in tissue, gametes, blood or blood products is liable on
conviction to a ﬁne and/or an imprisonment term not exceeding ﬁve years.
Switzerland: Article 69 of the Federal Law No. 810.21 of 2004 on the transplantation of
organs, tissues and cells states that a person who trades human organs, tissues or cells, or
remove and transplant human organs, tissues or cells in or from Switzerland or abroad for
monetary or any other gain not pursuant article 7 of the Law, is subject to an imprisonment
term and a maximum ﬁne of 200,000 Swiss francs. If the oﬀender is a health professional,
he/she is punishable by a maximum ﬁne of 500,000 Swiss francs and an imprisonment term of
at most 5 years. The oﬀender is punishable by a maximum imprisonment term of 6 months
and a ﬁne of at most 100,000 Swiss francs if acted through negligence.
Turkey: Article 15 of the Law No.2238 of 29 May 1979 on the Removal, Storage and
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues states that those who buy, sell, intermediate and
commercialize organs and tissues are subject to a ﬁne between 50,000 and 100,000 Turkish
Liras and an imprisonment term between 2 and 4 years unless the act stipulates a higher
penalty. Pecuniary penalties of this law have been increased 786 times in accordance with the
Law no.4421 of 1999.
UK: Section 32 of Human Tissue Act of 2004 states that a person who; gives or receives a
reward for the supply of, or for an oﬀer to supply, any controlled material; seeks to ﬁnd a person
willing to supply any controlled material for reward; oﬀers to supply any controlled material for
reward; initiates or negotiates any arrangement involving the giving of a reward for the supply
of, or for an oﬀer to supply, any controlled material; takes part in the management or control of
a body of persons corporate or unincorporate whose activities consist of or include the initiation
or negotiation of such arrangements are subject to a ﬁne not exceeding the statutory maximum
and/or an imprisonment term not exceeding 12 months on summary conviction, and subject
to a ﬁne and/or an imprisonment term not exceeding 3 year on conviction on indictment.
US: Section 16 of the UAGA of 2006 states that a person that knowingly, for valuable
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consideration, purchases or sells a part for transplantation or therapy if removal of a part from
an individual is intended to occur after the individual's death is subject to, upon conviction,
a ﬁne not exceeding 50,000 US dollars and/or an imprisonment term not exceeding 5 years.
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